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FOREWORD
HONORABLE GILES

S.

RICH

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Habits are hard to break, especially the collective habits of a
profession wherein all of the members constantly reinforce each
other in the habit and see no need for change. And so it was for a
century or more in the patent law prior to the Patent Act of 1952.
The habit was to say that to be patentable, an invention, in
addition to being new and useful, had to be the result of
"invention," not merely the result of the skill "possessed by an
ordinary mechanic acquainted with business." This so called
"requirement of invention" appears to have originated in, or
at
least to have been established by, the Supreme Court's opinion in
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,' the now classic "door knob" case wherein
the only difference from what was known was the making of the
knob per se from clay or porcelain instead of metal or other
material. The majority affirmed the lower court holding of
unpatentability, saying that "[t]he difference is formal, and
destitute of ingenuity or invention."2 There was, even then, a
strong dissenting opinion by one justice.
In any event, the "invention" requirement became firmly
established in the ensuing years. Toward the end of a century
after Hotchkiss, however, in the late 1940's, considerable
dissatisfaction developed with the test due to two factors: the
vagueness of the test and a growing anti-patent sentiment in the
courts. The vagueness of the test made it very easy for a judge to
hold an invention unpatentable simply by saying he did not
believe it amounted to an invention.
In the late 40's a number of bills were introduced in Congress
with a view to getting a more satisfactory test, as by defining
"invention," which the Supreme Court had once said was a term
that was undefinable, or adopting one or more of the many
"negative tests for invention" that had been developed by the
text
writers, etc. The organized patent bar at that time consisted of
about two dozen local patent law associations based in larger cities
in addition to the nation-wide American Patent Law Association
and the ABA's PTC section.
One of the larger local organizations was the New York
Patent Law Association which had a Patent Law and Practice
Committee which closely followed legislation. I happened to be
Chairman of it at the time. We considered the pending bills and
decided they lacked merit and undertook to draft a proposal of our
1. 52 U.S. 248 (1850).
2. Id. at 266.
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own. I made the suggestion that one of the problems was the word
"invention" itself and that in stating a new statutory requirement
for patentability we should avoid its use. We drafted a substitute
for one of the pending bills the wording of which I can no longer
recall but it had in it the basic thoughts of present § 103. It got
into the stream of numerous proposals which were organized by
P. J. Federico of the Patent Office for the House Patents
Subcommittee into the first draft of the bill which became the
1952 Patent Act. In his first draft, known as the "Committee
Print," present § 103 was § 23.
On the day before the House Subcommittee brought out the
Federico draft, the organized bar had created its "Coordinating
Committee" (CC) with a two-man drafting committee, of which I
was one. The mission of the CC was to assist the House and to see
to it that any codification of Title 35, which they had proposed,
met with the approval of the patent bar.
I recall that my first act as a member of the drafting
committee on that first day of activity by the CC was to take a poll
of the two dozen or so patent lawyers present, asking them bluntly
whether or not they favored putting into the statute the
requirement for invention or some other provision, such as
Federico's § 23, to take its place. At the time, of course, there was
nothing in the statutes on that judge-made requirement. The vote
was in favor of inclusion by a healthy majority but far from
unanimous. Some lawyers, it seems, like having uncertainty in
the law. In about two years time Congress passed a new Title 35
in which we have since had § 103, which this work by George
Sirilla is all about.
This book-length article tells you so much about all aspects of
the statutory non-obvious requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 103,
including many things I have said about it and forgotten, but
which George has recorded for your benefit, that I will say no more
except to tell you a couple of personal anecdotes which stick in my
mind which fit into the story of long delays in establishment of the
new "third requirement."
After my two year stint on the CC, helping to write the new
patent statutes which came into effect in 1953, in 1956 I became a
judge on the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) whose
primary work then was hearing appeals from the Patent Office. In
the beginning, I found I was working on cases in which the
decision under review had been made before 1953.
Shortly,
however, I began to note that post-1953 decisions were still getting
the same treatment-by attorneys, the Patent Office, and my
court, "lack of invention." At a conference one day, I undertook to
point out that there was no longer an "invention" requirement in
the law, that the issue now was obviousness. "I don't understand,"
said one of my colleagues. "I thought that if it was an invention it
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was patentable." Habit, and not atypical in the judiciary! And not
surprising in view of the arguments we continued to get in briefs
and oral argument-years after the new statute became effective,
officially but not in reality.
One other example. About ten years after the enactment of
the 1952 Patent Act, a visitor came to my chambers who happened
to be one of the instructors in the Patent Office Academy wherein
the new members of the examining corps are trained. "You might
be interested in knowing," he volunteered, "that we have decided
you are right and are sweeping 'invention' under the rug."
Gratifying, and better late than never!
It was indeed a long haul of reeducation to break the old
habits of thought. George Sirilla not only has kept the diary on it
in what I believe to be a unique fashion, but he has also provided
analysis and guidelines including model jury instructions, findings
of fact and conclusions of law that are applicable to determinations
under 35 U.S.C. § 103. His work should prove to be a useful
reference for the judiciary as well as the patent practitioner since,
according to a recent survey, obviousness is still the most popular
and the most successful defense in patent litigation. Further, no
one would question that it is still the most common rejection made
by patent examiners.
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I. INTRODUCTION
No one can doubt that patent litigation has changed
dramatically since the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit was established in October 1982.' Prior to that
time only a handful of reported patent damage awards exceeded
one million dollars.4 Even fewer awards exceeded ten million
dollars. None even came close to one hundred million dollars.
Since that time, however, we have seen patent damage awards of
$873,158,971' and $211,499,731,' to say nothing of the numerous
other awards between 50 and 200 million dollars.7
But, in another way, it can be said that patent litigation has
remained the same even after the creation of the Federal Circuit
Court of Appeals. For the patent owner to prevail when the
patented invention is attacked as obvious, the asserted patent
claim must still include at least one claimed difference over the
closest prior art reference.8 Although that claimed difference may
seem obvious or slight in isolation, this is not the test. Rather, the
statutory test is whether the claimed subject matter, taken as a
whole, would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art
at the time the invention was made. 9 While the heavy burden of
proving invalidity by clear and convincing evidence" rests on the
defendant" the plaintiff can enhance the prospects of winning the
validity issue by establishing through objective evidence the
existence of so-called "secondary considerations," sometimes also
called indicia of unobviousness. Secondary considerations include,
for example, a long-felt need for the claimed invention, prior
unsuccessful attempts of others, commercial success, widespread
use of the invention (e.g., licensing or infringement) in the
industry, and access and copying by the defendant.
The 1952 enactment of § 103 of Title 35, United States Code,
also deserves a large part of the credit for the current strength of
3. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, §§ 101-02,

96 Stat. 25.
4. George M. Sirilla et al., The Advice of Counsel Defense to Increased
PatentDamages, 74 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 705, 706 n.7 (1992).
5. Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1711, 1714 (D.
Mass. 1991).
6. Haworth, Inc., v. Steelcase, Inc., 43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1223, 1224 (W.D. Mich.
1996).

7. Sirilla et al., supra note 4, at 708 n. 10.
8. According to a recent survey, the most popular ground for attacking the
validity of a patent and for invalidating patents is obviousness under 35
U.S.C. § 103. John R. Allison et al., EmpiricalEvidence on Patent Validity, 26
AIPLA Q. J. 185, 208, 210 (1998).
9. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1994) (emphasis added).
10. See, e.g., Glaverbel Soci(td Anonyme v. Northlake Mktg. & Supply, Inc.,
45 F.3d 1550, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Greenwood v. Hattori Seiko Co., 900 F.2d
238, 241 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
11. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1994).
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our patent system. 12 In the words of Judge Giles S. Rich, one of
the authors of that section, it is "the heart of the patent system
and the justification of patent grants."1 3 I doubt that any
knowledgeable member of the patent community in this country
today would seriously take issue with that 1972 characterization
of § 103. Indeed, if anything, the last twenty-five years have fully
confirmed it.
The present work will examine the development of the law to
the point where it is now understood that your best chance to have
a patented invention upheld as unobvious is to have not only a
claimed difference over the closest prior art reference, but also
objective evidence of one or more of the "secondary considerations,"
mentioned above; and that, within certain limits, the stronger
such objective evidence, the more difficult it will be for the patent
challenger to prove that the claimed invention was obvious. Of
course, the court will also have to determine the level of "ordinary
skill in the art" and measure the inventive contributions by that
skill in determining the question of unobviousness. In other
words, strong secondary considerations, alone, will not necessarily
and automatically transform a claimed difference over the closest
prior art into a patentable and, therefore, unobvious invention if
the level of skill in the art demonstrates that the claimed subject
matter would have been obvious.
However, even if the claimed difference may seem slight or
trivial in isolation, it may have been the very reason why the
claimed invention, as a whole, succeeded where others failed.
While there is no definition in § 103 of what specific criteria or
method should be used to determine the obviousness of the
claimed invention, case law development has recognized objective
evidence of "secondary considerations"'4 as a way to help the Court
decide that issue; that is, the issue of whether the claimed
difference(s) over the prior art is (or are) "such that the subject
matter as a whole [would not have been] obvious at the time the

12. Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 is entitled "Conditions for
patentability; non-obvious subject matter," and part (a) reads:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in § 102 of this title, if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art
to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
13. Giles S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the "Invention"Requirement, 1 AM.
PAT. L. ASS'N Q. J.26, 26 (1972) [hereinafter Rich, Laying the Ghost.
14. See Robert W. Harris, The Emerging Primacy of "Secondary
Considerations"as Validity Ammunition: Has the Federal Circuit Gone Too
Far?, 71 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 185 (1989).

1999]

Obvious Patent Hall-of-Famers

invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to
5
which said subject matter pertains.",
The non-obviousness standard or condition for patentability
of § 103, however, was long in coming. It has its roots in Thomas
Jefferson's 1791 complaint that too many patents were being
sought on trifles. He, therefore, proposed at that time amending
the 1790 Patent Act to add, as a defense to a patent, that the
invention "is so unimportant and obvious that it ought not be the
subject of an exclusive right."'"
As we near the golden anniversary of § 103, let us take a close
look at this now healthy, mature and adult creature, namely, nonobviousness as a condition of patentability, and examine its
tortuous odyssey through three centuries. That odyssey began
with Thomas Jefferson's 18th century desire; then followed a
journey to a 19th century conception in the Supreme Court, in its
1850 Hotchkiss v. Greenwood decision,' 7 that led to a century-long
gestation period culminating in a difficult labor in the 20th
century. Then, thanks to the skill and unflagging zeal of the legal
"physicians," Judge Learned Hand and Judge Giles S. Rich, that
labor concluded in a successful delivery in 1952, a recovery in
early teens from an inherited, chronic "invention" addiction, the
development of sound and healthy criteria for determining
nonobviousness and, finally, the healing of a pernicious and near
fatal "synergism" virus.
To that end, this work will consider:
(1) a representative district court decision and representative
jury instructions exemplifying the manner mandated by the
Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit for determining
obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
(2) the historical
background of the standard of
unobviousness 8 and the development of case law in the

15. Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
16. 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1788-1792, 279 (Paul
Leicester Ford ed., G.P. Putnam's Sons 1895) [hereinafter WRITINGS]. See
Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 403
(1960) [hereinafter Rich, Principles]. See also Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co.
v. United States, 320 U.S. 1, 61 n.1 (1943); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 8-9 (1966).
17. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1850).
18. Prior to the enactment of the 1952 Patent Act, there was no standard
that was uniformly applied by the courts to determine whether the claimed
subject matter of a patent was patentable over prior art, let alone a standard
of nonobviousness. Rather, courts determined the validity of a patent by
focusing the inquiry on whether there was "invention" without giving
consideration to any objective evidence of unobviousness. See generally Rich,
Laying the Ghost, supra note 13.
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United States Supreme Court and lower federal courts prior
to the enactment of the Patent Act of 1952;
(3) the legislative history, surrounding circumstances, and
the "Congressional intent" behind the Patent Act of 1952,'9
and in particular, § 103;
(4) the contributions of Judge Learned Hand's decisions that
stressed the importance of looking at the objective evidence of
unobviousness. Those decisions were handed down both
before and after the 1952 Patent Act, and included a
landmark 1955 decision 0 that anticipated the Supreme
Court's later 1966 interpretation of § 103 in Graham v. John
Deere Co.;21 and last, but not least,
(5) the contributions of Judge Giles S. Rich to the drafting
and enactment of § 103; and his subsequent indispensable
and invaluable role as a judge on the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals and its successor, the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.
In that capacity, he promulgated the
standard of non-obviousness in his opinions.
He also
educated the PTO, the bench and the bar in his speeches and
published articles. Indeed, one of his speeches in 1964
provided the basis for the much-needed and long-sought
criteria adopted and mandated by the Supreme Court in 1966
for resolving the issue of unobviousness or not under § 103.
II. HOW THE

NON-OBVIOUSNESS STANDARD OF §

103 Is

DECIDED

TODAY
Before beginning an examination of the historical roots of §
103, it might be useful to consider a representative district court,
bench trial case decided under that statutory provision, and also
representative jury instructions, exemplifying the manner
mandated by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals for determining the unobviousness of a patented
invention.
A.

The Exemplary Case of Haworth, Inc., v. Steelcase, Inc.,

The district court bench trial case we will examine is
Haworth, Inc., v. Steelcase, Inc.," a case where there was at least
19. See Giles S. Rich, CongressionalIntent-Or Who Wrote the PatentAct of

1952, in NONOBVIOUSNESS-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY
1:1 (John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980) [hereinafterRich, CongressionalIntend.
20. Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 224 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 350 U.S. 911 (1955).
21. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).

22. 867 F.2d 615 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (reversing a holding of no infringement
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one claimed difference over the closest prior art, coupled with
strong secondary considerations, an important combination for a
determination of non-obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
The two Haworth patents in that case related to portable wall
panels having a pre-wired power system in the base." They were
used to divide office space into so-called work stations that were
designed to be conveniently mechanically and electrically
connected together, or disassembled and rearranged, in different
configurations, as office needs changed, without requiring the
services of a licensed electrician or the use of code-prohibited
extension cords. 4
1.

The Standards Governing the Obviousness Inquiry

At the trial, Steelcase attacked the asserted patent claims as
invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103, contending that the claimed subject
matter would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the
art at the time the inventions were made." At the beginning of
Judge Richard A. Enslen's analysis of the validity issue, he made
the following statement about the obviousness inquiry, based on
controlling Federal Circuit authority.
The Federal Circuit had recently summarized the appropriate
standards governing the obviousness inquiry in Uniroyal, Inc., v.
26
Rudkin-Wiley Corp.
In that case, the court held:
Obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is a legal conclusion involving a
preliminary determination of four factual inquiries: (1) the scope
and content of the prior art; (2) the differences between the claims
and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art;
and (4) secondary considerations, if any, of non-obviousness.
Secondary
considerations
include
objective
indicia
of
nonobviousness such as commercial success, long-felt but
unresolved need and failure of others.27
As support for that statement of the appropriate standards in
the Uniroyal case, the Federal Circuit cited the 1966 Supreme

and affirming a holding of enforceability; the lower court's holding that the
patents were not proven invalid was not appealed).
23. Id. at 1426.
24. Id. The litigation resulted in a final damage award for Haworth on
those patents of over 200 million dollars. Haworth, Inc., v. Steelcase, Inc., 43
U.S.P.Q.2d 1223 (W.D. Mich. 1996). In a later suit on the same patents
against a different defendant, the same court deemed the Haworth patents
"highly successful pioneer... patents." Haworth, Inc., v. Herman Miller, Inc.,
37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1080, 1094 (W.D. Mich. 1994). That case and other claims
against the rest of the industry based on the same patents netted Haworth
settlements worth another 100 million dollars.
25. Haworth, Inc., v. Steelcase, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 1422, 1432 (W.D. Mich.
1998).
26. 837 F.2d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
27. Haworth,685 F. Supp. at 1433.
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Court decision, Graham v. John Deere C0.28 In that case, the
Supreme Court laid down the following four steps as the criteria or
basic factual inquiries to be considered in resolving the
obviousness issue under 35 U.S.C. § 103:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be
determined; differences between the prior art and the claims at

issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or
nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined.
Such
secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but
unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light

to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter
sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness,
these inquiries may have relevancy.2
In a speech given almost two years before Graham v. John
Deere Co. was decided, Judge Rich suggested essentially the same
four-step methodology for considering obviousness under § 103:
[T]he following potential issues of fact appear: (1) What are the
differences between "the invention" and "the prior art"? (2) What is

disclosed by the prior art presumed to have been available to the
inventor? (3) What was the level of ordinary skill in the art at the
time the invention was made? (4) Other fact issues relating to
circumstances indicative of the presence or absence of obviousness,
traditionally taken into account in determining "invention," such as
long-felt need, immediate copying, sudden displacement of existing
practices or devices, difficulty of achievement, failure of others, etc.
What this key four step analysis or criteria did was to provide
a much needed specific methodology for courts to arrive at a
judgment as to whether or not a claimed invention meets the
requirements of § 103; a judgment that would be as free as
possible from the objectionable use of hindsight and the subjective,
personal views or philosophies of individual jurists. P.J. Federico,
then an Examiner-in-Chief at the U.S. Patent Office, and one of
the drafters of § 103 along with Judge Rich, offered the following
prophetic comments in 1952.
28. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
29. Id. at 17-18 (citation omitted).

30. Giles S. Rich, The Vague Concept of "Invention"As Replaced By Sec. 103
of the 1952 PatentAct, 46 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 855, 872 n.36 (1964) [hereinafter
Rich, The Vague Concept of "Inventioni. It might be noted that in his step (1),
Judge Rich refers to determining "the differences between 'the invention' and
'the prior art'." His reference to "the invention" obviously means the claimed
invention. In Graham v. John Deere Co., the Supreme Court describes that
same step as the "differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are
to be ascertained." 383 U.S. at 17. The similarity between the four steps or
criteria enunciated by the Supreme Court in 1966 and earlier by Judge Rich in
1964 is unmistakable. How this came about will be explained later in this
work.
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The problem of what is obvious and hence not patentable is still of
The statute does not purport to
necessity one of judgment.
categorize the particular criteria according to which the judgment is
to be exercised, in fact, the Revision Note under § 103 indicates that
the section would also serve as a basis for the3 addition at a later
out. '
time of some criteria which may be worked
a. The Scope and Content of the Prior Art; and Differences
Between the Claims at Issue and the Prior Art
Let us return to the Haworth case, and see how Judge Enslen
applied this four-step criteria in reaching the conclusion that the
claimed inventions were not obvious. He first determined the
scope and content of the prior art and then ascertained the
differences between the claims at issue and the prior art.32 For
example, he made the following statement about how two of the
asserted claims distinguished over Siegal, the closest prior art:
"Siegal teaches the use of flexible cords and conventional electrical
components to accomplish handed electrical connections between
Claims 5 and 29 of the '008 patent specify a
adjacent panels ....
non-handed connection."33
b.

Level of Ordinary Skill in the Art

On the question of how to determine the level of ordinary skill
in the art, to help resolve the obviousness issue, Judge Enslen
again cited and followed controlling Federal Circuit authority:
Several factors must be considered in determining the level of
ordinary skill in the art. These include: (1) the educational level of
the inventor; (2) the type of problems encountered in the prior art;
(3) prior art solutions to those problems; (4) the rapidity with which
innovations are made; (5) the sophistication of the technology; and
(6) the educational level of active workers in the field.
Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil of California, 713 F.2d
693, 696-97 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Orthopedic Equipment Co. v. All
Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., 707 F.2d 1376, 1381-82 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
Applying that standard to the evidence in the trial record,
Judge Enslen described a person of ordinary skill in the art in
question as follows:
Persons devising panel pre-wiring in the mid 1970's required no
specialized training in pre-wiring of office divider panels. They
would have needed some basic understanding of electrical and

31. P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1, 23
(1954) (published with the original 1952 edition of 35 U.S.C.A.).
32. Haworth, 685 F. Supp. at 1435-37.
33. Id. at 1436.
34. Id. at 1434.
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mechanical engineering, but would not have needed advanced
training in either field.
They needed to have only a basic
understanding of general wiring and electrical component skills. In
designing such a system, they would have studied commercially
available products and literature, used the National Electric Code
as a design guide, consulted with Underwriters Laboratories and
other code personnel to insure that their designs would receive
approval and then redesign their system accordingly until the
distribution and safety problems were solved a5
c. Secondary Considerations and the Requirement for a Nexus

Turning to the fourth step for determining obviousness or not,
namely, secondary considerations, Judge Enslen noted first that
the patent owner must establish a nexus between the claimed
invention and the evidence offered on secondary considerations: "A
nexus is required between the merits of the claimed invention and
the evidence offered, if the evidence is to be given substantial
weight enroute [sic] to conclusion on the obviousness issue."06
He went on to describe the principal secondary considerations
as follows:
The principal "secondary considerations" which support findings of
non-obviousness are: (1) whether the invention was commercially
successful; (2) whether the invention represented a solution to a
previously unsolved, but recognized problem in the industry; and (3)
whether others had tried to devise a solution to that problem and
failed. See, e.g., Alco Standard Corp. v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
808 F.2d 1490, 1500 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman
Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Stratoflex
Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d at 1538-40.7
He then observed the Federal Circuit's mandates that "'prior
art, however, cannot be evaluated in isolation, but must be
considered in light of the secondary considerations bearing on
obviousness.'... Thus evidence rising out of the so-called
'secondary considerations' must always when present be considered
"
en route to a determination of obviousness. 01
As we will see later in this work, Learned Hand had
consistently cautioned against the danger, indeed, the error, of
evaluating the patented invention and the prior art in isolation
from the surrounding contemporaneous circumstances (i.e.,
secondary considerations) that led to the patented invention and
the infringement. Stated differently, he believed the prior art
should not be evaluated through hindsight and in isolation, using
35.
36.
1539
37.
38.

Id. (citation to the record omitted).
Id. at 1437 (quoting Stratoflex, Inc., v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530,
(Fed. Cir. 1983)).
Haworth, 685 F. Supp. at 1437.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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the patented invention as a guide to judging whether the claimed
difference(s) over the prior art would have been obvious.
Again citing and following the Federal Circuit, Judge Enslen
in the Haworth case rejected the use of hindsight and required
something in the prior art as a whole to suggest the claimed
modifications to the prior art that are now asserted to have been
obvious:
The obviousness standard, while easy to expound, is sometimes
difficult to apply. It requires the decisionmaker to return to the
time the invention was made. "The invention must be viewed not
with the blueprint drawn by the inventor, but in the state of the art
that existed at the time.... That which may be made clear and
thus 'obvious' to a court, with the invention fully diagrammed and
aided..." by experts in the field, "may have been a breakthrough of
substantial dimension when first unveiled." Interconnect Planning
Corp. v. Feil, 774 F.2d 1132, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 1985).. . . When prior
art references require selective combination by the court to render
obvious a subsequent invention, there must be some reason for the
combination other than hindsight gleaned from the invention itself."
Interconnect Planning Corp., 774 F.2d at 1143.... Something in
the prior art as a whole must suggest the desirability, and thus the
Lindemann
obviousness,
of making the combination.
Maschinenfabrik Gmbh v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d
1452, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
After considering the evidence, Judge Enslen concluded that
Haworth's evidence had "demonstrated the proper nexus between
the claimed invention and the secondary considerations it
advances. "4 0 That evidence included:
(1) That "[tihe need to develop a non-handed, pre-wired office panel
was well-known in the industry at the time the Haworth invention
was made."4'
(2) That: this shows only that the problems were well understood in
the office furniture industry. It does not show that anyone,
including Steelcase, was able to devise an acceptable solution to
these problems before the Haworth inventors did ....

[Steelcase]

was unable to devise a method
for pre-wiring42 those panels until
•
.
after the Haworth invention was on the market.
(3) and that: [i]n short, the long recognized need in the industry for
a panel system similar to the one devised by Haworth, as well as the
commercial success Haworth's panel system had when it was
introduced... indicate to this Court that the invention, while it
incorporated well-known design choices to solve problems long

39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 1433.
Id. at 1437.
Id.
Haworth, 685 F. Supp. at 1437-38.
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recognized in the industry, represented an innovation which no one,
prior to the Haworth inventors, had been able to devise. Thus, I
find that Steelcase has failed to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the innovations disclosed in the Haworth patents
would have been obvious to one reasonably skilled in the art at the
time the invention was made. I conclude, therefore, that the
patents in suit are not rendered obvious by the prior art cited by
Steelcase, and are thus not invalid.43
d. It is not the Magnitude of the Claimed Difference over the
Prior Art, but the Claimed Invention "As a Whole" that Must be
Considered
A close look at the Haworth case, therefore, demonstrates
that Judge Enslen strove to observe and did, indeed, observe the
requirements laid down by the Federal Circuit for determining
whether or not the claimed invention had been shown by the
alleged infringer to be directed to obvious subject matter under 35
U.S.C § 103."+ Of particular interest, as to the claimed difference
(over the closest prior art) of non-handed electrical connections, he
stated:
Steelcase argues that non-handedness was an obvious design choice,
as opposed to a patentable innovation. While the concept of the nonhanded electrical connections was well known in the relevant time
period, the method for translating concept to reality was not.
Haworth provided the first pre-wired, non-handed office panel. It
thus achieved what others had not. The means by which it
accomplished this goal is not [an obvious] design choice .......
Hence, in comparing the differences between the prior art and
the claims at issue, Judge Enslen specifically rejected the notion
that the invention be equated with the claimed difference over the
art, and held that:
[Ilt is improper.., to consider the difference as the invention. The
"difference" may have seemed slight (as has often been the case with
some of history's great inventions, e.g., the telephone), but it may
also have been the key to success and advancement in the art
resulting from the invention....
Hence the statute, the law
established not by judges but by Congress, requires that the
invention as claimed be considered "as a whole" when considering
whether that invention would have been obvious when it was made.
35 U.S.C. § 103."

43. Id. at 1438.

44. On appeal, Steelcase did not seek reversal of the district court's ruling
on validity. Haworth, Inc., v. Steelcase, Inc., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1251, 1252 (Fed.
Cir. 1989).
45. Haworth, Inc., v. Steelcase, Inc., 685 F. Supp. at 1436 n.18.
46. Jones v. Hardy, 727 F.2d 1524, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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ProposedFindings of Factand Conclusions of Law on the
Obviousness Issue for a Bench Trial

In the Haworth case, Judge Enslen had required the parties
to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law before
the trial began. Selected portions of the proposed findings of fact
and the proposed conclusions of law submitted by Haworth and
directed to the obviousness issue, are provided at the end of this
work, as Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively, for the
convenience of the reader.
C. Sample Instructionson the Obviousness Issue for a Jury Trial
In a jury trial, even though the ultimate question of
obviousness or not under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is a question of law, the
parties and the court may ask the jury to decide that question, or
the jury may be asked to decide only disputed factual issues that
underlie the ultimate determination of nonobviousness.47
In a jury trial, whether the court or jury decides the ultimate
legal question of obviousness, the jury will still have to decide, as
factual matters, the four steps or criteria, discussed above in the
Haworth case. That is, the jury will have to be instructed to
determine from the evidence at trial the following factual matters:
(1) the scope and content of the prior art relied upon by the alleged
infringer; (2) the differences between the asserted patent claims
and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art;
and (4) any secondary considerations of non-obviousness; as well
as the existence of a causal connection or nexus between any such
secondary considerations and the claimed invention.
If the jury is to decide the ultimate obviousness question,
then it will have to decide, after making those factual
determinations whether the claimed invention, as a whole, would
have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the pertinent art
at the time the invention was made. Hence, the jury will have to
be given appropriate instructions about not using hindsight, about
not evaluating the patented invention and the prior art in
isolation, about the necessity for evaluating secondary
considerations, and about the need for carefully looking at the
prior art to determine whether it suggests the modification(s)
necessary to make this claimed combination.
The American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA)
has published a "Guide to Jury Instructionsin PatentCases."48 For

47. See, e.g., Newell Cos. v. Kenny Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 764 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (stating that "it is not error to submit the question of obviousness to the
jury"); accordConnell v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
48. AMERIcAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, GUIDE TO JURY
INSTRUCTIONS IN PATENT CASES 25-29 (1990) [hereinafter GUIDE TO JURY
INSTRUCTIONS].
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the convenience of the reader, the AIPLA's instructions on
obviousness that relate to the case where the jury makes the
ultimate determination of obviousness or not under 35 U.S.C. §
103, including the four step analysis described above, are
appended hereto, in their entirety, as Appendix C.49
1. Level of OrdinarySkill
The AIPLA's model jury instructions identified the following
factors to be considered in determining the level of ordinary skill
in the pertinent art:
(1) the educational level of the inventor;
(2) the types of problems encountered in the art;
(3) the prior art patents and publications;
(4) the activities of others;
(5) prior art solutions to the problem encountered by the
inventor;
(6) the sophistication of the technology; and
(7) the education of others working in the field. 0
2. Secondary Considerations
The AIPLA's model jury instructions contain the following
statements on secondary considerations:
Before reaching your conclusion as to whether the defendant has
established the obviousness you must consider the following
evidence which may tend to negate defendant's evidence of
obviousness: (use only the applicable)
1. Commercial success of products covered by the patent in
suit due to the merits of the invention and not other factors
such as advertising;
2. A long-felt need in the art which was satisfied by the
invention of the patent in suit;
3. The failure of others to make the invention;
4. Copying of the invention by others in the field;
5. Unexpected results achieved by the invention;
6. Praise of the invention by the infringer or others in the
field;
7. The taking of licenses under the patent by others;
8. Expressions of disbelief by experts and those skilled in the
art; and
49. And, for the further convenience of the reader, appended hereto as
Appendix D are selected jury instructions from 4 Leonard B. Sand et al.,
Modern Federal Jury Instructions § 86.03 (1995), which relate to a jury's

determination of the four-step analysis, where the court will decide the
ultimate legal question of whether the claimed invention was obvious.
50. GUIDE TO JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 48, at 27 (citations omitted).
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9. The patentee proceeded contrary to accepted wisdom of
prior art.

You must be satisfied there is a causal connection between the
evidence showing the existence of one or more of the listed facts and
the claimed invention.
For example, if you conclude that
commercial success is due solely to advertising, promotion,
salesmanship or the like, or is due to features of the product other
than those claimed in the patent in suit, then it is not established
that commercial success has a relation to the invention itself and
should weigh
against defendant's evidence on the question of
,51
obviousness."

3. Cautions Against Use of Hindsight and the Obvious- to-Try
Test
The AIPLA's model jury instructions caution against the use
of hindsight and an "Obvious-to-Try" test:
The question of nonobviousness is simple
to ask, but difficult to answer. A person of ordinary skill in the art
is presumed to have knowledge of the relevant prior art at the time
of the patentee's invention. If you find the available prior art shows
each of the elements of the claims in suit, you must determine
whether it would then have been obvious to a person of ordinary
skill in the art to combine or coordinate these elements in the same
manner as the claims in suit. The difficulty that attaches to all
honest attempts to answer this question can be attributed to the
strong temptation to rely on hindsight while undertaking this
evaluation. It is wrong to use the patent in suit as a guide through
the maze of prior art references, combining the right references in
the right way so as to achieve the result of the claims in suit."
OBVIOUSNESS-HINDSIGHT.

OBVIOUS TO TRY. The evidence might indicate to you that what the

inventors did was obvious to try. If so, this does not necessarily
indicate the patent is invalid for obviousness. "Obvious to try" is not
the standard. The standard is whether the invention as a whole
would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the field to which
the invention pertains at the time the invention was made. 3
You are instructed that
when you consider the prior art, whether in the form of writings,
physical exhibits, or patents, you must consider them for what they
actually disclose to one of ordinary skill in the art, and no more.
You cannot use hindsight to assemble the invention from parts
made up of individual elements of the prior art devices, nor can you
reconstruct any of the prior art devices or materials unless obvious
STATE OF THE ART-CANNOT USE HINDSIGHT.

51. Id. at 27-28 (citations omitted).
52. Id. at 28 (citations omitted).
53. Id. (citations omitted).
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to one of ordinary skill in the art to do so. 54

III.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE NON-OBVIOUSNESS
STANDARD OF § 103

We will now examine the historical background leading up to
the currently applied § 103 patentability standards discussed in
the preceding section.
A.

The Acts of 1790 and 1793 and Earle v. Sawyer

The earliest reference to a standard of patentability55 in the
United States appears to be in the patent statute of 1790, which
simply required the "invention" to be "sufficiently useful and
important."' 6 This vague standard was abandoned
in 1793 in favor
5 7
of a standard requiring only novelty and utility.
In the earliest reported patent decision found where the
expression "obvious" to "one of ordinary skill" appears, the court
essentially rejected the notion that, under the 1793 Act, anything
more was needed for patentability than novelty and utility. That
was the case of Earle v. Sawyer.5 8
In that case, Circuit Justice Story denied a motion for a new
trial after the jury found the plaintiffs patent valid and infringed

and awarded damages in the amount of $300." The invention
involved substitution of a circular saw for the perpendicular saw

54. Id. at 29 (citations omitted).
55. The standardof patentability itself has no Constitutional footing. The
Constitutional grant to Congress of the power to confer patents does not
provide any such standard. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. There is merely a
reference to the objective to be realized by the patent system. Rich, The Vague
Concept of "Invention",supra note 30, at 861 n. 14a (reprint of speech delivered
by Rich when he accepted the Kettering Award in 1963). The Kettering
Award, named for the famous inventor, was given annually for some years by
the Patent, Trademark and Copyright Institute of the George Washington
University.
56. Patent Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109. Then Secretary of
State, Thomas Jefferson, headed the three-of person agency empowered by the
statute to issue patents. Jefferson was bothered by the fact that too many
patents were being sought on frivolous or trifling devices, so he proposed a
legislative change that would deny patents on inventions that were
'unimportant and obvious." WRITINGS, supranote 16, at 279.
57. As noted by the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co.:
Although the Patent Act was amended, revised or codified some 50
times between 1790 and 1950, Congress steered clear of a statutory set
of requirements other than the bare novelty and utility tests
reformulated in Jefferson's draft of the 1793 Patent Act.
383 U.S. 1, 10 (1966).
58. Earle v. Sawyer, 8 F. Cas. 254 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825) (No. 4,247).
59. Id. The plaintiffs counsel in Earle v. Sawyer are identified simply as
"Bliss and Webster." Id. at 254. It cannot be determined from the report
whether the "Webster" was Daniel Webster.
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in plaintiffs prior art shingle manufacturing machine. 60 One of
the challenged jury instructions was "[t]hat if any man makes or
constructs
a machine, which is new and useful, he is entitled to a
6
patent. 1
The defendant argued that there had to be more, namely, an
"invention," for the patent to be sustained. He submitted evidence
that the substitution of a circular saw for a perpendicular saw in
plaintiffs old machine "was so obvious to mechanics, that one
62 of
ordinaryskill... could scarcely fail to apply it in [that] mode."
But the court rejected that evidence and the related argument
that the 1793 Act required the court to undertake a "mode of
reasoning upon the metaphysical nature, or the abstract definition
of an invention." 63 Rather, in upholding the verdict of validity and
the jury instruction that only novelty and utility are required,
Judge Story reasoned: "If it is new, if it is useful, if it has not been
known or used before, it constitutes an invention within the very
terms of the act, and, in my judgment,
within the very sense and
64
intendment of the legislature."
In spite of Earle v. Sawyer, courts thereafter began to
recognize and require "invention" as a third element, in addition to
novelty and utility, for a patent to be upheld. As we will see, the
result was that a vague standard of "invention" was applied to
invalidate patents in a large number of decisions. In many of
those cases, the stated reason for invalidating the patent was that
the patented subject matter did not rise to the level of "invention,"
65 But first,
or did not involve the exercise of the inventive
66 faculty.
Greenwood.
v.
the seminal case of Hotchkiss
60. Id. at 254.
61. Id. at 255.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Earle, 8 F. Cas. at 255.
64. Id. 256. As support for rejecting a requirement for a third element
beyond novelty and utility, namely, some mental steps amounting to an
invention not obvious to one of ordinary skill, Justice Story cited English law
precedent:
How, indeed, can it be possible, that an English court should deem some
intellectual labour, beyond the novelty of the combination, necessary for
a patent, when it is the acknowledged law of England (different in that
respect from our own), that the first importer of an invention, known
and used in foreign parts, may be entitled to a patent as the inventor in
England? What of intellect is employed in the mere importation of a
known machine? An inventor, in the sense of the English law, is the
first maker, or constructor, or introducer, in England.
Id.
65. The use of the term "invention" to denote a new device or apparatus as
well as to articulate the standard used to determine the validity of patents
was an unfortunate development that led to much confusion, as discussed in
later sections of this work. See also Rich, Laying the Ghost, supra note 13.
66. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1850). The case is commonly
known as "the door knob case." See Rich, Laying the Ghost, supra note 13, at
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B. The Periodfrom 1850 to 1891
1.

The Hotchkiss Decision

In Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, perhaps its most important early
decision relating to patents, the Supreme Court accepted a jury
instruction that required more than novelty and utility to sustain
the patent. The patent in that case was for a more durable and
cheaper door knob made of clay. 7 Although the material used in
the construction of the new door knob was not a brand new
material, it was attached to a shank and spindle structure like
that used in prior door knobs that were constructed from metal or
wood. 8 The jury in the lower court had struck down the patent.
In the Supreme Court's review, a particular jury instruction was
at issue.69
The Supreme Court did not cite any case law precedent to
support the standard of patentability embodied in that instruction.
Nevertheless, the Court upheld it and struck down the patent,
noting that the material (clay) used in the new door knob and the
manner of construction of the new door knob were well-known and
in prior use in the United States. The "knob of clay was simply
the substitution of one material for another."" Thus, the Court
was of the opinion that the use of clay may merely "afford evidence
of judgment and skill in the selection and adaptation of the
materials in the manufacture of the instrument for the purposes
intended, but nothing more. 71
In striking down the patent, the Supreme Court accepted a
third requirement for patentability, in addition to novelty and

29.
67. Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 251-52.
68. Id. at 252.
69. The lower court had instructed the jury as follows:
[If the knobs of the same form and for the same purposes as that
claimed by the patentees, made of metal or other material, had been
before known and used; and if the spindle and shank, in the form used
by them, had been before known and used, and had been attached to the
metallic knob by means of a cavity in the form of dovetail and infusion of
melted metal, the same as the mode claimed by the patentees, in the
attachment of the shank and spindle to their knob; and the knob of clay
was simply the substitution of one material for another, the spindle and
shank being the same as before in common use.., and no more
ingenuity or skill required to construct the knob in this way than that
possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, the
patent was invalid, and the plaintiffs were not entitled to a verdict.
Id. at 264-65 (emphasis added). The plaintiffs claimed that the instruction
was erroneous, and one for which a new trial should be granted. Id. at 265.
In rejecting the plaintiffs agreement, the Supreme Court merely accepted the
test that the trial court had adopted.
70. Id. at 265.
71. Id. at 266.
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utility, namely, passing the challenged instruction's skill-of-"an
ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business"-test:
[uInless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method of
fastening the shank and the knob were requiredin the application of
it to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary
mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of that
degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of
every invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the
skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor.72
The Court, however, provided no methodology or criteria to be
applied by the courts to determine whether the improvement was
within the province of the "ordinary mechanic." Furthermore, it
ignored the patent owner's arguments about the difficulties
encountered in trying to attach the clay door knob to the iron
shank and spindle, and about the commercial success of the clay
door knob (secondary considerations).73 And, in contrasting the
"work of the skillful mechanic," on the one hand, to that of "the
inventor," on the other hand, the Supreme Court was inviting
future courts to equate "invention" with the exercise of more skill
than that possessed by "an ordinary mechanic" in that art. In
accepting that invitation, courts in subsequent patent cases
seemed to focus first on a requirement for "invention" or the
"exercise of the inventive faculty," and, then, depending on
whether or not that requirement was met, the court would decide
whether the patented invention was obvious to one skilled in the
art. In other words, while "invention" was treated as synonymous
with something that was not obvious to one of ordinary skill in the
art, it was still the principal, if not the only, test or standard that
was applied. But, since the term "invention" is so broad, covering
by its dictionary definition any product of the imagination,"4
virtually any new "art, machine, manufacture or composition of
matter" could qualify as an invention under that definition.
With such an amorphous, vague and ambiguous test, one
could easily predict the confusing state of the law of patent
validity that followed in the wake of Hotchkiss.
In his dissent in Hotchkiss, Justice Woodbury rejected any
inquiry into the amount of skill and ingenuity involved in creating
72. Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 267 (emphasis added). At the time of this
decision, the applicable patent statute was the "Act Creating the Patent
Office" passed July 4, 1836, 5 Stat. 117. Section 6 of that act provided that a
patent may be granted to "any person... having discovered or invented any
new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." Id. § 6
(emphasis added).
73. Id. at 254-55.

74. See, e.g., Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1188 (1986)
(including among its definitions of "invention": "a product of creative
imagination or fertile wit," "an act of mental creation or organization:
application of knowledge" and "a product of thought or mental synthesis").
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the patented invention. He observed that: "the true test of [the
new invention] being patentable was, if the invention was new,
and better and cheaper than what preceded it."' "'
This was
essentially the same test that had been adopted in the lower
circuit court opinion that Hotchkiss reversed. Justice Woodbury
cited Earle v. Sawyer for the propositions (1) that the combination
is patentable if new, even though it may be simple and obvious,
and (2) that the mental process by which it was conceived is of no
consequence.76
The Hotchkiss decision, although decided almost one hundred
and fifty years ago, has never been overruled. It contained the
seeds, if not the embryo, of the later statutory provision for a
standard of non-obviousness, independent of any test of
"invention," and played an important role in the subsequent
construction and interpretation of § 103 by the judiciary.
A major theme in this work is that the Supreme Court has
been at best uneven in its treatment of patents and the standard
of non-obviousness (or "invention") prior to the 1952 Patent Act. A
study of the history of the high Court's cases reveals periods of
leniency followed by periods of hostility toward patents, as well as
many years when the Court's attitude toward patents vacillated,
with the test of "invention" providing a convenient "nose of wax"
that could be twisted and shaped to fit whichever way the court
wanted to rule on patentability in a particular case.
Understandably, this led to confusion among the lower courts and
in the patent community at large.
2.

19th Century Cases after Hotchkiss

a. The Birth of the "Inventive Genius" Test
In Reckendorfer v. Faber," a case decided twenty five years
after Hotchkiss, but also under the 1836 patent statute, the
invention involved the combination of a pencil with a rubber
eraser. Expanding the suggestion in Hotchkiss, the Court drew
the following distinction between invention and mechanical skill:
"An instrument or manufacture which is the result of mechanical
skill merely is not patentable. Mechanical skill is one thing;
invention is a different thing. Perfection of workmanship, however
much it may increase the convenience, extend the use, or diminish
expense, is not patentable.""8
The Court then sought to clarify this distinction further by
introducing an "inventive genius" test: "The distinction between

75. Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 268.
76. Id. at 269-70.
77. Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. 347 (1875).
78. Id. at 356-57 (emphasis added).
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mechanical skill, with its conveniences and advantages and
inventive genius, is recognized in all the cases.""
The Court
adopted this language, which implies such an imposing and severe
requirement, despite the fact that Hotchkiss v. Greenwood made
no reference to any such criterion. 8°
b. The Emergence of "Secondary Considerations"; Commercial
Success, Long Felt Need and Failure of Others
In Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co.,8 a case decided a
year after Reckendorfer, it is believed that the Supreme Court for
the first time embraced what it would later call "secondary
considerations" or "indicia of obviousness or non-obviousness." 82
The patent in Smith v. Goodyear Dental related to dentures set in
rubber.83 The common practice until then had been the use of
metallic fixtures. 84 The Court upheld the patent, describing the
invention as "an object long and earnestly sought," which "had
been a subject for frequent discussion among dentists and in
scientific journals. " 85 The decision also recognized the commercial
success of the invention by noting that
"when revealed [the
86
invention's] value was soon recognized."
In contrast to the strictness it had displayed in the
Reckendorfer case, the Court placed importance on these factors,
later called "secondary"87 considerations, and went on to say: "The
evidence also shows that [the invention] has wrought a revolution
in dental practice, and that many thousands of operators are using
79. Id. at 357 (emphasis added).
80. Some 66 years later, however, although citing Hotchkiss, the Supreme
Court suggested a "flash of creative genius" test for patentability. Cuno Eng'g
Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 90-91 (1941).
81. Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486 (1876).
82. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966).
These
secondary considerations or indicia of unobviousness include long-felt need for
the invention, failure of others to satisfy the need, copying by others, and
commercial success. See Note, Subtests of "Nonobviousness"."A Non-technical
Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1964). Judge Learned
Hand also referred to these factors as "indicia of nonobviousness," or
"signposts" of patentable invention. See Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501
(2d Cir. 1960); Lyon v. Bausch Lomb Optical Co., 224 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1955).
These cases are discussed in detail below.
83. Goodyear Dental, 93 U.S. at 490.
84. Id. at 494.
85. Id. at 495 (emphasis added).
86. Id.
87. The word "secondary" is placed in quotes because, as later articulated
by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, the so-called secondary considerations are not really
"secondary," but must be examined in every case as part of the determination
of obviousness or not. See, e.g., Stratoflex, Inc., v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d
1530 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (Markey, C.J.): In re Khelghatian, 364 F.2d 870
(C.C.P.A. 1966) (Rich, J.).
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it in preference to older devices."88
Thus, such "secondary"
considerations were deemed probative evidence in determining
whether there was "invention" and, therefore, a valid patent.
Later in the same year, in Dunbar v. Myers, the Supreme
Court invalidated a patent for sawing lumber on the ground of
lack of "invention."89 There the Court held that the new device did
not constitute "invention" because "change of form, proportions, or
degree" and "mere carrying forward of an original patented
conception" were not sufficient for patentable inventions.90
Then, five years later, the Court seemed to favor patents
again. In Loom Co. v. Higgins,9' the Court upheld a patent "for
improvements in looms for weaving pile fabrics." 92 Writing for the
Court, Justice Bradley rejected the attack on the patent:
But it is plain, from the evidence and from the very fact that it was
not sooner adopted and used, that it did not, for years, occur in this
light to even the most skillful persons. It may have been under their
very eyes, they may almost be said to have stumbled over it; but
they certainly failed to see it, to estimate its value and to bring it
into notice.... At this point we are constrained to say that we
cannotyield our assent to the argument, that the combination of the
different parts or elements for attaining the object in view was so
obvious as to merit no title to invention. Now that it has succeeded,
it may seem very plain to any one that he could have done it as well.

This is often the case with inventions of the greatest merit. It may
be laid down as a general rule, though perhaps not an invariable
one, that if a new combination and arrangement of known elements
produce a new and beneficial result, never attained before, it is
evidence of invention [,] ... and we think that the combination of
elements by which this was effected, even if those elements were
separately known before, was invention sufficient to form the basis
of a patent.93
Thus, the language in Loom not only showed the influence of
such "secondary considerations" as long-felt need and the failure of
others in determining obviousness or non-obviousness, but also
criticized the use of hindsight to determine whether the patented
88. Goodyear Dental,93 U.S. at 495.
89. Dunbar v. Myers, 94 U.S. 187 (1876).
90. Id. at 199. The so-called "aggregation of old elements" patents have
fueled controversies resulting in many inconsistent decisions by the Supreme
Court as well as lower courts. See, e.g., Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc. 425 U.S. 273
(1976) (holding patent for water flush system for cleaning cow barn floors
invalid because all elements were known previously). The Sakraida decision
used an "invention" test although it was decided some 25 years after the
enactment of § 103, which was meant to do away with the "invention"
standard, as will be discussed later. See Rich, Laying the Ghost, supra note
13.
91. Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105 U.S. 580 (1881). -.

92. Id. at 580.
93. Id. at 591-92 (emphasis added).
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subject matter merited the title "invention."
In striking down patents in other cases before it during this
same time frame, the Supreme Court sought to denounce
"speculative schemers" who seek to secure patent monopolies on
what the Supreme Court perceived to be "every trifling device,
every shadow of an idea" and thereby "lay a heavy tax upon the
industry of the country."94 The patent in Atlantic Works related to
a dredge-boat, and in a drastic change of tone from his opinion in
Loom where the patent was upheld, Justice Bradley, writing again
for the Court, held the patent invalid:
The process of development in manufactures creates a constant
demand for new appliances, which the skill of ordinary headworkmen and engineers is generally adequate to devise, and which,
indeed, are the natural and proper outgrowth of such development.
Each step forward prepares the way for the next, and each is
usually taken by spontaneous trials and attempts in a hundred
different places. To grant a single party a monopoly of every slight
advance made, except where the exercise of invention somewhat
above ordinarymechanical or engineeringskill is distinctly shown,
is unjust in principle and injurious in its consequences.
The design of patent laws is to reward those who make some
substantial discovery or invention, which adds to our knowledge and
makes a step in advance in the useful arts. Such inventors are
worthy of all favor. It was never the object of those laws to grant a
monopoly for every trifling device, every shadow of a shade of an
idea, which would naturally and spontaneously occur to any skilled
mechanic or operator in the ordinary progress of manufactures.
Such an indiscriminate creation of exclusive privileges tends rather
to obstruct than to stimulate invention. It creates a class of
speculative schemers who make it their business to watch the
advancing wave of improvement, and gather its foam in the form of
patented monopolies, which enable them to lay a heavy tax upon the
industry of the country, without contributing anything to the real
advancement of the art. It embarrasses the honest pursuit of
business with fears and apprehensions of concealed liens and
unknown liabilities to lawsuits and vexatious accountings for profits
made in good faith.95
The Loom and Atlantic Works cases, while resulting in
opposite holdings on patent validity, can be reconciled on the
ground that the Court found the Loom invention not to be "so
obvious as to merit no title to invention," 96 while the invention in
Atlantic Works was viewed as something that "would naturally
and spontaneously occur to any skilled mechanic [i.e., it was

94. Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1883).
95. Id. at 199-200 (emphasis added).
96. Loom, 105 U.S. at 591.
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obvious].
The Supreme Court bolstered its approval of "secondary"
considerations of non-obviousness as indicative of "invention" in
Magowan v. New York Belting & Packing Co.98 The patent in that
case was for "improvements in vulcanized India rubber packing. " "
In upholding the patent, Justice Blatchford wrote for the
Court:
[Wie think that Gately [the inventor] made a substantial discovery
or invention, which added to our knowledge, and made a step in
advance in the useful arts.... [Wihat Gately did was not merely the
work of a skilled mechanic, who applied only his common knowledge
and experience, and perceived the reason of the failure of [previous
inventions], and supplied what was obviously wanting; and that the
present case

faculty.

°°

involves ...

the creative work of the inventive

Thus, while referring to the skilled mechanic test of
Hotchkiss, the Court nonetheless sought to add a vague and
undefined "creative work of the inventive faculty" standard to the
requirement for patentability. Notably, the opinion did recognize
the commercial success of the invention "as a fact not to be
overlooked, and having much weight,"'' stating:
[T he Gately
as almost to
It may also
packing was
higher than
92
produce it.

packing went at once into such an extensive public use
supersede all packings made under other methods....
be added that the evidence shows that the Gately
put upon the market at a price from 15 to 20 per cent.
the old packings, although it cost 10 per cent. less to

c. The Need for a Nexus between Commercial Success and the
Patented Invention
But the Supreme Court's enthusiasm for extensive use or
sales, alone, in the Magowan decision, was tempered by its
decision the following week in McClain v. Ortmayer, a case
involving a patent on a pad for horse collars. 0 3 Justice Brown,
writing for the Court, now rejected the relevance of extensive sales
where there was no evidence that the sales were due to the
superiority of the invention rather than the result of energetic
advertising and marketing:
That the extent to which a patented device has gone into use is an

97. Atlantic Works, 107 U.S. at 200.
98. 141 U.S. 332 (1891).
99. Id. at 333.

100. Id. at 343 (emphasis added).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 141 U.S. 419 (1891).
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unsafe criterion, even of its actual utility, is evident from the fact
that the general introduction of manufactured articles is as often
effected by extensive and judicious advertising, activity in putting
the goods upon the market, and large commissions to dealers, as by
the intrinsic merit of the articles themselves ....
The very case
under consideration is not barren of testimony that the great
success of the McClain pads and clasping hooks [a second patent in
the case]-a large demand for which seems to have arisen and
increased year by year-is due, partly at least, to the fact that he
was the only one who made the manufacture of sweat-pads a
specialty; that he made them of a superior quality, advertised them
in the most extensive and attractive manner, and adopted means of
pushing them upon the market, and thereby largely increased the
extent of their sales. Indeed, it is impossible from this testimony to
say how far the large sales of these pads is due to their superiority to
others or
to the energy with which they were forced upon the
0 4
market.'
McClain will thus be seen to stand for the proposition that
the patent owner must establish a causal connection or nexus
between the claimed subject matter and commercial success.
Without such a nexus, the Court opined, evidence of extensive
sales might result in affirming patents on trifling devices or
variations:
If the generality of sales were made the test of patentability, it
would result that a person, by securing a patent upon some trifling
variation from previously known methods, might, by energy in
pushing sales or by superiority in finishing or decorating his goods,
drive competitors out of the market, and secure a practical
monopoly, without in fact having made the slightest contribution of
value to the useful arts.'05
Only a year after the McClain decision the Court returned to
a consideration of commercial success in Washburn & Moen
Manufacturing Co. v. Beat 'Em All Barbed-Wire Co.'06
The
inventor in Washburn improved the last step in the process of
making barbed wire used in fences.
Writing for the Court, Justice Brown reversed the lower court
and upheld the patent by first recognizing that the patented
improvement was the reason for the commercial success, that is,
the patent owner had proven a nexus between the patented

invention and commercial success: 10
It is true that the affixing of barbs to a fence-wire does not

104. Id. at 428 (emphasis added).
105. Id.
106. 143 U.S. 275 (1892).
107. Recall that Justice Brown authored the Court's opinion in McClain v.
Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419 (1891). See supra notes 103-105 and accompanying
text, where he failed to find any such nexus.
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apparently give a wide scope to the ingenuity of the inventor; but
from the crude device of Hunt [previous inventor] to the perfected
wire of Glidden [the patent owner], each patent has marked a step
in the progress in the art. The difference between the Kelly fence
and the Glidden fence is not a radical one, but, slight as it may seem
to be, it was apparently this which made the barbed-wire fence a
practicaland commercial success.1
The Court not only noted the commercial success of the new
invention, but deemed significant the prior unsuccessful attempts
of others:
There are many instances in the reported decisions of this court
where a monopoly has been sustained in favor of the last of a series
of inventors, all of whom were groping to attain a certain result,
which only the last one of the number seemed able to grasp .... 09
It is quite evident, too, that all or nearly all these experiments were
subsequently abandoned. But it was Glidden, beyond question, who
first published this device, put it upon record, made use of it for a
practical purpose, and gave it to the public, by which it was eagerly
seized upon, and spread until there is scarcely a cattle-raising
district in the world in which it is not extensively employed.""
3.

Summary

The decisions of the Supreme Court from the Hotchkiss case
in 1850 to 1891 (when, incidentally, Congress created the regional
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals), were at best
inconsistent, and at worst confusing, with respect to any
methodology for determining whether or not a patented device
amounted to a truly patentable "invention." Plainly, there was no
uniformly applied standard or test for patentability in these cases.
The Washburn case stands out, however, as an early
recognition that the merits of a patented invention should not be
determined in a vacuum divorced of all the surrounding
circumstances, but rather should be evaluated in the context of the
surrounding circumstances in the industry; that is, a court should
look to objective evidence in the record of "secondary
considerations" or "indicia of non-obviousness."
In Washburn, the Court clearly recognized that an invention
which may seem to involve only a slight, not radical, difference
over the prior art may, nevertheless, satisfy the requirements for a
valid patent monopoly where that slight difference made the
product "a practical and commercial success" and where others
had failed. This decision, therefore, should be contrasted with
Atlantic Works and McLain where the Court criticized patents on
108. Washburn, 143 U.S. at 282 (emphasis added).
109. Id. at 283.
110. Id. at 292.

19991

Obvious PatentHall-of-Famers

devices that were considered trifling, apart from any examination
of the surrounding circumstances.
The approach and thinking in these cases may have given
rise to the two schools of judicial thought that later developed in
the twentieth century: one where an invention was evaluated
against the backdrop of surrounding circumstances or relevant
contemporaneous events in the industry, e.g., secondary
considerations; and the other where an invention was evaluated
essentially in isolation from surrounding circumstances, that is,
only against the prior art references, using hindsight, and without
looking at what was going on in the industry prior to and after the
invention.
Judges Learned Hand and Giles S. Rich were the champions
of the former school of thought and their views ultimately
prevailed.
C. The Periodfrom 1892 to 1930
After the creation of the Circuit Courts of Appeal in 1891 and
the enactment of the statutory provision for writs of certiorari, the
Supreme Court was able to limit both the number and type of
patent cases that came before it."'
Nevertheless, the Court
displayed a mixed attitude toward patents from 1892 to about
1930, as indicated by the following discussion of some of the cases
decided during this period.
Justice
Brown
continued
to
embrace
"secondary"
considerations,"2 such as commercial success of the patented
device and the fact that it supplanted other devices, in C. & A.
3
Potts & Co. v. Creager."
In that case, writing for the Court, he
stated: "[Tihe fact that the device has gone into general use, and
displaced other devices employed for a similar purpose, is
sufficient to turn the scale in favor of the invention.....
1. The Hotchkiss "Skillful Mechanic"is Charged with Knowledge
of All PriorArt
In Mast, Foos, & Co. v. Stover Manufacturing Co., however,
the Court struck down the patent-in-suit and applied the
Hotchkiss hypothetical "skillful mechanic" test along with a
presumption that the skillful mechanic is charged with
constructive knowledge of all of the prior art: "Having all these
various devices before him, and whatever the facts may have been,
he is chargeable with a knowledge of all preexisting devices ..

111. The writ of certiorari is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1994).
112. See Washburn, 143 U.S. at 275.
113. C. & A. Potts & Co. v. Creager, 155 U.S. 597 (1895).

114. Id. at 609.
115. 177 U.S. 485, 493 (1900) (emphasis added).
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The Court even extended that presumption to the patentee: "[W]e
must presume the patentee was fully informed of everything which
preceded him, whether such were the actual fact or not."".6
2. Simultaneous Solution by Others and Rejection of the Use of
Hindsight
The Supreme Court later revisited the "inventive genius" test
of Reckendorfer v. Faberin Concrete Appliances Co. v. Gomery."7
The patent in that case was for covered apparatus designed for use
in transferring concrete or other plastic materials at a work site." 8
In an opinion of Justice Stone, the Court obliquely affirmed
the "inventive genius" test of Reckendorfer.
The adaptation independently made by engineers and builders of
these familiar appliances to the movement and distribution of
concrete cement in building operations and the independent patent
applications, within a competitively short space of time, for devices
for that purpose are in themselves persuasive evidence that this
use, in combination of well known mechanical elements was the
product only of ordinary mechanical or engineering skill and not of
inventive genius.' 9
The rationale of the decision appears to be the fact that a
number of engineers arrived at the same solution at about the
same time, thus supporting the defense of simultaneous solution
(by a number of different, independent inventors) to demonstrate
the level of skill in the art, and obviousness. Hence, the analyses
in some of the cases in this period will be seen to form the
foundation for some modern patent doctrines.
In addition to those cases noted above, in Diamond Rubber
Co. v. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co., the Court reaffirmed its
criticism of the use of what amounted to hindsight in determining
whether there was a patentable invention.' 20 The patent in that
case was for "improvements in rubber tire wheels ... designed for
use on ordinary vehicles, such as wagons, buggies, and
carriages.... In rejecting hindsight and upholding the patent's
validity, Justice McKenna acknowledged the presence of
"invention" as follows:
Knowledge after the event is always easy, and problems once solved
present no difficulties, indeed, may be represented as never having
had any, and expert witnesses may be brought forward to show that
the new thing which seemed to have eluded the search of the world
was always ready at hand and easy to be seen by a merely skillful
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id at 494 (emphasis added).
269U.S. 177 (1925).
Id. at 178.
Id. at 185.

120. 220 U.S. 428 (1911).
121. Id. at 430.
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subtle
attention. But the law has other tests of the invention than
not.122
conjectures of what might have been seen and yet was
The opinion implicitly rejected the "inventive genius" test or
any flash of genius standard for patentability, by stating that the
invention:
[M]ay be the successor, in a sense, of all that went before, a step
only in the march of improvement, and limited, therefore, to its
precise form and elements, as the patent in suit is conceded to be.
In its narrow and humble form it may not excite our wonder as may
the broader or pretentious form, but it has as firm a right to
protection. Nor does it detract from its merit that it is the result of
experiment and not the instant and perfect product of inventive
power. A patentee may be baldly empirical, seeing nothing beyond
his experiments and the result; yet if he has added a new and
valuable article to the world's utilities,he is entitled to the rank and
protection of an inventor. And how can it take from his merit that
know all of the forces which he has brought into
he may not
23
operation?'
Justice McKenna also appears to have given weight to the
commercial success of the invention by recognizing that "His [the
The Court
inventor's] success is his title to consideration."'24
rejected the notion that advertising and marketing accounted for
Rather, the Court reasoned "some
the invention's success.
advertising was necessary to bring it into notice, and give it a
certain use, but the extensive use which it attained, and more
certainly the exclusive use which it attained, could only have been
the result of its essential excellence, indeed, its pronounced
superiority over all other forms." 25 Thus, the Court concluded that
there was a nexus between the patented invention and commercial
" 2
1 6
success, and that "the effect of advertising is mere speculation.
The Diamond Rubber decision was significant, therefore, in
recognizing that even what may appear to be small improvements
over the prior art may be entitled to patent protection. That
approach was reaffirmed in Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota &
Ontario Paper Co., where the Court reversed the decision of the
First Circuit Court of Appeals and held the patent valid and
infringed.' 27 That case involved an invention to improve the speed
of paper-making machines.'2 8 The difference over the prior art was
raising the pitch of the moving screen or "paper-making wire" from
two to three inches to twelve inches to give the moving paper stock

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id. at 435 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 437.
Diamond Rubber, 220 U.S. at 442.
Id. at 442.
261 U.S. 45 (1923).
Id. at 46.
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Justice Taft wrote for the

In administering the patent law, the court first looks into the art, to
find what the real merit of the alleged discovery or invention is, and
whether it has advanced the art substantially. If it has done so,
then the court is liberal in its construction of the patent, to secure to
the inventor the reward he deserves. If what he has done works
only a slight step forward, and that which he says is a discovery is
on the border line between mere mechanical change and real
invention, then his patent, if sustained, will be given a narrow
scope .... In the case before us ....we think that Elbel made a
very useful discovery, which has substantially advanced the art.
His was not a pioneer patent, creating a new art; but a patent which
is only an improvement on an old30machine may be very meritorious,
and entitled to liberal treatment.
The Court once again implicitly rejected subjective and
unworkable tests like "inventive genius," opting instead for
adjusting the scope of the resulting patent in accordance with the
measure of its contribution to the art. Justice Taft also took note
of "secondary" considerations such as the adoption of the new
device by the industry and the failure of previous attempts. 13,
Other Supreme Court decisions of this period
also recognized and
32
emphasized "secondary" considerations.
3. Summary
The attitude of the Supreme Court toward patents from the
turn of the century to before 1930 was mixed. At times, the Court
used the Hotchkiss test, or variations of it, and at other times it
used the so-called subjective tests, such as the "inventive genius"
test, the "creative faculties" test, and the like.
One factor that may have contributed to the Court's use of
various tests for determining the existence of "invention" was the
advances in technology.
As inventions became more
technologically sophisticated, the courts may have felt it necessary
to refine the tests of patentable "invention" they had used at an
earlier time.
Despite many judicial attempts, however, there still emerged
no satisfactory, workable test of "patentability." Nevertheless, the
tests were frequently based on the Hotchkiss "skillful mechanic"

129. Id. at 55.
130. Id. at 63.
131. Id. at 66, 68.
132. See, e.g., Minerals Separation, Ltd. v.'%Hyde, 242 U.S. 261 (1916)
(recognizing the commercial success of the invention in a short time period);
Carnegie Steel Co. v. Cambria Iron Co., 185 U.S. 403 (1902) (recognizing that
finding a solution had been difficult, and that the patented invention was a
commercial success; also warning against the dangers of hindsight).
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approach, and generally required the presence of "invention,"
without attempting a universally applicable definition of
"invention."
Some cases added refinements to the basic Hotchkiss test.133
Some of these refinements were better-suited to determining the
validity of patents than others. The basic requirement, however,
still seemed to be the malleable "invention" standard.
While some cases seemed to recognize and embrace the
importance of protecting inventors' rights, others expressed a
negative and distrusting view towards patents and monopolies.
Moreover, the way a court treated the circumstances surrounding
the invention varied from case to case. Overall, the Supreme
Court's inconsistent approach to the determination of patent
validity provided little stability and guidance to the lower courts.
D. 1930 to 1952: The Beginningof the Supreme Court's Hostility
Toward Patents
1.

The GreatDepression and the Roosevelt Administration

Starting around 1930 the Supreme Court embarked on a
period of what can only be termed disfavor of, if not outright
hostility toward, patents. During that period, the Court seemed to
have no difficulty in finding ways to invalidate the patents that
Commentators have suggested several
came before it.
explanations.
One is that the Great Depression and the extreme economic
difficulties facing the nation, together with a prevailing distrust of
monopolies, provided a fertile ground for the Court's antagonism
toward patents.1 3 1 Indeed, referring to this negative attitude
toward patents, Judge Learned Hand later stated: "I think a great
deal of the odium that has surrounded the subject is because
patents are monopolies.' 31 It is entirely possible that the Great
Depression and the nation's economic woes prior to the New Deal
influenced the judiciary's, and particularly, the Supreme Court's
attitude toward patents.
The election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932 was
also influential in the direction of the Court. The New Deal was
Roosevelt's main domestic focus. However, as is apparent from
era, several Justices
some of the Supreme Court's decisions of13the
6
did not initially approve of the New Deal.
133. See, e.g., Mast, Foos, & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485, 485 (1900)
(charging the patentee with "knowledge of all pre-existing devices").

134. See Edward B. Gregg, Tracing the Concept of "PatentableInvention", 13

VILL. L. REV. 98 (1967).

135. Hearings on S. Res. 92 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks
and Copyrightsof the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,84th Cong. 114 (1955).
136. The New Deal called for the vesting of great powers in the federal
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In an effort to secure more favorable rulings from the Court,
President Roosevelt outlined his so-called "court-packing" plans in
1937.137 The plan called for adding a new seat on the court for each
Justice over the age of seventy.138 In effect, this would have given
President Roosevelt six immediate appointments to the Court and
39
a sympathetic majority of ten out of the fifteen justices.1
Whether the threat of court-packing had the effect sought by
the President, or whether some of the Justices simply changed
their views toward the New Deal of their own accord, is not clear.
However, the Supreme Court's subsequent decisions showed a
marked change. In that same year, 1937, Justice Roberts and
Chief Justice Hughes now joined the Court's liberal bloc in NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,"' to sustain "President Roosevelt's
"broad national intervention in the economy. ,4
Another factor contributing to the Supreme Court's
inhospitable attitude toward patents was probably the influence of
certain Roosevelt-appointed Justices on the Court during the two
decades prior to the Patent Act of 1952.
For example, the
influence of Justices Black and Douglas, appointed by President
Roosevelt in 1937 and 1939, respectively, was instrumental in the
42
Supreme Court's continued war on patents.'
government. Some of the early clashes between the Supreme Court and the
Executive became evident in defining the scope of the Commerce Clause. U.S.
CONST. art. I,§ 8. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936)
(rejecting the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935). The Act required
collective bargaining and setting minimum wages. In expressing concern for
the vitality of federalist principles, Justice Sutherland wrote for the Court:
"Mining brings the subject of commerce into existence. Commerce disposes of
it." Id. at 304. The Court then limited Congress' power to reach local
activities which directly affected commerce. See also Schechter Poultry Corp.

v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (rejecting Congress' authorization of
boards composed of industry representatives in local communities to set
standards for wages and hours).
See generally BARRON ET AL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 95-97 (Michie 4th ed. 1992)
(discussing Supreme Court cases of the New Deal era).
137. BARRON ETAL., supra note 136, at 96.
138. Id. Ironically, it was his implicit criticism of judges over seventy that
later prevented Roosevelt from appointing to the Supreme Court one of the
great legal and judicial minds of the period, Justice Learned Hand. The
reason: Hand was over 70 at that later time. Gerald Gunther, LEARNED
HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 559 (Albert A. Knopf 1994).

139. BARRON ETAL., supra note 136, at 96.
140. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
141. BARRON ETAL., supra note 136, at 96.
142. See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340
U.S. 147 (1950) (Black, J., concurring); Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices
Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941) (Douglas, J.). It may be true, as Judge Frank of the
Second Circuit asserted, that the Supreme Court's negative attitude toward
patents in the 1930-51 era did not start with the appointment of Justices
Black and Douglas:
That trend [striking down patents] is not (as some commentators imply)
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In addition, President Roosevelt himself appeared to have a
negative view toward patents. For example, in a 1938 message to
Congress, he suggested that the patent system was one cause of
the "economic malaise gripping the country."'43
By the end of the Second World War, the Antitrust Division of
the Justice Department "had launched a major campaign against
alleged patent abuses."'44 The anti-patent attitude in the Supreme
Court also seemed to increase in the 1940s.
The Supreme Court's conspicuous anti-patent bent in this
period first became evident in its second opinion, on rehearing,
Carbice Corp. of America v. American Patents Development
Corp., 45 which involved a patent for a "refrigerating apparatus.
It took Justice Brandeis all of three paragraphs to invalidate the
patent.
In writing for the Court, he observed that "the
combination in suit lacks patentable invention and novelty [and]
[elach of the elements [of the invention] ...performs its function
in a known way.,,141
2. Secondary ConsiderationsRejected in Favorof the Court's
Subjective Comparisonof the Invention to the PriorArt
The Court later found occasion to discount "secondary"
considerations when it reversed the Second Circuit in Paramount

due to the presence on the Supreme Court of Justices appointed by
President Franklin D. Roosevelt. No such appointee sat in that court
before May 24, 1937. Yet, in the ten-year period ending with that date,
the Supreme Court, as I compute it, held 17 patents invalid and 2 valid.
Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 639 n.2 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank,
J., concurring).
Nevertheless, the Court's philosophy propounded by Justices Black and
Douglas at least hastened the rush to invalidate patents, as discussed later in
this work. The role of Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, also appointed by
President Roosevelt in 1939 and 1941, respectively, seemed to be less
consistent. Compare, e.g., Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314
U.S. 84 (1941) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) and Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950) (Jackson, J.) with Jungersen
v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560 (1949) (Frankfurter and Jackson, J. J.
dissenting). See also Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S.
275 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
143. George E. Frost, Judge Rich and the 1952 Patent Code-A
Retrospective, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'y 343 (1994).
144. Id.
145. 283 U.S. 420 (1931). (Initial opinion at 283 U.S. 27 (1930), denying
relief because of what became known later as "patent misuse.")
146. American Patents Dev. Corp. v. Carbice Corp. , 38 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.
1930), rev'd, 283 U.S. 27 (1931). The device was a "transportation package,"
consisting of the combination of three elements: (1) an outside container
(shipping case); (2) solid carbon dioxide (dry ice); and (3) the articles to be
refrigerated. Id. at 62.
147. Carbice, 283 U.S. at 421.
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Publix Corp. v American Tri-Ergon Corp."" The patent in dispute
was "for producing combined sound and picture films." 9
Essentially, the patentee had claimed "a method of producing a
single photographic film by printing upon it a picture record and a
sound record from separately exposed and developed negatives. ' 50
The Second Circuit had held the patent valid and infringed.
The Supreme Court, through Justice Stone, reversed and held the
patent invalid:
An examination of the prior art can leave no doubt that the method,
as thus described and clearly restricted by the patent, lacks novelty
and invention. The only step In respondent's [patentee's] method for
which any advance could be claimed over earlier methods, is the
process of uniting two records on a single positive film by printing
them from separate negatives ....

[AIIl that was novel in the

claimed method was its application in the production of a combined
sound and picture record, instead of a combination of two picture
records.... Against this conclusion respondents throw the weight
of voluminous evidence, showing the practical utility and
widespread use of the patented process, which prevailed with the
court below as sufficient to establish invention. It is said that,
however simple and obvious the method may appear to be now that
it is in successful use, no one before the patentees had used It for
producing the union of a sound and a picture record. Respondents
also allege that... it has found all but universal acceptance.... [It

is only when the invention is in doubt that advances in the art may
be thrown in the scale...

The Court
invention:

51

discounted

the commercial

success

of

the

On the contrary, the inference seems plain that the advance awaited
the public acceptance of the sound motion picture; that, when the
public demand became manifest, it was still necessary to develop
suitable mechanisms, not embraced in the patent, for the
reproduction of sound from film. There had long been, ready at
hand, knowledge in the photographic art which would enable one
skilled in the art to produce the film suitable for use in the new
apparatus. 152
The argument that others had failed in their attempts to
accomplish what the patent taught similarly fell on deaf ears:
The bare fact that several inventors, in the early stages of sound
reproduction, working independently, of whose knowledge and skill
in the photographic art we know little or nothing, failed to resort to
a method, well known to that art, for printing a combination film for

148. 294 U.S. 464 (1935), rev'g, 71 F.2d 153 (2d Cir. 1934).
149. ParamountPublix,294 U.S. at 465.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 470, 473-74 (emphasis added).

152. Id.at 476.
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which there was then no generally
recognized need, does not give
53
rise to the inference of invention.'
The Paramount Publix case is a good example of how the
Court simply made its own subjective comparison of the patented
invention to the prior art and then concluded that such
comparison, alone, "can leave no doubt that the [patented]
method ... lacks ... invention. ""'
Having made that subjective
determination, the Court dismissed the otherwise persuasive
objective evidence of unobviousness, such as (i) the "voluminous
evidence, showing the practical utility and widespread use of the
patented process, which prevailed with the court below [the
Second Circuit] as sufficient to establish invention," and (ii) the
failure of others."' 5
The reason it gave for dismissing such
impressive evidence was that "it is only when the
invention is in
"
doubt" that such evidence is "thrown in the scale. 156
The Supreme Court revisited the patentability of a
combination or "aggregation" of old elements in Lincoln
Engineering Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp.'7
Justice Roberts
characterized the patent in question as one that "has to do with
apparatus for lubricating bearings."' 8 In striking it down, the
Court displayed a critical attitude toward patents on combinations
of old elements that would persist for many years:
The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in
the aggregation, perform or produce no new or different function or
operation than that theretofore performed or produced by them, is
not patentable invention. And the improvement of one part of an
old combination gives no right to claim that improvement in
combination with other old parts which perform no new function in
the combination.'5 9
3. Leading to the Subjective Flash of Creative Genius Test of
Cuno Engineeringand Reversal of LearnedHand
The next case in a series of Supreme Court decisions
invalidating patents, and one of the most famous Supreme Court
patent cases because of its strict "flash of creative genius" test for
patentable invention, Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic

153. Id. at 476.
154. Paramount,294 U.S. at 470.
155. Id. at 473-74.
156. Id. at 474. This same approach to considering objective evidence of
unobviousness only when invention was in doubt was later adopted by the
Patent Office after Graham v. John Deere Co. It was later overruled in an
opinion by Judge Rich. See -Inre Khelghatian, 364 F.2d 870 (C.C.PA. 1966),
as contrary to Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
157. 303 U.S. 545 (1938).
158. Id. at 546.
159. Id. at 549-50 (footnotes omitted).
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Devices Corp., came in 1941.160 The patentee in Cuno Engineering
had invented the pop-out, cordless cigarette lighter for
automobiles. In the court below, Judge Learned Hand had held
the patent valid and infringed.'6 ' In his opinion, Judge Hand reviewed the history of
automobile cigarette lighters from their inception, where two
wires connected the lighter mechanism to the dashboard.' 2 Later,
"wireless" lighters had appeared.' 3
These devices were
inconvenient and "required the continued attention of the user"
because they had to 64be kept depressed in the dashboard until the
lighter coils heated.

In contrast, the new lighter used a thermostat, rendering
constant user attention unnecessary. 5 Judge Hand noted the
previous general use of "thermostats to break a circuit when it got
overcharged," but concluded that:
[T]hese uses rather fortify than impair the invention; for, the more
general and familiar was the use of a thermostat to cut out an overheated member in an electric current, the more curious it is that no
one should have thought
of its use to remedy the known defect of
66
"
'wireless lighters.'

As to whether the new lighter was an "invention," Judge
Hand rejected the argument that the patented lighter involved
merely simple structural changes, holding:
That is never the test; it is the conception that counts, the act of
imagination which assembles the elements into the new and fruitful
combination; not the working out of details. Complicated machines,
which are in the day's work for skilled mechanics, will appear magic
to a tyro who may find nothing but the obvious in a combination
that has failed of discovery for a decade after the need arose.167
In evaluating the validity of the patent, Judge Hand did not
simply subjectively compare the patented invention to the prior
art, as the Supreme Court did in Paramount. Rather, he also paid
particular attention to the objective evidence of the circumstances
160. 314 U.S. 84 (1941). In order to understand the background of Cuno
Engineering,it is important to recognize that the case came to the Court after
President Roosevelt had expressed his belief to Congress that the patent
system was one of the evils responsible for the country's ills. Furthermore, by
that time, Roosevelt had appointed new Justices to the Court, including
Justices Black and Douglas. See supra notes 120-133 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the patent system during the Roosevelt era.
161. Automatic Devices Corp. v. Cuno Eng'g Corp., 117 F.2d 361 (2d Cir.
1941), rev'd, 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
162. Id. at 362.
163. Id.

164. Id.
165. Id. at 362-63.

166. Automatic Devices, 117 F.2d at 363 (emphasis added).
167. Id. (citations omitted).
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surrounding
the
invention,
namely,
the
"secondary"
considerations. First, he noted that previous inventors had made
"rather futile attempts" at producing a device that did not require
constant user attention. 8 In addition, he noted that the invention
had enjoyed remarkable commercial success and
[Hiad become a standard fixture in motor cars; and upon every
detail of these as much human ingenuity has been expended as
perhaps on any machine. Just such trifles often help sales; in the
severe competition of motor car industry the perfecting of even a
trifling furnishing like this may be the object of study and
experiment.189
On balance, he had this to say about the validity of the
patent: "If patents are to go to those who contribute new
appliances that are beyond the limited imagination of the ordinary
skilled person, this invention seems to us to merit a patent."'
It is clear from even the few excerpts above that, in reaching
his decision, Judge Hand not only evaluated the claims in the
patent and the prior art, but he also considered the objective
evidence of the history or circumstances surrounding the invention
and the art, both before and after the invention. In other words,
he considered the invention in. context of its own temporal,
circumstantial environment. His approach, however, was in stark
contrast to the Supreme Court's subjective and speculative
analysis that characterized this period.
The Supreme Court "granted the petition for certiorari [in
Cuno Engineering Corp.]... because of a conflict between the
decision in the court below [Judge Hand's decision] and Automatic
Devices Corp. v. Sinko Tool & Manufacturing Co. 7 ...7 decided by
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.0 1
Writing for the Court, Justice Douglas made no effort to hide
his dislike of patents. He held that the only advance of the art by
the new lighter "was the use of the removable plug bearing the

168. Id. at 362.
169. Id. at 363.
170. Id. at 364.
171. Automatic Devices Corp. v. Sinko Tool & Mfg. Co., 112 F.2d 335 (7th
Cir. 1940). The Sinko Tool court gave the following, largely subjective,
evaluation of the new cigarette lighter:
We do not feel justified in holding that this amounted to invention, in
view of the fact that wireless plugs without the thermostat had been
used so long, and in view of the further fact that the same principle of
thermostatically disconnecting the circuit had been used in the
manufacture and use of electric irons, and the like ....

[Wle think his

[the patentee's] disclosures amounted to nothing more than mechanical
skill, and we think the claims herein relied upon are invalid.
Id. at 341.
172. Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 85 (1941).
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heating unit. 1 13 But the patentee had done more than that; he
had also incorporated a thermostat in the lighter to avoid the need
for constant user attention, and to reduce the danger of the driver
taking his or her eyes off the road. Justice Douglas failed to give
any consideration to the long and unsolved need in the art and the
prior unsuccessful attempts of others. He simply subjectively
concluded: "To incorporate such a thermostatic control in a socalled 'wireless', or 'cordless' lighter was not to make an 'invention'
or 'discovery' within the meaning of the patent laws.""' 4 Although
it was hard to deny the contribution to the art made by the new
lighter,7 5 the Court nevertheless held that "[m]ore must be done
than to utilize 76the skill of the art in bringing old tools into new
combinations.",
In an attempt to justify its analysis, the Court turned to
Hotchkiss:
Since Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, decided in 1851, it has been
recognized that if an improvement is to obtain the privileged
position of a patent more Ingenuity must be involved than the work
of a mechanic skilled in the art.... The principle of the Hotchkiss
case applies to the adaptation or combination of old or well known
devices for new uses.177
The Court's next statement appeared to raise from the dead a
new and stricter variant of the "inventive genius" test,' 78 one that
was later rejected in the language of § 103:
That is to say that the new device, however useful it may be, must
reveal the flash of creative genius not merely the skill of the calling.
If it fails, it has not established its right to a private grant on the
public domain ....
We cannot conclude that his skill in making
this contribution reached the level of inventive genius which the
Constitution, Art. 1,
8, authorizes Congress to reward....
Ingenuity was required to effect the adapttation [sic], but no more
than that to be expected of a mechanic skilled in the art. Strict
application of that test is necessary lest in the constant demand for
new appliances the heavy hand of tribute be laid on each slight
technological advance in an art. 79
The significance of the Cuno Engineeringholding cannot be
underestimated. There was much more at stake than the validity

173. Id. at 89.
174. Id.
175. "We may concede that the functions performed by the lighter
combination were new and useful." Id. at 90.
176. Id. at 89.
177. Cuno Eng'g, 314 U.S. at 90-91 (citations omitted).
178. Recall the "inventive genius" test of Reckendorfer v. Faber,92 U.S. 347,

357 (1875); see supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the "inventive genius" test.
179. Cuno Eng'a, 314 U.S. at 91-92 (emphasis added).
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of the patent on the new cigarette lighter, as a careful examination
of Justice Douglas's opinion reveals.
First, the issue of whether the patentee's device constituted a
patentable "invention" does not seem to have been explicitly before
the Court. Rather, the adversary had several technical 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 objections to the claims in the patent."' Nevertheless, laying
judicial restraint aside, Justice Douglas seized the occasion to
advance his strict, if not negative views toward patents: "We do
not, however, stop to consider these objections. For it is our
opinion that the [new] device was not the result of invention "but a
mere exercise of the skill of the calling, an advance plainly
indicated by the prior art. " 8"
Second, even if the Court were justified in deciding whether
the new lighter constituted a patentable "invention," it is unclear
what test of patent validity was used. Justice Douglas began by
stating the Hotchkiss test was his yardstick of patentability. 2
Next, he applied the Hotchkiss test to "the adaptation or
combination of old or well known devices for new uses.,,183
However, without citing any precedent, he introduced a new and
stricter requirement, the famous or infamous "flash of creative
genius" test, into the validity calculus. 84'
In doing so, he was
raising the standard of patentability to a level that very few
worthwhile inventions could ever reach.
The Hotchkiss test of more ingenuity than possessed by the
"skillful mechanic" is, of course, not nearly as strict and limiting
as the "flash of creative genius" which Justice Douglas was
advocating.
Finally, Justice Douglas essentially ignored the "secondary
considerations" which had played such a significant role, not only
in Judge Hand's opinion,' 85 but in previous decisions of the
Supreme Court itself."6 For example, the Court paid no attention
to the fact that "[slo far as appear[ed], nobody
in this country
187
before Mead made 'wireless' lighters automatic.
180. Justice Douglas outlined the issues as follows:
Petitioner makes several objections to the validity of the claims-that
they do not comply with the standards for full, clear and concise
description... ; that they are indefinite and broader than any disclosed
invention; and that they are for a device so imperfect and unsuccessful
that a construction of the claims broad enough to include it is not
permissible.

Id. at 88.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
1941)
186.
187.

Id.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 91.
Cuno Eng'g, 314 U.S. at 91.
See Automatic Devices Corp. v. Cuno Eng'g Corp., 117 F.2d 361 (2d Cir.
(L. Hand, J.), rev'd, 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
See, e.g., Smith v. Goodyear Dental Vulcanite Co., 93 U.S. 486 (1876).
Automatic Devices, 117 F. 2d at 362.
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In the following term, the Supreme Court invalidated the
broad claims in a patent to Marconi (that was an improvement to
his basic patent that covered the first successful radio
transmission).
Justice Frankfurter dissented, criticizing the
Court for using hindsight and for ignoring the fact that Marconi's
solution escaped everyone for forty years, until he invented it and
disclosed it to the public:
Reconstruction by hindsight, making obvious something that was
not at all obvious to superior minds until someone pointed it out,this is too often a tempting exercise for astute minds .... To find in
1943 that what Marconi did really did not promote the progress of
science because it had been anticipated is more than a mirage of
hindsight. 189
The following year, in Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical
Corp., the Court struck down another patent, one on printing
ink.'99 The patent had been held valid by the Second Circuit."'
In that same year, in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., v. Ray-OVac Co., the Court upheld the patent in suit. 92 The patent in that
case covered a metal sheath for a dry cell battery. 9 The metal
sheath prevented the battery from leaking,
a common
94
phenomenon with the dry cells of the period.
The district court and the court of appeals both upheld the
patent.'99 The district court based its decision on the novelty of the
invention and its immediate success in the marketplace.'96 In a
decision somewhat out of character with other decisions in this
timeframe, the Supreme Court upheld the patent's validity.
Justice Black, however, dissented, taking the occasion to downplay
the invention through his own subjective comparison of the
invention to the prior art:
188. Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1 (1943).
189. Id. at 62-63. Frankfurter's dissenting opinion reflects the influence of
Learned Hand whom he greatly admired. Id. at 61 n. 1. Indeed, Frankfurter
had spearheaded a relentless but unsuccessful campaign with Roosevelt in
1942 to have Hand appointed to fill the Supreme Court vacancy created when
James F. Byrnes resigned from the Court to become director of the wartime
Office of Economic Stabilization. In one of his letters to FDR about Hand's
qualifications, Frankfurter observed: "Knowledge of what greatness has done
for Court and Country-and surely Holmes, Brandeis and Cardozo were the
only truly great judges here since the Civil War-makes me covet for you that
you give to the history of your presidency the only man worthy to rank with
Holmes, Brandeis and Cardozo." Gunther, supra note 138, at 553-58.
190. 325 U.S. 327 (1945).
191. Interchemical Corp. v. Sinclair & Carroll Co., 144 F.2d 842 (2d Cir.
1944). Learned Hand was not on the panel.
192. 321 U.S. 275 (1944).
193. Id. at 276-77.
194. Id. at 276.
195. Id. at 275.
196. Id. at 278.
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If the patentee here has "discovered" anything, it is that the creamy
substance in a dry cell will not leak through a steel jacket which
covers and is securely fastened to the ends of the cell ....
Antiquarians tell us that the use of solid containers to hold liquids
predated the dawn of written history .... It is impossible for me to
believe that Congress intended to grant monopoly privileges to
persons who do no more than apply knowledge which has for
centuries been the universal possession of all the earth's peopleeven those of the most primitive civilizations.' 97
He thus seemed to argue that the invention was akin to a
bottle containing water or a pot containing a liquid. He seemed to
disregard the objective evidence in the record of the complex
technical issues facing the artisans in the field before the
invention was conceived.
In Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co. the Court had another
opportunity to review a Second Circuit patent case involving a
dissent by Learned Hand. 9 8 The patent in that case related to a
process for casting items of detailed design, including jewelry.'99
Before Jungersen's method, practitioners used the so-called "lost
wax" method to cast such items. 00 That method involved using a
model to prepare a primary mold, filling the mold with molten
wax, stripping the mold after the wax hardened, making a new
mold around the now hardened wax model, melting the wax out of
the new mold, thus leaving the new mold ready for injection with,
for example, precious metals. 0 '
Jungersen's improvement lay in using centrifugal force to
inject wax into the primary mold or to inject metal into the final or
secondary mold.0 2 Using centrifugal force allowed the wax or
metal to penetrate the finest recesses of the design, thus achieving
a final product of superior quality and more precise definition.' °3
Judge Clark, writing for the Second Circuit, invalidated the
patent on the ground that it did not constitute "invention."" 4 The
combination of known elements in Jungersen's method was not
"invention," nor was the application of an old process to a new
and
analogous use.0 5
Moreover, the Second Circuit rejected claims of commercial

197. Ray-O-Vac, 321 U.S. at 280.
198. 335 U.S. 560 (1949).
199. Id. at 562-63.
200. Id. at 563.
201. Jungersen v. Baden, 166 F.2d 807, 808-09 (2d Cir. 1948), aff'd, 335 U.S.
560 (1949). Judges Learned Hand and Augustus Hand also sat on the
appellate panel. Id. at 808.
202. Id. at 809.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 809-11.
205. Id.
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06
Judge Clark relied on
success as being indicative of "invention."Q
"recent Supreme Court pronouncements" to hold that "commercial
success cannot raise a combination of known elements to the
exalted level of invention."0 7
Judge Learned Hand dissented. He observed that no one had
ever thought of combining all of Jungersen's claimed steps in a
single sequence.0 8 He argued-unsuccessfully to the panel-that
Jungersen's new process, utilizing centrifugal force to help the
wax to penetrate the deepest reaches of the mold cavity,
constituted "invention."209 In reaching this conclusion, he took into
account "secondary considerations," specifically, a long-felt need in
the industry and the failure of other artisans to bring to
conception the claimed method." °
In an opinion by Justice Reed, the Supreme Court affirmed
the Second Circuit's holding of invalidity.' In so doing, the Court
noted that those skilled in other arts, such as dental casting, had
used centrifugal force in making casts. 2"2 The Court then
contended that Jungersen's use of centrifugal force "was not an
exemplification of
inventive genius such as is necessary to render
21 3

the patent valid."

Justice Frankfurter dissented. While he characterized the
invention as one having moderate value-one that does not "carry
serious consequences for an important industry and thereby for
the general public"214-he said the present case did "raise basic
issues regarding the judiciary's role in [the] existing patent
system."...
As for the identification and resolution of those issues, Justice
Frankfurter felt that Judge Learned Hand's dissent in the Second
Circuit accomplished those ends. Thus, Justice Frankfurter said
he would "adopt [Judge Hand's] opinion as [his own]." 26 Moreover,
in Justice Frankfurter's view, long-felt need and the failure of
others by themselves were enough in this case to tip the
patentability scales in favor of the invention:
206. Baden, 166 F.2d at 811.
207. Id. at 811. The plaintiff argued, and the district court agreed, that the
use of centrifugal force constituted a new step in Jungersen's claimed
invention. Id. at 810. The Second Circuit rejected that contention. Id.
208. Id.

209. Id.at 812.
210. Id,
211. Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560 (1949).
212. Id. at 555-56.
213. Id. at 566. Jungersen's argument-that "jewelry casting is a separate
and distinct art"-did not prevail. Id. at 567. Thus, "advancements in other
types of casting" undermined the novelty and patentability of Jungersen's
invention. Id.
214. Id. at 568 (Frankfurter and Burton, J., dissenting).
215. Id.
216. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. at 568.
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What better test of invention can one ask than the detection of that
which others had all along had a strong incentive to discover, but
had failed to see, though all the while it lay beneath their eyes? ....
In the case at bar, I can only say that, so far as I have been able to
comprehend those factors which have been held to determine
invention, and to which at least lip service continues to bepaid,the
combination in suit has every hall-mark of a valid patent.
Justice Jackson also dissented. He opined that the claimed
And
invention met "the patent statute's every requirement.
confronted by this record an industry heretofore galled by futility
and frustration may well be amazed at the Court's dismissal of
"
Jungersen's ingenious and successful efforts. ""
Justice Jackson further took the occasion to voice his
frustration with the course that the Supreme Court had taken
with respect to patents. He granted the majority the notion that
"[ilt would not be difficult to cite many instances of patents that
have been granted[] improperly ... and without adequate tests of
invention by the Patent Office," but "doubt[ed] that the remedy for
[the Patent Office's] passion for granting patents is an equally
9
strong passion in this Court for striking them down.""
Justice Jackson then penned his famous prophecy that rocked
the patent bar at that time and for many years to come. He said
that as a result of the Court's "strong passion ... for striking
[patents] down ... the only patent that is valid is one which this
22 °
Needless to say, he,
Court has not been able to get its hands on."
22
"
too, agreed with Judge Learned Hand's dissenting opinion below. '
4.

The Emergence of Synergism as a Test for Patentability

The Supreme Court added a still further gloss to the confused
"invention" test, before the enactment of § 103 in 1952. In Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., the
mechanical
a
involving
invention
an
Court invalidated
combination for a new rack-type device for collecting and moving
217. Id. at 570-71 (emphasis added). Justice Frankfurter's reference to
paying only lip service to "secondary considerations" may seem to be a
generous overstatement, to some critics of the Supreme Court of this period.
218. Id. at 571.
219. Id. at 572. Justice Jackson acknowledged that 'in this high pressure
age sales volume may reflect only powerful promotion or marketing magic,
and its significance as an index of novelty or utility may rightly be suspected."
Id. at 571.
Nonetheless, he pointed out that "Jungersen's success was grounded not in
the gullibility of the public but in the hard-headed judgment of a highly
competitive and critical if not hostile industry." Id. Thus, in Justice Jackson's
view, commercial success did not make patentable an otherwise unpatentable
invention, but it did, nevertheless, "fill the void in our understanding of what
the invention has meant" to artisans. Id.
220. Id. at 572.
221. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. at 572.
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groceries at a supermarket checkout counter.2
Writing for the Court, and in a sense fulfilling his own earlier
prophecy in his Jungerson case dissent, Justice Jackson struck
down the patent that had been found valid by both the district
court and the court of appeals, even though he found that the
invention had been "widely adopted and successfully used...
beyond dispute."223
Nevertheless, in addition to using the
"invention" test to strike down the patent, Justice Jackson noted
that, despite the "voluminous literature which the subject has
excited," it had never "ventured to give a precise and
comprehensive definition of the test [of invention] to be applied" in
cases involving mechanical-combination patents."'
Justice Jackson then ventured to give such a definition:
It is agreed that the key to patentability of a mechanical device that
brings old factors into cooperation is presence or lack of invention.
In course of time the profession came to employ the term
.combination" to imply its presence and the term "aggregation" to
signify its absence, thus making antonyms in legal art of words
which in ordinary speech are more nearly synonyms. However
useful as words of art to denote in short form that an assembly of
units has failed or has met the examination for invention, their
employment as tests to determine invention results in nothing but
confusion. The concept of invention225is inherently elusive when
applied to combination of old elements.

Despite his perceptive judgments as to the state of the law on
the standard of patentability for mechanical combination patents,
Justice Jackson did not confine the Court's ruling to a "precise and
comprehensive" test for the patentability of inventions employing
mechanical combinations. Instead, he went on to advance a new
synergy requirement:
The conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute
something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its
parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable. Elements may,
of course, especially in chemistry or electronics, take on some new
quality or function from being brought into concert, but this is not a

222. 340 U.S. 147 (1950). The invention in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
was for a "cashier's counter equipped with a three-sided frame, or rack, with
no top or bottom, which, when pushed or pulled, [would] move groceries
deposited within it by a customer to the checking clerk and leave them there
when it [was] pushed back to repeat the operation." Id. at 149. Guides kept
the frame on the counter. Id. The new device offered the advantages of
"speed[ing] the customer on his way [and] reduc[ing] checking costs for the
merchant." Id. Both the district court and the court of appeals held the
patent valid. Id.
223. Id. at 149.
224. Id. at 150.
225. Id. at 151 (emphasis added).

19991

Obvious PatentHall-of-Famers

usual result of uniting elements old in mechanics.

226

Justices Douglas and Black concurred with the majority in
striking down the patent. They also took the opportunity to
comment on the constitutional role of patents, concluding that
"[tihe Framers plainly did not want [patent] monopolies freely
granted."227 Indeed, Douglas and Black would add a further gloss
on the "flash of creative genius" test; in particular, "to justify a
patent," they claimed that an invention must "serve the ends of
science-to push back the frontiers of chemistry, physics, and the
like; to make a distinctive contribution to scientific knowledge."22 8
Thus, Justices Douglas and Black seemed to erect yet another
barrier to the patentability of an invention by adding a "pushing
back the frontiers of science" gloss to the "flash of creative genius"
test or the tired "invention" test. The problem remained the same,
however: pushing back the frontiers of science presents the same
vagueness and indefiniteness that plagued the "invention" test.
5. Summary
The period from 1930-1952 will be seen to contain the
Supreme Court's most critical attitude towards patents and patent
monopolies. The only glimmer of hope for the patent system in
that period was the Goodyear v. Ray-O-Vac battery case, but that
hope was later dashed in the Ostby & Barton case when Justice
Jackson prophesied that "the only patent that is valid is one which
this Court has not been able to get its hands on." 29 And even he,
later, wrote the majority opinion in the Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co. case, invalidating the patent in that case.
After the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. decision, the
Supreme Court seemed to withdraw itself from any further efforts
to develop an "invention" test. Surely, it had expressed its views
on patents in no unmistakable terms.
IV. PATENTABILITY STANDARDS APPLIED AND DEVELOPED BY JUDGE
LEARNED HAND BEFORE § 103

Judge Learned Hand's judicial career started in 1909 with his
appointment by President Taft as a federal district judge for the

226. Id. at 152 (emphasis added). Applying this standard to the invention,
the Court announced that the "case is wanting in any unusual or surprising
consequences from the unification of the elements here concerned." Id.
227. GreatAtlantic, 340 U.S. at 154.
228. Id. (emphasis added). To justify their requirement of a pushing back
the frontiers of science standard, the Justices appealed to the "inventive
genius" test of Reckendorfer v. Faber,92 U.S. 347 (1875). See supra notes 7879 for a discussion of the "inventive genius" test as introduced in
Reckendorfer.
229. Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949).
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Southern District of New York.23 ° In 1924, he was elevated to the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals where he continued to serve until
his death in 1961.23 ' During his tenure on the federal bench, Hand
wrote many opinions in cases involving a diverse array of legal
topics. So far-reaching was his influence on the development of
American jurisprudence that, upon his death in 1961, the Times of
London wrote "there are many who... feel that with the death of
the golden age of the American Judiciary has come
Learned Hand
232
to an end."

A. Early Cases as a District Court Judge
Learned Hand left his mark on patent law in his many
opinions on the subject.233 From the beginning of his career as a
district court judge, he displayed an awareness of the complexities
inherent in patent cases and the difficulties that they pose for the
judiciary. He called for a recognition of these special problems and
steps toward a solution.
For instance, just four years after his appointment to the
federal bench, Judge Hand, in Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K Mulford
Co., questioned having a layperson judge subjectively evaluate
technological inventions:
I cannot stop without calling attention to the extraordinary
condition of the law which makes it possible for a man without any
knowledge of even the rudiments of chemistry to pass upon such
questions as these. The inordinate expense of time is the least of
the resulting evils, for only a trained chemist is really capable of
passing upon such facts ....How long we shall continue to blunder

along without the aid of unpartisan and authoritative scientific
assistance in the administration of justice, no one knows; but all fair
persons not conventionalized by provincial legal habits of mind
ought, I should think, unite to effect some such advance.13

230. Gunther, supra, note 138, at 133. In his book, Professor Gunther
provides an enlightening study of the life and work of this great American
jurist.
231. See generally id.
232. Id. at 679. The New York Times reminded its readers of Judge Hand's
reputation as "the greatest jurist of his time." Id.
233. For a collection of Learned Hand's cases on patent law, see LEARNED
HAND ON PATENT LAW (Paul H. Blaustein ed., 1983) (providing citations for,
and excerpts from, Learned Hand's cases). Professor Gunther also provides a
brief account of some of Judge Hand's patent cases. See Gunther, supra note
138, at 138, 292-93, 306-15.
For examples of commentaries on Learned Hand's contributions to patent
law, see Edmund A. Godula, Judge Learned Hand and the Concept of
Invention, 9 IDEA 159 (1965) (discussing Learned Hand's cases involving the
concept of "invention"). See also Note, Judge Learned Hand and the Law of
Patents and Copyrights,60 HARV. L. REV. 394 (1947).
234. 189 F. 95, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). In Parke-Davis, Judge Hand noted with
approval "secondary considerations": "[Blut commercial or practical stability is
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Hand echoed similar views in a later case, Wire Wheel Corp.
ofAmerica v. C. T. Silver, Inc."' In Wire Wheel, Learned Hand-in
contrast to the Supreme Court's less inhibited approachexpressed doubt about the ability of judges to properly gauge the
existing state of the art and the true worth of the inventor's
contribution:
Doubtless it is always a difficult question to say, when any step is
taken in art, what degree of imagination it required. Possibly
judges are not well qualified to restate to themselves the stage in
the technique of the art reached when the step was taken, or try to
put themselves in the position of those who took it, yet the settled
law requires them to do so, and, if not, novelty and invention would
236
be synonymous.
The adjudication of patent cases in his court unavoidably
confronted Judge Hand with the "invention" test. And it would
hardly surprise anyone to learn that the different problems
presented by that test greatly troubled him. In what would
become a trend lasting beyond the enactment of § 103, Judge
Hand took the opportunity in his patent cases to comment on the
"invention" test.
In the early Wire Wheel case, he held the patent in suit void
for "noninvention" and commented on the subjectivity of the
"invention" test: "I know of no objective test which will serve to
answer that question, which arises in nearly every case; it must be
solved by an attempt to reconstruct the scope and limits of
imagination of the ordinary skilled man.,,237
In another case, Van Heusen Products v. Earl & Wilson,
Judge Hand ruled on the patentability of a combination invention
for a multi-layered, interwoven shirt collar.2 38 Noting that he was
"faced with the usual collection of cases to prove that it is never
invention to substitute one material for another," he conceded that
"[clases like Hotchkiss v. Greenwood might be piled up

a somewhat elastic term, and this is a case where he should be entitled to a
lenient construction, for he has been author of a valuable invention and has
succeeded where the most expert have failed." Id.
235. 266 F. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1919), affd, 266 F. 229 (2d Cir. 1920) (per curiam).
236. 266 F. at 227. See also Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co. v. General
Elec. Co., 155 F.2d 937, 939 (2d Cir. 1946) ("Courts, made up of laymen as
they must be, are likely either to underrate, or to overrate, the difficulties in
making new and profitable discoveries in fields with which they cannot be
familiar . .

").

237. 266 F. at 227. Judge Hand also noted that the "invention" standard
requires ad hoc determination, based on the facts of particular cases. Id.
"The required standard of conduct in such cases, as in some other branches of
the law, e.g., negligence, notice, and the like, is not susceptible of deductive
application; it must be constructed in each case for that case." Id. (emphasis
added).
238. 300 F. 922 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
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indefinitely" to support the proposition that substituting one
material for another does not amount to patentable invention.239
But the "usual collection of [those] cases" did not impress
Learned Hand. He repeated his earlier theme that the "invention"
test defies an a priori determination and requires case-by-case
adjudication:
I do not conceive that the law has ever laid down any such absolute
rule on this subject, or any other absolutes for that matter. The
prospect of getting objective tests for invention is tempting, but it is a
mirage. How is it possible to say a priori what combination of
elements needs an original twist of the mind, and what is within the
compass of the ordinary clod? Is it not clear that the quality of a
man's inventiveness must be tested by reconstitutingthe situation as
it was in the light of the preceding history of the art? There is no
vade mecum for such inquiries.
Judge Hand seemed to believe that at the bottom of the
"invention" test lies, or should lie, a reconstruction of the events in
the industry preceding and following the invention. Only then
should a subjective judgment be made. He demonstrated this
hypothesis using a simple example:
Our unknown ancestor, who first substituted iron for bronze in the
head of an ax, was the bright exemplar of all inventors to come. Yet
it was not an invention, if one is bound by this objective test
[substituting one known material for another is not invention]. In
this subject the standard escapes any abstract definition, because
the end in view needs nicer adaptations .... "'
Realizing that using his proposed "test" of patentability
defeats predictability, Judge Hand pointed out that the law must
serve broader goals than mere certainty: "The defect of such a
standard is indeed its uncertainty, but certainty is only one of the
ends of law."242
B. Later Cases as a CircuitCourt ofAppeals Judge
Learned Hand returned to the "invention" test a year later in
Kirsch Manufacturing Co. v. Gould Mersereau Co.11 3 By then,
serving as a circuit judge on the Second Circuit, Judge Hand
elaborated on the notion that an inquiry into the patentability of
an invention made a subjective step in the analysis inevitable:
[W]e take no recourse to any supposed absolute objective test, as, for

239. Id. at 929 (citations omitted).
240. Id. (emphasis added). In this early case, Judge Hand already exposed
his view that inventions must be evaluated against the backdrop of what went
on in the industry, i.e., the "secondary considerations."
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. 6 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1925).
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example, that one may not patent as an invention the making into
one part of what formerly was in two. In spite of our language in
[an earlier case,] language which has been repeated again and
again, we think that such tests are delusive, if used as more than
rough rules for guidance. The question is one of evidence in each
case, and the issue necessarily depends upon a shifting standard,
244
just as in cases of due care.
Judge Hand then commented on what he perceived as the
futility of attempting to use an "absolute objective test" to gauge
the patentability of an invention:
Objective tests may be of value vaguely to give us a sense of
direction, but the final destination can be only loosely indicated. An
invention is a new display of ingenuity beyond the compass of the
routineer, and in the end that is all that can be said about it. Courts
cannot avoid the duty of divining as best they can what the day to
day capacity of the ordinaryartisanwill produce. This they attempt
by looking at the history of the art, the occasion for the invention, its
success, its independent repetition at about the same time, and the
state of the underlying art, which was a condition upon its
appearance at all. .. . [W]e cannot help exposing the inventor to the
hazard inherent in hypostatizing such modifications in the existing
arts as are within the limited imagination of the journeyman. There
comes a point when the question must be resolved by a subjective
opinion as to what seems an easy step and what does not. We must
try to correctour standardby such objective references as we can, but
in the end the judgment will appear, and no doubt be, to a large
24-5
extent personal, and in that sense arbitrary.

244. Id. at 794 (emphasis added).
245. Id. (emphasis added). In another case, Learned Hand seemed to
embrace something resembling the Hotchkiss "skillful mechanic" test. See
Sachs v. Hartford Elec. Supply Co., 47 F.2d 743, 748 (2d Cir. 1931).
The test is more practical than that, because inventions are to answer
human needs, and the elements may be mechanically inert. The
cooperation of the means necessary to create an invention is to be
measured by the purpose to be fulfilled, not by the interaction of the
parts.... Therefore, we can find little advantage in a discussion of what
is or what is not an "aggregation." In patents, as in other branches of
the law, the question is of the interests involved; inventions depend
upon whether more was required to fill the need than the routine
ingenuity of the ordinary craftsman. Such a standard is no more of a
will-o'-the-wisp than others which the law adopts, reasonable care,
reasonable notice and the like; the effort is to fix that standard by
recourse to average propensities, dispositions and capacities. Any
attempt to define it in general terms has always proved illusory; it is
best to abandon it.
Id.
This position seems consistent with Hand's views presented in some of the
cases that he decided after § 103 went into effect. See, e.g., Lyon v. Bausch &
Lomb Optical Co., 224 F.2d 530, 536 (2d Cir. 1955) (stating that "§ 103 only
restores the original gloss, substantially in ipsissimis verbis; which has never
been overruled; but on the contrary for seventy or eighty years had continued
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Judge Hand repeated similar sentiments on other occasions. 246
His belief that the determination of the patentability of an
invention ultimately involves a subjective step does not
necessarily imply that he approved of the subjective and vague
"invention" test. Indeed, in Western States Machine Co. v. S.S.
Hepworth Co.,247 he termed the "invention" test "elusive."2 48 And in
other cases he again commented on the "invention" test, calling it
"as fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and vague a phantom as
exists
24
in the whole paraphernalia of legal concepts." 9
C. The Strain of FollowingDecisions of the Supreme Court
Despite his dislike of the "invention" test, Learned Hand
nevertheless felt bound by the Supreme Court's decisions that
relied on it.
But, faced with confusing and seemingly
contradictory Supreme Court cases on the subject of "invention," 0
Hand attempted to make an educated guess as to how the Court
would rule in a given case. He elaborated on his approach in 1946
in Foxboro Co. v. Taylor Instrument Cos.:2"
Finally, when all else is said, we cannot ignore the change in recent
years in the standard of invention adopted by the Supreme Court.
It is as idle to pretend that there has been no change as it would be

to be regarded as authoritative") (referring to Hotchkiss). The Bausch & Lomb
case is discussed in more detail in a later section of this work.
246. See, e.g., B.G. Corp. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 79 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1935)
("[Those putatively objective principles by which it is so often supposed that
invention can be detected are illusion, and the product of unconscious
equivocation; the inexorable syllogism which appears to compel the conclusion
is a sham."); E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Glidden Co., 67 F.2d 392, 39495 (2d Cir. 1933).
An invention must be judged by what was in the public demesne, as well
in the inventor's favor, as against him.... If genius is demanded,
surely he was no inventor .... There are indeed expressions in the

books which, taken literally, would exclude' such work from the
protection of the patent laws; there are others which would not. But we
deprecate such a priori rules for determining invention. Nothing has
tended more to confuse and obscure the issue than the attempts of
courts to lay down generalities. The issue does -not admit of such
treatment, for invention is always a function of the particularsituation,
of the conditions which preceded and followed the appearance of the
composition or the machine. That this is a treacherous standard is true
enough, but at least it is less treacherous than easy absolutes which fit
the immediate occasion, but lie athwart any realistic treatment in the
next case.
Id. (emphasis added).
247. 147 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1945).
248. Id. at 347.
249. Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950).
250. See supra for a discussion of selected Supreme Court cases on the
"invention" test.
251. 157 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1946).
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to protest against it; and it is as much the duty of a lower court to
give effect to it, as it is its duty to give effect to any other of the
decisions of that court. We are to dispose of the question of
invention, so far as we can divine, as we think the Supreme Court
would dispose of it; and, once the cloud of complicated scientific
theory, with which it has been surrounded, is blown away, and the
issues are bared as they really are, we have no doubt that that court
would hold the claims invalid. 2

In another example not directly related to the "invention"
standard, but rather involving the novelty of an invention, in
Ruben Condenser Co. v. Copeland Refrigeration Corp. 23 Judge
Hand accepted the Supreme Court's ruling on strict liability for
"Inventors are charged with
knowledge of the prior art:254
knowledge of what the art has done, and all255the elements had been
used before in this, or closely allied, fields."

In another case, Merit Manufacturing Co.
ManufacturingCo.,26 he reiterated similar sentiments:

v.

Hero

Perhaps it would be desirable that an inventor should not be

charged with acquaintance with all that the patent offices of this
and every other country contain, and with all that has ever been
publicly sold or used in the United States; although in that event it
would be an inevitable corollary that infringements should be
limited to plagiarisms. With such considerations we have nothing to
252. Id. at 234 (footnote & citation omitted). Even after the enactment of §
103, Hand continued his cautious approach. Cf Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb
Optical Co., 224 F.2d 530 (1955).
On the other hand it must be owned that, had the case come up for
decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty-five, years before the Act of
1952 went into effect on January 1, 1953, it is almost certain that the
claims would have been invalid. The Courts of Appeal have very
generally found in the recent opinions of the Supreme Court a
disposition to insist upon a stricter test of invention than it used to
apply-indefinite it is true, but indubitably stricter than that defined in
§ 103. Indeed, some of the justices themselves have taken the same
view. The Act describes itself as a codification of existing law, as it
certainly is in the sense that the structure of the system remains
unchanged. Moreover those decisions that have passed upon it have
uniformly referred to it as codification, although so far as we have found
none of them has held that § 103 did not change the standard of
invention. And so the question arises whether we should construe § 103
as restoring the law to what it was when the Court announced the
definition of invention, now expressly embodied in § 103, or whether we
should assume that no change whatever was intended. To decide that
question it seems desirable to look briefly backward.
Id. at 535 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
253. 85 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1936).
254. See, e.g., Mast, Foos, & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co., 177 U.S. 485 (1900). See
also supra notes 115-116 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Stover
Manufacturingdecision.
255. Ruben, 85 F.2d at 541.
256. 185 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1950).
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do; as the law stands, the inventor must accept the position of a
mythically omniscient worker in his chosen field. As the arts
proliferate with prodigious fecundity, his lot is an increasingly hard
257
one.

Perhaps no case better illustrated the dilemma that Hand
faced in discharging his duty as a neutral judge on the one hand,
and his feeling bound by the confused and contradictory Supreme
Court cases on the other, than Jungersen v. Baden.2 8 In his
dissent in that case, Hand reviewed the history of the "invention"

test and the various other standards erected by the high Court,
concluding that "the whole approach to the subject has suffered a
shift within the last decade or so, which I recognize that we should
accept as authoritative."" 9
He went on to confess, however, that the Supreme Court's
cases left him with little, if any, useful road signs on how to
adjudicate cases like Jungersen. Judge Hand seemed pained by
the seeming impossibility of remaining fair, detached, and neutral,
as he felt he should be as a federal judge. He wrote: "However, I
confess myself baffled to know how to proceed, if we are at once to
profess to apply the system as it is, and yet in every concrete
"2 °
instance we are to decide as though it did not exist as it is.

D.

6

Reliance on "SecondaryConsiderations"

To achieve fair and even-handed administration of justice,

Learned Hand, almost always resorted to what the Court later
called "secondary considerations "26' in cases involving the
patentability of inventions.262 The reason perhaps lies in Hand's

257. Id. at 352.
258. 166 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1948).
259. Id.at 812.
260, Id.
261. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). The
Court apparently adopted that terminology from a law review note.
262. Under the guidance of Judge Giles Rich, the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals later adopted Hand's position, and required courts to consider
evidence of "secondary considerations" in all cases involving the patentability
of inventions. See In re Khelghatian, 364 F.2d 870, 873 n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1966)
(Rich, J.).
In our view the [Supreme] Court [in Graham v. John Deere Co.] said
nothing at all about 'doubtful cases,' nor in any way suggested that any
record evidence should not be accorded its full probative weight in
particular situations, such as where the examiner 'is satisfied' the prior
art makes the invention 'clearly obvious.'
Such an approach is
reminiscent of the proverbial 'don't bother me with the facts, my mind is
made up' method of decision and has, we think, no place in the
application of 35 U.S.C. § 103. We therefore remain of the view that the
law requires consideration of all evidence, properly submitted, bearing
on the question of obviousness.
Id. (emphasis added).
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belief that courts must adjudicate these cases on an ad hoc basis,
guided by the facts of each case.
On several occasions during his long tenure on the bench,
Judge Hand philosophized on the importance of "secondary
considerations." For example, in Safety Car Heating & Lighting
Co. v. GeneralElectric Co., he observed:
In appraising an inventor's contribution to the art, as we have often
said, the most reliable test is to look at the situation before and
after it appears ....

[S]o far as it is available, [courts] had best

appraise the originality involved by the circumstances which
preceded, attended and succeeded the appearance of the invention.
Among these will figure the length of time the art, though needing
the invention, went without it: the number of those who sought to

meet the need, and the period over which their efforts were spread:
how many, if any, came upon it at about the same time, whether
before or after: and-perhaps most important of all-the extent to
which it superseded what had gone before. We have repeatedly
declared that in our judgment this approach is more reliable than a
priori conclusions drawn from vaporous, and almost inevitably self-

dependent, general propositions.
And in Clark v. Wright Aeronautical Corp., he articulated a
similar view:
In dealing with the issue of invention, we have tried, so far as
possible, to rely upon objective factors in preference to our a priori
judgment, drawn from what seems to our untutored experience to be
within the range of a person skilled in the art. Instead of trying

ourselves to mirror his capacities, we look to the length of time
during which the incentive existed to contrive the invention, to the
number of unsuccessful efforts that were made in that period,to the
density - so to speak - of those efforts at about the time when the

invention was made, to whether success came independently to
several inventors at about the same time, and to the extent to which
after the invention appeared, it supplanted what had gone before.

These usually are hard questions to answer; but when they can be
answered, they form a substantial basis for inference.6 4
Judge Hand remained faithful to this philosophy after the

The Federal Circuit, after replacing the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals in 1982, embraced Judge Rich's reasoning in Khelghatian. See, e.g.,
Stratoflex, Inc., v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538-39 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(Markey, C.J.).
[Elvidence of secondary considerations may often be the most probative
and cogent evidence in the record. It may often establish that an
invention appearing to have been obvious in light of the prior art was
not. It is to be considered as part of all the evidence, not just when the
decisionmaker remains in doubt after reviewing the art.
Id.
263. 155 F.2d 937, 939 (2d Cir. 1946) (emphasis added).
264. 162 F.2d 960, 966 (2d Cir. 1947) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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enactment of § 103 in 1952.265 He consistently relied on these
objective factors or indicia of unobviousness to determine the
patentability of inventions before the Supreme Court officially
endorsed them in 1966.266
The cases Learned Hand decided sometimes involved
commercial success of the claimed invention as a "secondary
consideration."
One such case, Traitel Marble Co. v. U T.
Hungerford Brass & Copper Co., presented him with the question
of the patentability of an invention for "guide strips in laying
'terrazzo mosaic."' 267 In holding the invention patentable, Judge
Hand noted the commercial success of the invention:
The patent met with wide success and is now used in nine-tenths of
all the "terrazzo mosaic" laid in this country.... Assuming, for
argument, that the law is absolute that there can be no patent for
the new use of an old thing, that is because the statute allows no
monopolies merely for ideas or discoveries. If the thing itself be
new, very slight structural changes may be enough to support a
patent, when they presuppose a use not discoverable without
inventive imagination.... Thus the case is in substance familiar
enough, one in which the inventor has culled this and that out of
nearby arts, and so formed a combination nowhere before existing.
It has been a success; it has substantially driven out earlier
cumbersome methods; it has enabled the art to do with ease what
before it could only do slowly and imperfectly. The result seems to
us a genuine invention, and we so hold." 8
In another case, B.G. Corp. v. Walter Kidde & Co.,269 Learned
Hand expanded on the theme of using evidence of "secondary

265. See, e.g., Norman v. Lawrence, 285 F.2d 505, 506 (2d Cir. 1960) ("We
can only reply that, while the standard remains what it is, we can see no
escape from measuring invention in cases where all the elements of the new
combination had been long available, (1) by whether the need had long existed
and been desired, and (2) whether, when it was eventually contrived, it was
widely exploited as a substitute for what had gone before."); Reiner v. I. Leon
Co., 285 F.2d 501, 504 (2d Cir. 1960) ("There are indeed some sign posts: e.g.,
how long did the need exist; how many tried to find the way; how long did the
surrounding and accessory arts disclose the means; how immediately was the
invention recognized as an answer by those who used the new variant?").
266. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18'(1966) (recognizing
.secondary considerations" or indicia of obviousness or unobviousness, as an
aid in determining unobviousness under § 103).
267. 18 F.2d 66, 67 (2d Cir. 1927). The patent specification disclosed "a
means of laying upon a concrete flooring a top layer of variously colored
concrete surface made in some pattern, and designed roughly to imitate a
mosaic." Id. To accomplish this, "it was necessary to secure a bond between
the two layers, by adding the second while the first was still wet." Id.
268. Id. at 67-69. See also E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Glidden Co., 67
F.2d 392, 395 (2d Cir. 1933) (stating that "courts have always treated such
recognition [i.e., commercial success] as a relevant consideration and certainly
it may not be altogether disregarded").
269. 79 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1935).
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He saw such evidence as probative of
considerations."
patentability, without which courts would have only the nebulous
"invention" standard to rely on:
Often we can truly treat the inquiry as one of fact by observing what
went before and what followed ....

[Ihf no impediment, technical, or

commercial, stood in the way, if during that time others had been at
work upon the same subject, and if the invention was at once
accepted as an answer to the old need, there is usually just basis for
the inference. When such evidence is not at hand, we are forced to
fabricate a standard as best we can from our naive ignorance .... "0
In an early case, National Sweeper Co. v. Bissell Carpet
Sweeper Co., Hand looked to the evidence of commercial success of
the invention.271 Yet, simultaneously, he recognized the dangers
inherent in a cursory examination of commercial success as a
signpost of the patentability of the invention:
The plaintiff... does largely rely upon the success which its
sweeper has attained, and we are forced, therefore, to a
consideration of the propriety of that test here. It is true that the
books are full of cases in which courts have regarded the success of
the plaintiffs patent as an important test of invention, and we are
in no sense disposed to question its value in proper cases. Yet it is a
hazardous rule, and one which is quite likely to result in confusing
genuine invention with imagination in advertising and energy and
business skill in promotion. Where the art presents a case of earlier
efforts, unsuccessful because of the absence of what the patentee
contributed, and followed by a wide success after that contribution
was added, it is reasonable to infer that the art needed that feature,
and that it was not so easy to invent as7 might seem to us, who
necessarily have no proficiency in the art.11
Judge Hand, therefore, required a "nexus" between the

270. Id. at 22.
271. 249 F. 196, 198 (2d Cir. 1918); see also M.S. Wright Co. v. Bissell Carpet
Sweeper Co., 249 F. 199, 201 (2d Cir. 1918) ("No discussion of the success of
the machine is necessary, beyond what we have said in the case of National
Sweeper Co. v. Bissell Carpet Sweeper Co.").
272. National Sweeper, 249 F. at 198; see also E.I. Du Pont de Nemours &
Co. v. Glidden Co., 67 F.2d 392, 394-95 (2d Cir. 1933) ("True, this [reliance on
commercial success] must not be pressed too far; it is easier to pay tribute
than to fight, and a substantial part of the trade has combined in this contest.
But courts have always treated such recognition as a relevant consideration

and certainly it may not. be altogether disregarded."); Wire Wheel Corp. v. C.
T. Silver, Inc., 266 F. 221, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1919) ("As in all successful patents,
the patentee, properly enough, relies upon the supposed proof of invention
It is a most hazardous test.
arising from commercial exploitation.
Commercial success, as the courts have repeatedly observed, may arise from
many other reasons than a new inventive idea .... [Ilts main value is in cases
where the existing means have for some time been unsatisfactory, and where
the new step has at once answered the need and displaced what went before.")
(emphasis added).
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commercial success of the invention and the patented invention:
It by no means follows that every successful exploitation of a patent
complies with these conditions; ... but we must be able to attribute
the success to the invention, and the dominant idea rested, as it
seems to us, rather in the general conception of such an appliance,
[and not in the claimed invention].273
In addition to commercial success, Learned Hand was
cognizant of the significance of other "secondary considerations,"
such as failure of others and long-felt need in the art to which the
invention pertains. While still a district judge, in Wire Wheel
Corp. of America v. C. T Silver, Inc., he commented on the role of
evidence of failure of other artisans to achieve what the invention
had accomplished and added that such evidence, when coupled
with evidence of the commercial success of the invention, was
"telling" of patentability.274
He observed that he would not
substitute his "own judgment for the objective2 7evidence
that the
5
new thing was not so easy to make as it looked. ,
2 76
Ruben Condenser Co. v. Copeland Refrigeration Corp.
presented Judge Hand with the issue of the significance of the
failure of artisans to supply the needed invention. He refined that
sub-test as follows:
The setting here is a familiar one; at about the same time several
inventors began to supply the same need; they naturally varied in
their answers and one may be better than the others. But there is
little antecedent reason for saying that any of such spontaneous
outcroppings required unusual abilities, or that a successful device
was not sure to be soon found. That is quite a different picture from
that of a need long existing, with inconclusive answers spread
throughout its duration, finally capped by success. 277
Six years later, in Dewey & Almy Chemical Co. v. Mimex
Co.2 7 ' Learned Hand eloquently set forth reasons for continuing
adherence to his earlier rule of attaching significance in cases that
presented evidence of the failure of others in the field. First,
noting the "exceptional" commercial success of the invention,
273. National Sweeper, 249 F. at 198-99. Finding no such nexus, Judge
Hand found a lack of patentable "invention." Id. at 199. The Federal Circuit
has embraced a similar nexus requirement in the post § 103 era. See, e.g.,
Stratoflex, Inc., v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("A
nexus is required between the merits of the claimed invention and the
evidence offered, if that evidence is to be given substantial weight enroute to
conclusion on the obviousness issue.").

274. 266 F. 221, 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
275. Id. Nevertheless, based on the totality of the evidence present in the
case, Judge Hand held the patent invalid. Wire Wheel Corp. v. C. T. Silver,
Inc., 266 F. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1919).
276. 85 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1936).
277. Id. at 541.
278. 124 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1942).
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Judge Hand felt that denying patentability to the invention for the
"improved preservation of foods and other perishable goods[ 27I9
would deny recognition where recognition most is [sic] helpful.
He then addressed the failure of others in the field:
These inventors did not move along a well-marked way; they struck
out on a new path which led to a goal that men had unsuccessfully
tried to reach for many years. To say that for this they needed to
look no further afield than the ordinary routineer, one must shut
280
one's eyes to all the significant facts.
Similarly, in Western States Machine Co. v. S.S. Hepworth
Co., Hand commented first on the nebulous invention test and the
difficulties it causes. 21 He then went on to note that "[a]s [he had]
often repeated, in judging what requires uncommon ingenuity, the
best standard is what common ingenuity
has failed for long to
282
contrive under the same incentive."

Finally, in the famous case of Jungersen v. Baden, Judge
Hand faced the situation where, partly because of the Supreme
Court's rulings, he could not rely on the 283
commercial success of the
invention as a sign-post of patentability.
Faced with such a difficult situation, Learned Hand resorted
to the invention's success in filling the void left by the failure of
others. In his dissent from the majority's decision to strike down
the patent, he wrote: "What better test of invention can one ask
than the detection of that which others had all along had a strong
incentive to discover, but
had failed to see, though all the while it
284
lay beneath their eyes?"
279. Id. at 990-91.
280. Id. at 991. Judge Hand held the invention patentable.
281. 147 F.2d 345, 347 (2d Cir. 1945).
However, "invention" is so elusive a word that, if nothing had stood in
the way of fabricating such a machine, if the art had waited long for one,
and if, when it appeared, it had superseded all that had gone before; if
all these facts conspired, we will not say that they might not have
overcome our hesitation.
Id.
282. Id.
283. 166 F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1948), affd, 335 U.S. 560 (1949) ("In the past
the commercial success enjoyed by plaintiff might well have sufficed to tip the
balance in favor of validity. Recent Supreme Court pronouncements indicate
clearly that commercial success cannot raise a combination of known elements
to the exalted level of invention."). In addition, Hand felt bound by the high
Court's strict "flash of creative genius" standard. See id. at 810. ("Hence the
'flash of genius' must be found, if anywhere, in the plaintiffs recollection of the
use of this force in dental casting and decision to apply it to this old process.").
284. Id. at 812. See also Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 224 F.2d 530,
535 (2d Cir. 1955).
The most competent workers in the field had at least ten years been
seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there had been
a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile nothing in the
implementary arts had been lacking to put the advance into operation;
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Other cases presented the opportunity for Judge Hand to

consider and comment on additional "secondary considerations,"
such as licensing by others285 and contributions to a crowded
field.286 Although recognizing the significance of the evidence of

such "secondary considerations," Hand took care not to confuse the
presence of patentable invention with other factors that may have
contributed
to287 the
apparent
presence
of
"secondary
considerations."

In Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., Hand wrote a
landmark decision interpreting the impact of § 103 shortly after it

was enacted.288

In that case and other later patent cases he

decided, he adhered to the same philosophy about patents and the

same approach to deciding patentability questions, namely, by
placing them in the context of the surrounding circumstances.
That was the same philosophy that was so evident in his pre-1952
Patent Act decisions.

when it appeared, it supplanted the existing practice and occupied
substantially the whole field.
Id.
285. See, e.g., Ruben Condenser, 85 F.2d at 540-41 ("The plaintiffs have
indeed received a large income from licenses..
").
286. See, e.g., Automatic Devices Corp. v. Cuno Eng'g Corp., 117 F.2d 361,
363-64 (2d Cir. 1941), rev'd, 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
It would indeed be absurd to rate this [an automatic cigarette lighter for
an automobile] as a major invention, yet it did bring to what appears to
be its final form a contrivance which had become a standard fixture in
motor cars; and upon every detail of these as much human ingenuity
has been expended as perhaps on any machine. Just such trifles often
help sales; in the severe competition of motor car industry the perfecting
of even a trifling furnishing like this may be the object of study and
experiment....
If patents are to go to those who contribute new
appliances that are beyond the limited imagination of the ordinary
skilled person, this invention seems to us to merit a patent.
Id.
287. See, e.g., Ruben Condenser Co. v. Copeland Refrigeration Corp., 85 F.2d
537, 541 (2d Cir. 1936). Judge Hand noted that the plaintiffs had obtained
licenses from other players in the field:
but that only means that the licensees have preferred to make their
peace rather than fight, and little can be judged from it.
Such
acquiescence has often been taken as evidence of invention upon
preliminary injunction, but the force of the inference is very variable.
The reasoning is that if licensees consent to pay tribute, they must
believe the disclosure to be patentable, and that this is evidence that It
was beyond commonplace contrivance. But when a manufacturer takes
a license, it Is the resultant of two opposed motives, its cost and the
dangers of Infringement; and the magnitude of neither factor can be
ascertained without knowing that of the other.
Id.
288. 224 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1955).
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V.

EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE ENACTMENT OF §

103

A. A Crying Need for a Workable Standardof Patentability
Court decisions prior to the enactment of § 103 failed to
produce, let alone apply, a uniform standard of patentability.
Rather, the dragon of the "invention standard" ran roughshod
through the patent kingdom. Patent attorneys took advantage of
the situation, quoting from whichever case best suited their
position. As Judge Rich so eloquently put it, "'Invention' was that
'beautiful uncertainty in the law' from which the Patent Bar made
its living-practicing what was essentially a mystery."289
Judges also took advantage of this weakness in the patent
law. Judge Rich commented on the way judges were using the
random and inconsistent caselaw to select a test of patentability
stating:
I would say that, in general, judges did whatever they felt like doing
according to whatever it was that gave the judge his feelings-out of
the evidence coupled with his past mental conditioning-and then
selected those precedents which supported his conclusions. Patent
Office examiners and Board of Appeals members did the same.290
But there were movements in the Patent Bar to correct the
problem. For instance, in 1948, the National Patent Planning
Commission, headed by Charles Kettering,29' came out with a
report on the status of the patent law. Their observations
reflected the times:
One of the greatest technical weaknesses of the patent system is the
lack of a definitive yardstick as to what is invention. The most
serious weakness of the present patent system is the lack of a
uniform test or standard for determining whether the particular
contribution of an inventor merits the award of the patent grant."'

289. Giles S. Rich, Why and How Section 103 Came to Be, in
NONOBVIOUSNESS-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY 1:201, 1:207
(John F. Witherspoon ed., 1980) [hereinafterRich, Why and Hov.
290. Id. at 1:208. In another article, Rich commented that "[tlhe requirement
for 'invention' was the plaything of the judges who, as they became initiated into
its mysteries, delighted to devise and expound their own ideas of what it meant,
some very lovely prose resulting." Rich, Principles,supra note 16.
291. Charles Franklin Kettering was a famous inventor credited with inventing
the first electrical ignition system, the self-starter for automobile engines, and the
first practical engine-driven generator. The National Inventors Hall of Fame 4142 (U.S. Pat. and Trademark Off. 1984). Kettering had set up and directed a
research laboratory at General Motors which was responsible.for developing "the
lightweight diesel engine that made the diesel locomotive possible, the refrigerant
Freon, four-wheel brakes, safety glass, and many other Items." Id.at 42.
Kettering held some 140 patents. Id.
292. Report of the 1948 National Patent Planning Commission, quoted in Rich,
Why and How, supra note 289, at 1:207.
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The National Patent Planning Commission lamented the use
of the intangible, undefinable "invention" standard: "The difficulty
in applying this status [R.S. 4886] arises out of the presence of the
words 'invented' and 'discovered.' Novelty alone is not sufficient,
nor is utility, nor is the final accomplishment. There must also be
present some
mysterious ingredient connoted in the term
29 3
'invented.'
The National Patent Planning Commission suggested a
solution to this problem. While it did not directly lead to any
legislative action, several members of the Patent Bar, including
Giles Rich, took notice. The Commission called for "the enactment
of a declaration of policy that patentability shall be determined
objectively by the nature of the contribution to the advancement of
the art, and not subjectively by the nature of294the process by which
the invention may have been accomplished."
Further evidence of the turmoil caused by the indiscriminate
use of the invention standard can readily be seen in the caselaw.
While numerous courts used expressions such as "obviousness" or
"obvious to one skilled in the art," no clear or consistent
patentability standard was discernable. To the contrary, the
courts seemed determined to decide first whether the patented
device demonstrated "invention" or the "exercise of the inventive
faculty." Then, they would conclude that the invention was or was
not obvious. Any patent attorney, therefore, who tried to advance
a non-obviousness standard of patentability was left open to
ambush by judicial references to lack of "invention," failure to
exercise the "inventive faculty," or lack of "inventive genius."
Many courts were persuaded of a patent's validity by
secondary consideration, such as long-felt need, prior unsuccessful
attempts of others, and commercial success. Although ultimately
rejected as having too narrow a focus, a long-felt need test to
determine obviousness would make its way into a proposal before
the House Committee on revision of the patent laws.295
But in the end, none of the secondary considerations made its
way into legislation. The reason may have been that there was no
uniformity in the caselaw in the way such considerations were to
be applied. Some courts applied them; others ignored them. Some
courts recognized the danger of hindsight analysis; others did not.
The dilemma facing the Patent Bar at this time is best exemplified
by caselaw discussed above and immediately following.
In Edison Electric Light Co. v. United States Electric Lighting
Co., the Second Circuit favorably considered Thomas Edison's
293. Id.

294. Id. (emphasis added by Giles Rich).
295. H.R. 4061, 80th Cong. (1949), cited In Rich, Why and How, supra note 289,
at 1:208-209. See P.J. Federico, Origins of Section 103, 5 APLA Q. J. 87, 90
(1977).
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famous patent on electric light bulbs.296 The accused infringer
argued that Edison's substitution of carbon for platinum in a
In siding with
vacuum tube was an obvious improvement.9'
Edison, the Court pointed out that the patented improvement led
to production of the first practical electric light bulb:
Experts called for the defendant have testified that such change of
material involved no invention, because the use, as a substitute for
platinum, of carbon of any size, operated in a vacuum, would be
obvious to one skilled in the art. To this proposition we cannot
assent. Sawyer and Man were skilled in the art, but even after they
had learned how to force out the occluded gases, and withdraw them
from the lamp chamber, they turned away from the vacuum thus
ready to their hands, feeling no doubt that they were following the
teachings of the art in seeking stability by the use, not of a vacuum,
but of a nitrogen atmosphere. Edison was skilled in the art, but
after he had the nearly perfect vacuum of the French patent,
secured against leaking by the all-gas globe of Geissler and Crookes,
it was only after months of patient and persistent experiment that
he found, in the substitution for his platinum of a filament of
carbon, the success he had long sought for, but not till then
attained. 98
Similar evidence of prior failed attempts convinced the court
in Richardson v. Shepard to uphold a patent for an improvement
on clothes pins. 99 Here, the court particularly noted the large
number of clothes fastening patents granted prior to the one at
issue. 300 Despite all of the experimentation, no one had thought to
make the present combination:
This circumstance strongly tends to prove that such a modification
of the [prior art] pin would not be obvious to one skilled in the art,
and that, therefore, it called for the exercise of the inventive faculty.
If we add to this the further circumstance that most of these prior
efforts were failures, and that none of them met with more than
moderate success, and contrast this with the great utility, extensive
public use, marked commercial success of the De Long hook, I think
these considerations are sufficient to resolve any doubt on the
question of patentability in favor of the patentee.30 '
This philosophy was also followed in Westinghouse Electric &
Manufacturing Co. v. Dayton Fan & Motor Co., where the court
rejected an argument that the patent at issue was invalid in view
of prior patents:

296. 52 F. 300 (2d Cir. 1892).

This case was decided well before Learned

Hand's appointment to the bench in 1909.

297. Id.at 308.
298. Id. at 308-09.

299. 60 F. 273 (C.C.D. Mass. 1894).
300. Id.at 275.
301. Id. (emphasis added).
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Now, it is said that in view of the prior art, including the Tesla
patents of May 1, 1888, there was no invention in this last step, but
merely the exercise of the skill of the electrician or electrical
engineer, because the taking of the first step by Tesla rendered the
second step perfectly obvious to any one skilled in the art. But,
notwithstanding the state of the prior art, and the "laboratory
knowledge" of those skilled in it, no one but Tesla took either of
these steps which have. added so much to the practical and useful
knowledge of the electrical world. 302

Some
commercial

courts

were

persuaded

of

patentability

success of the patented device.

In

by the

New Process

Fermentation Co. v. Maus, the Supreme Court heard an appeal of
the validity of a patent for an improved method of brewing beer. 3
The lower court had decided that the patent was invalid because
the claimed device "would seem not to involve anything more than

a mere mechanical change, which could be employed by any one
skilled in the art."0 4 The Supreme Court reversed. 30 ° The most
important fact in the Supreme Court opinion seemed to be the
widespread adaptation and use, i.e., commercial success, of the
patented process:
The testimony is very full and clear that, as a process, it was not
known or used before in the art of making beer; that it worked a
valuable and important change in that art, in the particulars set
forth in the specification; that it went at once extensively into use,
both in Europe and the United States; and that it was recognized as
a new and valuable invention, in published works on the subject,
immediately after it was made known. 301
37

Rodman Chemical Co. v. Deeds Commercial Laboratories,
provides an example of a patentability opinion which focused on
evidence of a long-felt need in the industry related to the patent at
issue. In Rodman, the Court rejected the defendant's argument
that the patent for an improved method of manufacturing
carbonizing material for dry packing was invalid because it was
obvious to one skilled in the art. The Court pointed to the
circumstances in the industry prior to the invention:
That the possible hints given by the patents cited were never
grasped, that tons of coal and coke dust were allowed to go to waste,
strengthen the presumption, inherent in the grant of the patent,
that the conception involved an exercise of the inventive faculties

302. 106 F. 724, 728 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1901), a/id, 118F. 562 (6th Cir. 1902)
(emphasis added).
303. 122 U.S. 413 (1887).
304. New Process Fermentation Co. v. Maus, 20 F. 725, 733 (1884), rev'd, 122
U.S. 413 (1887).
305. New Process, 122 U.S. at 413.
306. Id. at 424 (emphasis added).
307. 261 F. 189 (7th Cir. 1919).
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and was not an obvious deduction.

°8

Some courts adopted the rule that patentability should not be

negated by improper hindsight analysis.

For example, in In re

Pupin, the D.C. Circuit Court reversed a decision by the
Commissioner of Patents in which the Commissioner had rejected
as obvious certain claims directed to a direct-current generator.3 °9
The Court accused the Commissioner of allowing his judgment to
be tainted by hindsight stating:
We cannot hold that, after Steinmetz's disclosure, appellant's
apparatus became obvious to any one skilled in the art. To say that
would simply mean that, faced by a crying need for a device which
would remove the objectionable hum from sound-reproducing
systems, inventors of electrical appliances and those skilled in the
art were blind to the aggressively apparent for more than six years
after the announcement of the Steinmetz formula. Problems which
vex the brain for many a weary hour and many a weary year become
obvious to all the world, once they are solved, but their obviousness
after3 the
° fact does not necessarilyprove their obviousness before the
fact. t

Again in Kelley v. Coe, the D.C. Circuit held the
Commissioner of Patents in error for using hindsight in refusing to
grant a patent on a suction device for dry rock-drilling.3 ' The
invention differed from the prior art by substituting a blower, or
suction pump, for an ejector, as the means for sucking air out of
the hole being drilled. 32 The Commissioner had rejected the
substitution as obvious. The court reversed, noting: "This is a
splendid example of that type of reasoning which assumes,
because it is easy to follow a blazed trail, that it is also easy to
make one."313

308. Id.at 191. Similar logic was applied in Pieper v. S.S. White Dental Mffg.
Co., where the court rejected a defendant's argument that the plaintiffs
combination patent for an electrical dental motor was invalid a being obvious to
one skilled in the art:
Quite naturally the first thing they did was to try their direct current
dental engine on alternating current. It rotated, but they could not
make it satisfy the known requirements for a dental engine. Were they
stupid? Were they purposely avoiding the obvious? Is the looking
backward opinion of appellee's expert a better guide than their forward
efforts?
228 F. 30, 37 (7th Cir. 1915).
309. 299 F. 697 (D.C. Cir. 1924).
310. Id. at 701 (emphasis added).
311. 99 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
312. Id. at 437.
313. Id. at 440. A similar criticism was leveled by the court in a case involving
an application for a patent for a repeater compass. The D.C. Circuit Court
observed:
It is often easy, after a mechanical device has been discovered and
successfully reduced to practice, to speculate as to the simplicity of the
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Further, in response to the Commissioner's contention that
anyone skilled in the art could have taken this and that from the
various patents and, putting them together, could have devised
the Kelley method", the Court relied on evidence of a long-felt need
in the industry for a solution to the problem:
But the fact remains that, in the face of a crying need for a new
process or method in the industry, not one of the best engineers in
the world, with their attention especially directed to the subject for
approximately thirty years, was able to see what Kelley saw, or to
produce the result which he produced. 4
And, in Wach v. Coe, the D.C. Circuit Court again reversed
the Patent Office. '5
It concluded that the invention was
patentable, observing that if "the best marine engineers in the
world, with unlimited means at their command, failed to solve the
problem," the solution finally arrived at by the inventor could not
have been obvious to one skilled in the art. 6
Other cases appear to have taken an entirely different
approach.
Instead of looking at secondary considerations,
hindsight analysis was applied to the process of conception of the
invention and the determination of whether that process was
worthy of the title "invention." For instance, in Brunswick-BalkeCollender Co. v. Rosatto, the Third Circuit affirmed the lower
court's finding of patent invalidity for an improved bowling alley,
which comprised semicircular gutters instead of the prior art
rectangular gutters. 17' The Court assessed the patentee's thought
process as follows:
[Wihen Wiggins recognized the evil, he did not have to invent
anything to overcome it. There were no experiments or tentative
efforts. He did not invent circular pathways for balls, nor invest
them with any new function when they were used as ball-troughs
along an alley-bed. As an experienced builder, he was able to
remedy the evil as soon as he recognized it, for it was the recognition
of the evil, and not the means of overcoming it, that characterized

what he did. It was one of those mechanical problems which, as
soon as an evil was recognized, one skilled in the art was able to
meet. 311
process by which it was accomplished. The twilight zone between that
which is obvious to one skilled in the art and invention is not always
easy of determination.
Otto v. Robertson, 66 F.2d 213, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1933).
314. Kelley, 99 F.2d at 442.
315. 77F.2d 113 (D.C. Cir. 1935).

316. Id. at 114.
317. 165 F. 56 (3d Cir. 1908).

318. Id. at 58 (emphasis added).

The Sixth Circuit similarly opined in

Westinghouse Electric & Manufacturing Co. v Toledo, P.C. & L.Ry Co., on a
patent claim for a method of electric motor control that "the advance [was] so
slight as to be of no real value, and, such as it is, is obvious to one skilled in the
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Similarly, in Cambridge Trust Co. v. Coe, the D.C. Circuit
Court held that the substitution of a black and white sound track
for a blue sound track on color film did not involve any "inventive
concept" but was "an obvious step to one skilled in the art" and
thus, not patentable. 9 Quoting the Board of Appeals of the
Patent Office, the court stated:
In view of the very brief and broad reference to the simple solution
of the problem we think that after it was found that color tints
interfere with the sound record, if present therein, that inventive
concept is not involved in broadly separately producing these two
zones 2on
the film, leaving the sound record in plain black and
0
white.,

Variations of the Hotchkiss "skillful mechanic" test also
appeared in the caselaw. In Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co. v.
Rosatto, the bowling ball gutter case mentioned above, the court
looked for an "ordinary workman possessed of the usual
3 21
mechanicalskill."
In Phillips v. Detroit,the Supreme Court held
that an improvement in street and highway pavements "was
within the mental reach of any one skilled in the art to which the
patent relates."3 22 And in Adams v. Galion Iron Works &
Manufacturing Co., the Sixth Circuit specified that "the question
of invention must be approached from the standpoint of one skilled
in the art,not merely one of reasonable mechanical ability in other
arts.""'
The facility of the courts to "invent" new standards of
patentability or unpatentabilty might also be noted. For example,
the Seventh Circuit in Standard Oil Co. v. Globe Oil Refining Co.
combined a "new resulting use" test with requirements that the
patent achieve a "new or unobvious result," and be more than "a
art." 172 F. 371, 372 (6th Cir. 1909).

319. 87 F.2d 543, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
320. Id. (emphasis added). See also Bauer Bros. v. Bogalusa Paper Co., 96 F.2d
991, 995 (5th Cir. 1938) (holding that "the addition of water to the rolling and
crushing of the attrition mill is simply the adaptation of the function of the mill to
a process old in the art.... It is obvious to those skilled in the art. It teaches
nothing new."); Kalich v. Paterson Pac. Parchment Co., 137 F.2d 649 (9th Cr.
1943) (rejecting the patentability of an improved method for packing products
such as lettuce in parchment or other paper).
[H]e did nothing but improve with a minor difference which would occur
to one skilled in the art a system of packing lettuce or vegetable
products, which did not amount to invention. Skill by one of the trade
rather than invention was involved in the solution here. Patentees are not
entitled to a monopoly for the judicious use of material which would
produce the result to be expected from such selection. Recognition is not
invention.
Id.at 651 (emphasis added).
321. Brunswick-Balke, 165 F. at 58 (emphasis added).
322. 111 U.S. 604, 607 (1884) (emphasis added).
323. 42 F.2d 395, 397 (1930) (emphasis added).
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mere aggregation of old elements."32 4 In finding the claims for an
improved method of cracking petroleum invalid, the court applied
the following test:
Regardless of the multiplicity of references in such cases, the
validity must depend upon a new resulting use, or an operative
change in degree which was not theretofore obvious to one skilled in

the art. A perusal of the record convinces us that the District Court
was right in holding that this patent produced no new or unobvious
result,and that it was a mere aggregation of old elements. 25
The "flash of genius" test also periodically surfaced. For
instance, in Hamilton Standard Propeller Co. v. Fay-Egan
ManufacturingCo., the Sixth Circuit made a passing reference to
the Hotchkiss "skillful mechanic" test, but then concluded that
"[t]he patentee did not display any flash of genius, inspiration or
imagination."326

One commentator noted:
Various criteria have been used by the courts to determine what is a
.patentable invention.". .. Unfortunately, it is difficult, if not
impossible, to determine from the decisions whether the courts have
been applying a more severe and exacting legal standard of
patentability or whether they have merely been more exacting in
their determination of what
would have been obvious to one having
27
ordinary skill in the art.

Given the lack of any meaningful and uniformly applied
standard of patentability in the decisions of the Supreme Court
and lower courts throughout this period, it is curious that the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals suggested otherwise in
1944:
Until very recently the decisions of all courts having jurisdiction
over patent matters have uniformly held that if the thing patented
involved patentable subject matter, was useful and was not
anticipated by the prior art nor obvious to one skilled in the art, it
3281
evidenced invention and was patentable ....

In any event, it was this unhappy state of the law that led
Giles Rich to conclude that the "invention" standard should be
completely dropped from the determination of patentability. He
324. 82 F.2d 488, 498 (7th Cir. 1936).
325. Id.(emphasis added).
326. 101 F.2d 614, 617 (6th Cir. 1939).
327. Herbert H. Goodman, The Effect of Section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952
Upon the Patent Laws, 35 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. Soc'Y 233, 235 (1953)
(footnotes omitted).
328. In re Shortell, 142 F.2d 292, 295 (C.C.P.A. 1944) (emphasis added). Judge
Learned Hand took issue with this statement, observing that it would be "idle to
pretend that there has been no change" in the standard of invention adopted by
the Supreme Court. Foxboro Co. v. Taylor Instrument Co., 157 F.2d 226, 234 (2d
Cir. 1946).
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remarked that "the requirement for invention was a lead razor
which could not take
an edge and could be nothing other than a
29
blunt instrument. 0
B. Judge Rich's Involvement
In the mid-1940's, Giles Rich, then in private practice in New
York, became active in efforts to revive the doctrine of contributory
infringement."' Recent Supreme Court decisions had expanded
the scope of the patent misuse doctrine and nearly destroyed the
doctrine of contributory infringement. 33'
As the legislative
representative for the New York Patent Law Association, Rich
attended Congressional committee hearings in Washington, D.C.
on the Association's proposed contributory infringement bill."3 2 By
coincidence, that same committee also decided to take up
codification of the patent laws in Title 35.333
Fearing possible attacks on the patent system if the Justice
Department's Anti-Trust Division became involved, the Patent
Office quickly offered the services of one of its Examiners-in-Chief,
P.J. Federico, to draft a bill for the committee. 34 The National
Council of Patent Law Associations joined the effort, to ensure
that the Patent Office's interpretation of the law would be
compatible with the view of the Patent Bar. 3 ' To that end, the
Council set up a special two-man Drafting Committee and
appointed Rich as one of its members. Throughout the next two
years, Rich worked with and made pivotal modifications to
Federico's draft which included what would become § 103.
Although Rich did not abandon his work on contributory
infringement 36 he now took up the far more awesome task of

329. Rich, Why and How, supra note 289, at 1:213.
330. The Supreme Court's decision in Carbice Corp. v. American Pat. Dev.
Corp., 283 U.S. 27, reh' granted,283 U.S. 420 (1931) had piqued Rich's interest
in contributory infringement. Giles S. Rich, Address to American Inn of Court
Inaugural Meeting, October 1, 1991, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOc'y 309,
316 (1994) [hereinafter Rich, Address to American Inn]. In 1942, the Journal of
the Patent Office Society published in five installments a paper by Rich
discussing the issues of patent misuse, contributory infringement, the distinction
between a patent right and a monopoly, and licensing restrictions, entitled The
Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws. Giles S. Rich,
The Relation Between Patent Practicesand Anti-Monopoly Laws, 42 J. PAT. OFF.

SoC'Y 85, 159, 241, 328, 422 (1942).
331. See Rich, Address to American Inn, supra note 330, at 317 (citing Justice
Douglas' opinion in Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944),
as having "wiped out contributory infringement, in the opinion of the Patent

bar").
332. Rich, Address to American Inn, supra note 330, at 317.
333. Seeid. at 317-18.

334. Id.
335. Id. at 318.
336. Giles Rich continued to pursue the issue of contributory infringement
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attempting to erase the amorphous "invention" standard from the
minds of judges, patent attorneys and future patent caselaw.
While P.J. Federico was responsible for combining the actual
ingredients, Giles Rich was intimately involved in the drafting
process for § 103 from the beginning. For instance, the second
paragraph of Federico's very first draft came from a legislative
proposal Rich had made for the New York Patent Law Association
in 1948. After hearing of legislative proposals to either codify the
long-felt need test337 or to mandate a general objective approach,338
Rich convinced the New York Patent Law Association to offer its
own proposal. The New York Patent Law Association's suggestion
was aimed at eliminating tests such as the "flash of creative
genius" test of Cuno Engineering,that required exploration of the
mental processes of inventors. The Association's proposal simply
stated: "[Platentabilty shall be determined by the nature of the
contribution to the advancement of the art not by the nature of the
process by which such contribution may have been
accomplished.

039

While that specific language was not adopted in the
legislative session, Federico used a slightly modified form in his
first draft (then titled § 23):

throughout his involvement with § 103. After the Seventh Circuit struck down a
patent for patent misuse in Cardox Corp. v. Armstrong Coalbreaking Co., 194
F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1952), Rich wrote an article criticizing the decision. In this
article he stated:
The misuse doctrine, in the course of its evolution, is approaching the
ultimate, at which point all a patentee will have to do to be held guilty
of misuse is to confess to the crime of patent ownership .

. .

. [Ilf this is

to be the law then the patented article has indeed become a strange and
delicate creature, doomed to walk alone and afraid to associate with
common unpatented merchandise, like motors, compressors, pipe,
unions and connectors, for fear of becoming infected with their
unpatented status.
Giles S. Rich, Misuse, A New Frontier?, 34 J. PAT. OFF. SOc'Y 391, 391, 394
(1952). Rich's efforts finally resulted in §§ 271(b) and (c) and the predecessor to
current § 271(d) of Title 35.
337. H.R. 4061, 80th Cong. (1949), citedin Rich, Why and How, supranote 289,
at 1:208-09.
338. H.R. 5248, 80th Cong. (1949), citedin Rich, Why and How, supranote 289,
at 1:209. This bill would have added the following sentence to the current
statute:
Patentability of inventions and discoveries, including discoveries due to
research, and improvements thereof, shall be determined objectively by
the nature of the contribution to the advancement of the art, and not
subjectively by the nature of the mental process by which the invention
or discovery, or the improvement thereof, may have been accomplished.
Id.
339. Rich, Why andHow, supra note 289, at 1:209.
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§ 23 Conditions for patentability, lack of invention
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described in the material specified in § 22 of this title, if
the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented
and said material are such that the subject matter as a whole would
be obvious to an ordinary person skilled in the art.
Patentability as to this condition shall be determined by the nature
of the contribution to the advancement of the art, and not by the
nature of the mental
processes by which such contribution may have
34 0
been accomplished
The first changes Rich and the Drafting Committee suggested
to Federico's draft were to the title of the section. Rich had
already been working to convince his fellow committee members
and the congressional committee that the troublesome "invention"
terminology should be omitted from the statute. He asked them:
"Why don't we get away from this troublesome term altogether?
... Let's not use it at all and say what we really mean, and speak
in terms of a requirement for patentability,saying how it shall be
determined."3 4'
Hence, "Conditions for patentability, lack of
invention" became
"Conditions for patentability, non-obvious
34
subject matter." 1
Rich, through his role on the Drafting Committee, made
further contributions to focus the obviousness test and to limit the
scope of the patentability inquiry. On the question of obvious to
whom, Rich answered, "obvious to a person having ordinary skill
in the art." As to when the determination of obviousness was to be
made, Rich answered, "at the time the invention was made." Rich
also explained that the invention to be considered in a
determination of obviousness should include "the [claimed] subject
matter as a whole." (emphasis added).
Finally, Rich and the Drafting Committee wanted to make
sure that the flash of genius test would be banished forever. For
that purpose, they modified the second sentence of Federico's draft
to unequivocally state that patentability "shallnot be negatived by
the manner in which [the] contribution may have been
accomplished." (emphasis added).
After the suggestions and comments of Rich and the Drafting
Committee were incorporated, the draft proposal read:
§ 103. Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described in the material specified in § 102 of this title,

340. Federico, supra note 297, at 91 (emphasis added).
341. Rich, Why and How, supra note 289, at 1:209.
342. Id. at 1:211.
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if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented
and said material are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinaryskill in the art.
Patentability as to this condition shall be determined by the nature
of the contribution to the art, and shall not be negatived by 34the
3
manner in which such contribution may have been accomplished.
A comparison of this draft to the current form of § 103 shows that
these modifications have withstood the test of time.3
There is no doubt that § 103 was an improvement over the
undesirable "invention" standard. As Giles Rich explained:
The question will, of course, be asked, "What difference does it
make, it must still be a subjective decision?" True, but now the
statute provides a standard according to which the subjective
decision must be made. There is a vast difference between basing a
decision on exercise of the inventive or creative faculty, or genius,
ingenuity, patentable novelty, flashes, surprises and excitement, on
the one hand, and basing it on unobviousness to one of ordinary skill
in the art on the other. It is possible to determine what art is
involved, what type of skill is possessed by ordinary workers in it,
and come to some conclusion as to what "ordinary skill" would be at
a given time. This may present knotty problems but it is a definite
pattern of thinking and does not leave the Patent Office or the
courts free to conclude that a thing is not patentable for any old
reason and then stand on the proposition that something
indefinable and impalpable called "invention" was not involved. At
least they have to talk in terms of obviousness to a man of ordinary
skill in the art. While the ultimate decision as to what his skill
would be and what would be obvious to him is subjective, it is one
definite proposition on which evidence can be adduced. The best the
courts could do in the past was to assume, under certain sets of
circumstances such as the existence of a long-felt want and an
immediate market acceptance of an invention, that there must have
been "invention."345

343. Federico, supra note 295, at 94 (emphasis added).
344. The current statute reads:
§ 103 Conditions for patentability; nonobvious subject matter:
(a) A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentabilityshall
not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1994).
345. Rich, Principles,supra note 16, at 406.
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C. CongressionalIntent for § 103, or Lack Thereof
The passage of § 103 was a milestone in patent law history,
even though Congress did not recognize its significance. The
report of Mr. Crumpacker, a member of the House Subcommittee
on Patents recalled the event as follows:
A good 95% of the members of both bodies never knew that the
legislation was under consideration, or that it had passed, let alone
what it contained.
In the House the bill went through on the Consent Calendar-along
with, on the same day, dozens of other pieces of legislation. When it
was reached on the calendar no questions were asked and no
explanations were offered. There was not even an insertion in the
record to explain the bill. The entire time consumed by the passage
of the bill probably did not total 30 seconds. Only a handful of
members-the members of the "Objectors' Committee" on the two
sides of the aisle- were paying any attention to what was going on.
How can the House, as a legislative body, be said to have had any
"intent" with respect to the bill?346

The issue of what Congressional intent should be attributed
to this minimal action would come up time and time again as the
meaning of § 103 was later examined and interpreted by the
courts. While the plain language of the statute unmistakably
rejects the "flash of genius" test, some patent attorneys and judges
would take a different view, relying on the following conversation
from the Senate floor as justification:
Mr. SALTONSTALL: Mr. President, will the Senator from Nevada
tell us the purpose of the bill?
Mr. McCARRAN: The bill would codify the patent laws of the
United States. It is under the able guidance of the Senator from
Wisconsin. (Mr. Wiley).
Mr. SALTONSTALL: I am not a patent lawyer, but I know patents
are a very technical subject. Does the bill change the law in any
way or only codify the present patent laws?
Mr. McCARRAN: It codifies the present patent laws. It passed the
House, and it was approved by the Judiciary Committee of the
Senate.
Mr. HENDRICKSON: Mr. President, as I recall, it was approved by
the Judiciary Committee unanimously.
Mr. McCARRAN: I think the Senator from New Jersey is correct,

346. Rich, CongressionalIntent, supra note 19, at 1:11 (quoting "Symposium on
Patents," Summary of Proceedings,Section of Patents, Trademark and Copyright
Law (Chic.: Amer. Bar Center, 1962) 141, 143).
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Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a statement prepared
by me may be inserted in the RECORD at this point. There being
no objection, the statement was ordered to be printed in the
347
RECORD ....
This conversation would also be used to justify countless
attempts to revive the old tests for "invention." Long after the
enactment of § 103, Giles Rich would continue defending it from
this slander. In more than one speech he would counter the
"Legislative Intent" argument with:
Realistically, the "intent" with respect to the Patent Act of 1952,
was the intent of a subcommittee to pass the bill prepared by the
patent lawyers, as agreed to by codification counsel, committee
counsel, and the members of the subcommittee.... [If legislative
intent is to be found anywhere in the legislative body, it is in the
views expressed by committees as found in their hearings and
reports. That one legislator, who knows nothing of the details and
who has only one vote, stands to ask one question of another
legislator, who also knows nothing of the details and who gives a
noncommittal answer, is no expression of "legislative intent." At
most, it shows the intent of not more than one or two men.348
VI. POST-SECTION 103 DEVELOPMENTS
A. Early Failureof Courts to Apply the § 103 Standard
On July 4, 1952, with the passage of § 103, non-obviousness
formally joined novelty and utility as a requirement for
patentability. Although pure coincidence, it seems appropriate
that such a revolutionary event in patent law history occurred on
Independence Day. This date is also fitting because Judge Giles
Rich, who contributed so much to34 9§ 103, was recently called the
"Founding Father of Patent Law."
When speaking about the origin of § 103, Judge Rich
modestly acknowledges his role as a midwife to its birth.3 0 He
continued to play the necessary role of champion and defender of
that statutory provision long after its enactment. He offered the
following description of the checkered history of § 103:
It was an infant left on a doorstep crying feebly for recognition and
nourishment; who were its parents and what were they doing on a
night in April 1949? There is a question of paternity; who was the
father? Did the mother know? I can tell you one thing: it was not a
member of Congress. Congress had no more to do with the

347. Id. at 1:12 n.21 (quoting S. REP. NO. 120, at 9534 (1952)).
348. Id. at 1:13.
349. An article on the life and career of Giles Rich was titled The Founding
Fatherof PatentLaw. Nadine Cohodas, LEGAL TIMES, July 10, 1995, at 1.
350. Rich, Why and How, supra note 289, at 1:201.
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conception of this brain-child than does a hospital where a baby is
born.
This child of unknown parentage but many ancestors, was rejected,
in its early days, by court after court with a passion akin to oldfashioned abhorrence of illegitimacy, especially of infants not of
their own creation, and, with rather poor prospects of survival, was
taken in and nourished by a kindly CCPA. At the tender age of 14 it
was adopted by a kindly Supreme Court. A few years later, upon
discovering that it was a bastard, the Court decided it would at least
have to change the name of the child, if it was to stay in the family,
from unobviousness to synergism, thus covering up its natural
origins with a pretense of legitimacy. (I wonder if there is a
Freudian connection between sin and synergism.)
But this
35
1
nonsense has afflicted the child with schizophrenia.
Like Congress, however, most courts, including the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, and the Patent Office failed to
recognize or to apply the carefully drafted changes embodied in §
103 in the first few years after its enactment.
For example,
declaring the statute a "mere[ J codifi[cation]" of previous
caselaw," 2 some judges continued to demand evidence that a
patent owner show "invention," or "unusual or surprising
, ,354
consequences, " "' or that it was the result of "inventive genius.
Hence, these early 1953-54 cases merely perpetuated the addiction
of the courts to the unworkable invention standard that § 103 was
designed to replace.
One such instance was Wasserman v. Burgess & Blacher
Co.,.-a First Circuit patent opinion decided in 1954. This case
involved a patent for a unique skylight opening covering that
prevented water from seeping into the interior of the building.
In holding the patent invalid, the court summarily dismissed the
1952 Act as a mere codification of pre-existing law, as though the
pre-existing law provided a clear and precise standard of
351. Id. at 1:202-03.
352. Wasserman v. Burgess & Blacher Co., 217 F.2d 402, 404 (1st Cir. 1954);
Stanley Works v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 203 F.2d 846, 849 (3rd Cir. 1953); De Burgh
v. Kindel Furniture Co., 125 F. Supp. 468, 474 (W.D. Mich. 1954); Channel
Master Corp. v. Video Television, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 812, 815 (E.D.N.Y. 1953);
Joseph Bancroft & Sons v. Brewster Finishing Co., 113 F. Supp. 714, 721 (D.N.J.
1953).
353. Channel Master,117 F. Supp. at 814-15. Chief Judge Inch states, "[In the
case at bar, after a careful consideration of all the evidence, I fail to find an
'invention.'... Consequently, the patentee has not produced any 'unusual or
surprising consequences'.. . and the patent does not meet the test of
invention...." Id. at 814-15.
354. Joseph Bancroft, 113 F. Supp. at 722. See also De Burgh, 125 F. Supp. at
475 (requiring evidence of the "exercise of the inventive faculty").
355. 217 F.2d 402 (1st Cir. 1954).
356. Id. at 403. This element had not been disclosed in any references cited by
the infringing defendant. Id.at 403-04.
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patentability that was embodied in § 103.
Another example is United Mattress Machinery Co. v. Handy
Button Machine Co. involving a patent on buttons used in
mattress tufting machines. 7 Prior to the invention mattress
buttons had a tendency to "pop off" when pressure was applied to
the mattress. 3 8 The patented button had a heart-shaped shank
attached to its head which "made the insertion of the button into
the mattress easy and its withdrawal difficult, thus solving the
popping out problem which had perplexed the industry."35 9 In its
analysis, the court noted that there was considerable demand in
the industry for the patented buttons. °
Though the shank feature of the patented button
distinguished it from all of the prior art, the court invalidated the
patent stating that "[e]ven if it be conceded that the fixed-in-head
shank... is a 'new and useful' improvement [over the prior
art] ...6 it is not an 'invention' as that term is used [in] patent
3

law."

'

Disregarding the express statutory provisions in § 103, the
Court declared "Congress has made no attempt to define the term
'invention', either under the older law or in the new Patent Act.
Instead, the courts, aided only by caselaw, have had to determine
for themselves what constitutes invention and what does not. 062
Unfortunately, the Judiciary Committee Report on the Patent
Act of 1952 was, itself, not completely faithful to the purpose of §
103 in its suggestion that § 103 set forth an 3"invention"
requirement, rather than a patentability requirement.1
357. 207 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1953).
358. Id. at 2.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.at 4.
362. Handy Button Machine Co., 207 F.2d at 5. See also Interstate Rubber
Prods. Corp. v. Radiator Specialty Co., 214 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1954). Some courts
still felt compelled to find an elusive "quality of invention" before they could or
would hold a patent valid.
It is quite impossible to define patentability except in the most general
terms. It cannot be denied merely on the ground of the simplicity of a
discovery ...

but it does not come into being merely because the device

is novel and represents an interesting and useful improvement. The
touchstone is whether the new thing is beyond the ability of the worker
of ordinary skill in the field, and neither the courts nor Congress have
been able to offer a more definite test, so that in the end it must be left
to the judgment of the courts in controverted cases to apply the formula
to the specific facts; and the judges may not endow with the quality of
invention every new and useful advance amidst the myriad activities of
a resourceful people.
InterstateRubber, 214 F.2d at 548 (emphasis added).
363. Report No. 1923 of the [House] Committee on Judiciary, reprintedin 34 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y. 549, 554 (1952).
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE BILL
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Furthermore, some courts justified their position that § 103
merely codified the most recent "invention" standard caselaw by
relying on the following paragraph:
Section 103, for the first time in our statute, provides a condition
which exists in the law and has existed for more than 100 years, but
only by reason of decisions of the court ... [Section 103]
paraphrases language which has often been used in decisions of the
courts, and the section is added to the statute for uniformity and
definiteness. This section should have a stabilizing effect and
364
minimize great departures which have appeared in some cases.
The fault in this line of reasoning lay in the fact that there is
no statement in the Judiciary Committee Report specifically
approving the most recent "invention" caselaw, or any older
caselaw for that matter. As discussed previously, prior to the
enactment of § 103, there was such a myriad of judicial opinions
on what constituted "invention," that a court could find caselaw to
support a finding of either validity or invalidity of a patent. The
"stabilizing effect" called for in the Judiciary Committee Report,
therefore, could only be achieved if § 103 was interpreted as
choosing one standard of patentability to be applied uniformly in
all patent cases. Giles Rich strove to explain this on more than
one occasion. For example, at a speech before the Los Angeles
Patent Law Association, he stated:
When, as was the case with the "requirement for invention," the
century's accumulation of judicial precedents range from A to Z in
strictness and Congress, looking at the situation under the guiding
light of Kettering's statement that this is no yardstick and the
greatesttechnical weakness of the patent system, determines to make
a yardstick and says the measure shall be "M", right in the middle
of the range, it behooves everyone concerned with administering
that law to follow the measure "M" and to stop flitting about
arbitrarily from A to Z, ignoring what Congress has done.6 5
B.

Lending a Hand to Giles Rich

But it was not until the first post-1952 Act patentability case

Although the principal purpose of the bill is the codification of title
35... there are a number of changes in substantive statutory law....
The major changes or innovations in the title consist of incorporating a
requirement for invention in § 103 and the judicial doctrine of
contributory infringement in § 271.
Id. (emphasis added).
364. Id. at 557. For cases quoting this paragraph of the Senate Report, see
Vincent v. Suni-Citrus Prods. Co., 215 F.2d 305, 315 n.21 (5th Cir. 1954); Stanley
Works, 203 F.2d at 849; General Motors Corp. v. Estate Stove Co., 203 F.2d 912,
915 (6th Cir. 1953); Joseph Bancroft & Sons v. Brewster Finishing Co., 113 F.
Supp. 714, 721 (D.N.J. 1953).
365. Rich, Laying the Ghost,supra note 13, at 36.
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reached the Second Circuit in 1955 that Judge Rich's reasoning
had a receptive listener. Long a critic of the amorphous invention
standard, Judge Learned Hand must have welcomed the
opportunity to replace it with the newly enacted non-obviousness
test. The fledgling statute could not have happened upon a more
respected federal judge to take up its cause."'
The case was Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.3 7 Dean
Lyon's patent involved a method for obtaining non-reflecting films
of inorganic salts on the surface of lenses.36" The process involved
two steps-heating the lens in a vacuum to evaporate water and
grease from the optical surface followed by vaporizing an inorganic
salt in the vacuum for coating the optical surface while keeping the
369
optical surface heated.
The result was a superior, hardy,
tenacious and scratch-resistant coating on the lens.370 The only
novelty, however, resided in keeping the optical surface heated
"
while the coating was applied.37
' A step that, in hindsight, might
not seem very significant.
The lower court had held the patent valid and infringed."
John W. Malley, then a senior partner at Cushman, Darby and
Cushman, tried and won the case for the patentee, Dean Lyon,
366. Hand rose to the Chief Judgeship of the Second Circuit in 1939, after the
scandalous indictment and resignation of Judge Martin Manton for accepting
bribes for votes on several patent cases. Gunther, supra note 138, at 503, 506.
Although Hand had obviously been unaware of Manton's activities, he later
blamed himself for not suspecting Manton's ulterior motives. Id. at 509.
Manton's conviction is reported in United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir.
1938).
Manton subsequently spent 17 months in a federal penitentiary.
Gunther, supra note 138, at 506.
Manton had accepted bribes in two patent cases that were also heard by
Learned Hand. Id. In a recent Hand biography, Gerald Gunther, his former
law clerk, reports that Hand constantly lamented the disgrace that Manton
had brought to the formerly esteemed Second Circuit. Id. at 509-13. Hand
spent the rest of his career working to restore the court's credibility and
integrity. Id. at 513. Clearly, Hand's contribution to patent law through his
opinions on nonobviousness more than made up for the failings of Manton.
Gunther comments:
Ultimately, Manton's behavior did not leave as deep and permanent a
scar on the reputation of the Second Circuit as Hand feared. By
restoring the court's high standards of ability and integrity, Hand and
his colleagues reestablished the Second Circuit's renown as the nation's
leading intermediate appellate court. A few months before he died,
Hand could comment that "the standards of judicial conduct are [now] a
good deal better" than they had been.
Id.
367. 224 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1955).
368. Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 119 F. Supp. 42, 43 (W.D.N.Y. 1953),
affid, 244 F.2d 530 (2d Cir. 1955).
369. Id.
370. Id.
371. Id. at 43-44.
372. Id. at 51.
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before Judge Harold P. Burke in Rochester, New York, and
successfully argued the appeal. When he began his argument
before the Second Circuit, Judge Hand asked him questions about
the caselaw leading up to the enactment of § 103. John Malley
responded that he would need at least an hour or more to do
justice to those questions. Judge Hand, the presiding judge on the
panel, secured the concurrence of the other judges on the panel,
Judges Swan and Hincks, and told John Malley he could have the
extra time. Malley seized the opportunity.
Judge Hand started his opinion upholding the patent's
validity by noting the trend of recent Supreme Court decisions to
impose a "stricter test of invention":
The Courts of Appeal have very generally found in the recent
opinions of the Supreme Court a disposition to insist upon a stricter
test of invention than it used to apply-indefinite it is true, but
indubitably stricter than that defined in § 103. Indeed, some of the
justices themselves have taken the same view. 373
He then accepted the premise that § 103 was a codification of
existing caselaw by stating:
The Act describes itself as a codification of existing law, as it
certainly is in the sense that the structure of the system remains
unchanged. Moreover those decisions that have passed upon it have
uniformly referred to it as a codification, although so far as we have
found none of them has held that § 103 did not change the standard
of invention. And so the question arises whether we should construe
§ 103 as restoringthe law to what it was when the Court announced
the definition of invention, now expressly embodied in § 103, or
whether we should assume that no change whatever was intended.
To decide that question it seems desirable to look briefly
backward.3 4
Hand then proceeded to identify which one of the various
legal theories had been codified by the statute. He focused on
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood:
[I]n Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, the Court imposed an authoritative
gloss upon the word, ["invention"] which it put in the following
words: "unless more ingenuity and skill in applying the old method"
were necessary "than were possessed by an ordinary mechanic
acquainted with the business, there was an absence of that degree of
skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every
invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of a skillful
mechanic, not that of the inventor." The instruction to the jury, the
exception to which the court overruled, had been in substantially
the same words: if "no other ingenuity or skill" be "necessary to
construct the knob than that of an ordinary mechanic acquainted
with the business, the patent is void." Thereafter this became the
373. Lyon, 224 F.2d at 535 (footnotes omitted).
374. Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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standard rubric and was applied in many cases. The variantswere
numberless, and "invention" became perhaps the most baffling
concept in the whole catalogueofjudicialefforts to providepostulates
for indefinitely varying occasions. However, the Court never
formally abjured it; nor has it ever substituted any other definite
test. Even Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.which in expression probably was the furthest departurerecognized the continued authority of Hotchkiss v. Greenwood."if an
improvement is to obtain the privileged position of a patent more
ingenuity must be involved than the work of a mechanic skilled in
the art." [And] again: "The principle of the Hotchkiss case applies to
the adaptation or combination of old or well known devices for new
uses.
While noting that subsequent decisions had created many
"variants" to the Hotchkiss rubric, he concluded that the
divergence was so great that the Lyon patent would fail the
3 76
patentability test as it was applied just prior to the 1952 Act.
Nevertheless, Judge Hand noted that the original Hotchkiss test
had never been overruled, and was continually recognized even by
the decisions which strayed the farthest from the original case. 7
Under these circumstances, he reasoned that § 103 was a
codification of the original Hotchkiss standard.
In the first place § 103 only restores the original gloss, substantially
in ipsissimis verbis; which had never been overruled; but on the
contrary for seventy or eighty years had continued to be regarded as
authoritative. Moreover-and this is the important considerationalthough it may have ceased in practice to be followed, and had
come to enjoy no more than lip service, there never has been the
slightest intimation of any definite substitute; nothing more than an
unexpressed and unacknowledged misgiving about the increased
facility with which patents were being granted. Such judicial
attitudes are indeed the stuff of which much of the law is made; but
we cannot agree that, however controlling upon the lower courts,
they are a warrant for that solid assurance, the disappointment of
which will make a statute invalid. Courts again and again shift
their position; and, although they are apt to do so under cover of
nice distinctions, they impose the risk of anticipating the changes
upon those who may have acted upon the faith of the original.
Certainly a legislature, whose will the courts have undertaken to
proliferate, must be free to reinstate the courts' initial
interpretation, even though it may have been obscured by a series of
later comments whose upshot is at best hazy.17
375. Id. at 535-36 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
376. Id. at 535. Hand observed that "[I]t must be owned that, had the case
come up for decision within twenty, or perhaps, twenty five, years before the Act
of 1952... it is almost certain that the claims would have been invalid." Id.
377. Id. at 536.
378. Lyon, 224 F.2d at 536-37. Soon after this decision was published, it
attracted the attention of commentators. See, e.g., Donald J. Libert, Note, Section
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In upholding the Lyon patent, Judge Hand placed
considerable emphasis on the circumstances in the industry that
preceded and followed the invention, i.e., secondary considerations
or the objective indicia of unobviousness:
The most competent workers in the field had for at least ten years
been seeking a hardy, tenacious coating to prevent reflection; there
had been a number of attempts, none satisfactory; meanwhile
nothing in the implementary arts had been lacking to put the
advance into operation; when it appeared, it supplanted the existing
practice and occupied substantially the whole field. We do not see
how any combination of evidence could more completely demonstrate
that, simple as it was, the change had not been "obvious . . . to a
person having ordinaryskill in the art"--§ 103.
Judge Hand bolstered the § 103 non-obviousness standard he
interpreted and developed in the Lyon case with his later opinion
in Reiner v. I. Leon Co., a case involving a patent for hair curlers,
specifically, clamps used to maintain formed curls in a woman's
hair.38 ° Hand now unequivocally and confidently declared, "[t]here
can be no doubt that the Act of 1952 meant to change the slow but
38
steady drift of judicial decision that had been hostile to patents. '
Reiterating his conclusion in the Lyon case, he stated that the
passage of the Patent Act of 1952 signaled Congress' deliberate
intent to restore the old Hotchkiss definition and "raise it from a
judicial gloss to a statutory command."3"2 He stated:
We discussed the question at length in Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb
Optical Co., and have little to add to what we then said. There can
be no doubt that the Act of 1952 meant to change the slow but
steady drift of judicial decision that had been hostile to patents
which made it possible for Mr. Justice Jackson in his dissent to
speak of the "strong passion in this Court for striking them"
(patents) "down so that the only patent that is valid is one which
this Court has not been able to get its hands on." That was in 1945,
while the test laid down in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood still had a
nominal authority, of which little remained in actual application.
We still cannot escape the conclusion--as we could not when Lyon v.
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. was decided in 1955-that Congress
deliberatelymeant to restore the old definition, and to raise it from a
judicialgloss to a statutorycommand. It is not for us to decide what
"discoveries" shall "promote the progress of science and the useful
arts" sufficiently to grant any "exclusive right" of inventors (U.S.
Constitution, Article 1, § 8).
Nor may we approach the

103 of the Patent Act and the Standard of Invention: Comments on Lyon v.
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 44 GEO. L.J. 100 (1955).

379. Lyon, 224 F.2d at 535 (emphasis added).
380. 285 F.2d 501, 501 (2d Cir. 1960).
381. Id. at 503.
382. Id.
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interpretation of § 103 of the Title 35 with a predetermined bias. 383
Judge Hand's Reiner opinion is also important for his reliance
on certain "sign posts" in his determination of non-obviousness.
These were, of course, essentially the same objective indicia of
unobviousness he characteristically looked for and mentioned in
his opinions:
The test laid down is indeed misty enough. It directs us to surmise
what was the range of ingenuity of a person "having ordinary skill"
in an "art" with which we are totally unfamiliar; and we do not see
how such a standard can be applied at all except by recourse to the
earlier work in the art, and to the general history of the means
available at the time. To judge on our own that this or that new
assemblage of old factors was, or was not, "obvious" is to substitute
our ignorance for the acquaintance with the subject of those who
were familiar with it. There are indeed some sign posts: e.g., how
long did the need exist,- how many tried to find the way, how long did
the surrounding and accessory arts disclose the means; how
immediately was the invention recognized as an answer by those who
used the new variant In the case at bar the answers to these
questions all favor the conclusion that it demanded more intuition
than was possessed by the "ordinary" workers in the field. The
needs were known, but the purpose to fulfill them with that
minimum of material and labor disclosed in the patent had not
appeared; and economy of production is as valid a basis for
invention as foresight in the disclosure of new means. In the case at
bar the saving of material as compared to anything that had
preceded, was very great indeed; the existing devices at once yielded
to Reiner's disclosure; his was an answer to the "long-felt want. " "'
In applying this non-obviousness test to the Reiner patent,
Hand referred to how long hair curler clamps were a subject of
experiment.3 85 He also noted there had been seven prior patents in
the thirteen years before the Reiner patent, all attempting to
perform the function Reiner achieved. 86
Considering the
differences between the Reiner patent and the closest prior art,
Hand commented that "[iun such small and fragile devices slight
divergences may be determinative."387 For Hand, the scales were
convincingly tipped in favor of patentability by the instantaneous
and unexpected commercial success the Reiner clamps received.388
He stated, "[W]e are of course acutely aware of the constant
reminders in the books that the sale of a patented device is not
alone a measure of its invention, and we accept that conclusion.
Nevertheless,
great commercial
success, when properly
383.
384.
385.
386.

Id.(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Id. at 503-04 (emphasis added).
Reiner, 285 F.2d at 503.
Id. at 503.

387. Id. at 504.
388. Id. at 503-04.
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scrutinized, may be a telling circumstance. "389 Judge Hand found
that the invention at once achieved an unexpected success:
In the first year-1946-its sales approximated $40,000, which at
ten cents for every three clamps meant a sale of over a million
clamps, and in twelve years the sales had reached 90 million. In
1957 they were about 750,000 a day, and by 1958 the plaintiff had
established an
390 almost complete monopoly of the "two-piece clips in
the market."

By developing clamps that were "not too troublesome to
adjust, yet tenacious when in place," 391 the inventors had devised
an invention that revolutionized hair styling. Not surprisingly,
Hand found the patent valid.
Judge Rich, no doubt, was very pleased with Judge Hand's
decisions in the Bausch & Lomb and Reiner cases, for he observed:
[F] or the first few years courts were not heeding the statute, largely,
I think, because the bar was not doing so. Judges tend to get the
law from the winning party's brief. The very first judicial
recognition of what was intended by § 103 was Judge Learned
Hand's opinion for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Lyon v.
Bausch & Lomb in 1955. He also understood the underlying reason
for § 103. He correctly stated in Reiner v. I.Leon that it was "to
change the slow but steady drift of judicial decision that had been
392
hostile to patents ....
Several other circuits adopted Hand's interpretation of §
103 . Citing Bausch & Lomb, these courts began to base their
patent validity opinions on the "differences between the subject
389. Id. at 503.
390. Reiner, 285 F.2d at 503.
391. Id.at 504.

392. Rich, Laying the Ghost,supra note 13, at 36-37 (citations omitted).
393. The Third Circuit made this observation following Hand's Lyon v Bausch
& Lomb decision:

The choice of language in the [1952 Patent] Act indicates, as the
legislative history discloses, an attempt to state what the law has been.
As such, it is a codification. The difficulty always existed in the
application of the law, because to a large extent the standards have been
indefinite and subjective.
And judicial attempts to improvise
expressions covering that which had been said many times before
account for numerous descriptive phrasings of an elusive concept. The
Act was intended to achieve the objective of stabilizing the law through
legislative expression which becomes the touchstone of the decisions. ...
To what extent a change is wrought would seem to depend upon the preexisting views of a tribunal as to the standard upon which it has
determined patentability. As pointed out by Judge Learned Hand in
Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., despite adherence to the keystone

cases, like Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, intangible elements have directed
judicial attitudes to "misgiving about the increased facility with which
patents were being granted."
R.M. Palmer Co. v. Luden's, Inc., 236 F.2d 496, 499-500 (3d Cir. 1956) (citations
omitted) (footnote omitted).
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matter patented and the prior art" and whether these differences
"would have been obvious, at the time the invention was made, to
a person having3 94ordinary skill in the art to which the subject
matter pertains."
C. Diverse Views of Other Courts on § 103
Following Hand's lead, many courts used objective factors like
long-felt need and commercial success to help determine
obviousness. For example, the Fourth Circuit in Brown v. Brock
upheld the validity of a patent for a "weeping doll."395 The Court
began its analysis of the patent by noting that "[1]ong before the
patent in suit, toy manufacturers had attempted repeatedly and
without success to produce a satisfactorily realistic weeping doll.
A number of patents had been issued for dolls designed to meet
this demand, but not one of them attained commercial
success .... 3 9 6
Dolls made according to the Brown patent,
however, were "met with quick commercial success" and continued
to be popular toys for the following five years."7 Citing the test set
out in Bausch & Lomb, the Court concluded that the patent must
be held valid:
The record. . . shows a longfelt and unsatisfied want for an
acceptable weeping doll. As we have seen, a number of devices were
attempted, but none served the purpose. If any solution to the
problem had been obvious, .it would 398
not have been overlooked in the
industry for want of desire or effort.
Other courts, however, stubbornly resisted recognizing any
intention in § 103 to reverse the drift in the courts toward
applying a stricter patentability standard. They continued to
dismiss any such intention by simply stating that "It] he Patent Act
of 1952 did not change the basic tests for determining
patentability." 39 9 Moreover, such courts continued to discuss
patent validity in
indefinite terms like "inventive genius ,,400 or
4
01
genius.'
"flash of
The patent in Caldwell v. Kirk Manufacturing Co. 40 2 suffered
394. Brown v. Brock, 240 F.2d 723, 727 (4th Cir. 1957). See also Mott Corp. v.
Sunflower Indus., Inc., 314 F.2d 872, 879 (10th Cir. 1963).
395. Brown, 240 F.2d at 723.
396. Id. at 725.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 727.
399. Belden v. Air Control Prods., Inc., 144 F. Supp. 248, 252 (W.D. Mich.
1956); see also Collins V.Kraft, 144 F. Supp. 162, 167-69 (D. Md. 1956); Hughes v.
Salem Co-Operative Co., 134 F. Supp. 572, 576 (W.D. Mich. 1955), affd, 237 F.2d
918 (6th Cir. 1956).
400. See, e.g., Caldwell v. Kirk Mfg. Co., 269 F.2d 506, 508 (8th Cir. 1959).
401. See, e.g., Oriental Foods, Inc., v. Chun King Sales, Inc., 244 F.2d 909, 914
(9th Cir. 1957).
402. 269 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1959).
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this treatment. It involved an apparatus which allowed animals
to oil themselves with e.g., insecticide by rubbing against cables.4 °3
The cables were connected to both a reservoir holding insecticide
and a horizontal support base.0 4 The invention was a means to
cause insecticide to flow down the cables when needed.4 °5
The Eighth Circuit based its entire analysis of the patented
invention on whether or not it revealed "inventive genius. ", °6 In its
opinion, Kirk merely applied the well-known knowledge that cattle
rub themselves against posts and cables to relieve their itching.4 "7
Hence, the court concluded that the Kirk combination
could not
"
"be held to rise to the dignity of patentable invention. 08

D. Giles Rich Becomes the FirstPatentLawyer to Sit as a Judge
on the CCPA

Giles Rich's contributions to patent law and particularly § 103
were recognized with his appointment in 1956 as the first patent
lawyer to serve as a judge on the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (CCPA). °9 He used his position of increased stature to
continue fighting for the acceptance of the § 103 non-obviousness
patentability test. One of his first efforts was to disabuse his
fellow judges on the CCPA of their belief that the test of
patentability was still "invention."
When I came to the CCPA in 1956, three and a half years after §
103 came into effect, I found it being totally ignored. That is not too
surprising. The court was dealing with [Patent] office actions
several years old rejecting claims for lack of "invention" and the
403. Id. at 507.

404. Id. at 509.
405. Id. at 509.
406. Id.at 507-10.
407. Caldwell, 269 F.2d. at 509-10.
408. Id. at 510. See also Thurber Corp. v. Fairchild Motor Corp., 269 F.2d 841,
849-50 (5th Cir. 1959). The Fifth Circuit made the following commentary on
proper jury instructions on the validity of a patent:
At least three times in the [District] Court's charge he included the
requirement of "exciting" as part of the standard of invention ....

[The

patent holder] contends that there is nothing very exciting about
automobile transmissions, particularly to a jury who has heard someone
talk about them for three and one-half weeks, and that this standard
imposed an "insurmountable burden" upon [the patent holder]. In the
total context we do not regard this as harmful but we do feel that this
was an unfortunate choice of words for the Trial Court to use in
describing the standard of invention.
Id.
409. Coincidentally, John W. Malley of Cushman, Darby and Cushman, who
had successfully argued the landmark Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb appeal before
Learned Hand, was also instrumental in Judge Rich's appointment to the CCPA.
He arranged for a key meeting he and Giles Rich had with then Deputy Attorney
General (later Attorney General) William Rogers. After that meeting, Judge Rich
was nominated and later appointed to be a judge on the CCPA.
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appellants' briefs, like those of the Patent Office Solicitor's, were
still couched in those terms. It was probably in my first conference
that I suggested that for some time we had had a statute that had
put patentability on another basis which we should follow. One of
the judges was incredulous. He said, "I thought if it is an invention
it is patentable. Do you mean to say you can have an unpatentable
invention?"" °
As Judge Rich correctly noted, before he came to the CCPA,
this court was still speaking in terms of a requirement for
"invention." For example, in In re Schechter decided in 1953, the
CCPA mentioned 35 U.S.C. § 112 of the Patent Act, but not § 103
in its determination of patentability. " ' The CCPA simply applied
the old "invention" test as though § 103 had not been enacted,
stating "[W]e conclude that all the compounds... are inventive
and patentable over the prior art of record ....
,,412
In one of his early opinions, In re Ruscetta, Judge Rich noted
that the Patent Office had rejected certain claims for "lack of
invention" over a prior British specification.1 3 In affirming the
Patent Office rejection, he specifically cited 35 U.S.C. § 103 and
held that the claimed feature "would be most
obvious to one skilled
14
in the art" in view of prior art teachings.
Concerned that the Patent Office was still making rejections
based on "lack of invention" rather than applying the
unobviousness standard as defined in § 103, Rich, in his 1964
Kettering Address, humorously suggested that the Patent Office
print up a wallpaper border to run around the patent examiners'
rooms, endlessly repeating the words "NEW - USEFUL UNOBVIOUS - PATENTABLE IF NO BAR." 41 5 In a more serious
tone, Rich suggested that federal judges receive books explaining
that "the 'requirement for invention' became obsolete in 1953 by
an act of Congress, along with many prior court opinions
discussing it, being replaced by unobviousness as
416 defined in 103 as
the THIRD REQUIREMENT for Patentability."
410. Rich, Laying the Ghost,supra note 13, at 37.
411. 205 F.2d 185 (C.C.P.A. 1953).
412. Id. at 191 (emphasis added).
413. 255 F.2d 687, 688 (C.C.P.A. 1958).
414. Id. at 692. Rich later noted the success of his efforts to eliminate the use
at the CCPA of an "invention" patentability standard:
Through the ensuing years that kind of thinking has totally disappeared
in our court-but not everywhere. The persistence of the C.C.P.A. in
following the statutory test gradually brought the Patent Office into line
and after a few years I was told that the Patent Office Academy, which
trains examiners, had swept the requirement for "invention" under the
rug. We now rarely see a rejection in those terms in a record. But it
was a slow transition.
Rich, Laying the Ghost, supra note 13, at 37.
415. Rich, The Vague Concept of Invention, supra note 29, at 874.
416. Id.
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VII. SECTION 103 REACHES THE SUPREME COURT IN GRAHAM V.
JOHN DEERE & CO.

In 1966, thirteen years after its enactment, § 103 finally
arrived at the Supreme Court in four cases: Graham v. John Deere
Co.;4"7 Calmar v. Cook Chemical Co."' and Colgate v. Cook
Chemical Co.;1 9 and United States v. Adams. 20 Rich anxiously
awaited the outcome, fearing the decision may be coming down too
soon.
Rich was waiting in his chambers for the opinion. When he got his
copy, he quietly went into his office, shut the door and spent two
hours poring over it.
Finally, he emerged and looked at
Witherspoon [his law clerk] and his longtime secretary, Josephine
Pizza .. , and said4 'simply, 'Well, John [Witherspoon], I think we've
1
turned the corner.

Of the three cases on § 103 decided in that term, the Graham
opinion contains the Supreme Court's most pertinent discussion of
§103 and its non-obviousness patentability standard.
The
sentiments of both Rich and Hand echoed throughout the opinion.
Rich could hardly have asked for a stronger endorsement of
his efforts. Speaking for the Court in Graham v. John Deere Co.,
Justice Clark expressly recognized that § 103 added a third
statutory test of non-obviousness to the previously recognized
novelty and utility requirements. 2 In a manner strikingly similar
to Rich's 1964 Kettering speech, the Court listed the factual
inquiries a court should make to determine obviousness and nonobviousness:
Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be
determined; differences between the- prior art and the claims at
issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or
non-obviousness of the subject matter is determined.4 3

417. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
418. Calmar, Inc., v. Cook Chem. Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
419. Colgate v. Cook Chem. Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
420. United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966).
421. Cohodas, supra note 349, at 18.
422. Graham, 383 U.S. at 12.
423. Id. at 17. John Witherspoon, one of Rich's many law clerks, commented,
"[A] comparison of the Graham opinion with the 'Kettering Address' [by Rich]
leaves little doubt that Judge Rich's thinking had a profound influence on the
Court." John F. Witherspoon, Turning the Corner: A Tribute to Judge Giles
SutherlandRich, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOc'Y 332, 336-37 (1994) (noting

that another Rich law clerk, James F. Davis first recognized the similarities).
The factual inquiries were identified in Rich's earlier Kettering speech as:
(1) What are the differences between "the invention" and "the prior art"?
(2) What is disclosed by the prior art presumed to have been available to
the inventor? (3) What was the level of ordinary skill in the art at the
time the invention was made? (4) Other fact issues relating to
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Justice Clark's opinion also followed the path laid out by
Learned Hand in Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb. Like Hand, Justice
Clark began his analysis of § 103 by conducting an historical
overview of patent law. Starting with the original constitutional
authorization and the efforts of "the first administrator of our
patent system," Thomas Jefferson, Justice Clark slowly worked his
way up to the seminal Supreme Court case of Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood.
Justice Clark lifted the same quote from Hotchkiss as had
been previously cited by Hand:
[Ulnless more ingenuity and skill.., were required ... than were
possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business,
there was an absence of that degree of skill and ingenuity which
constitute essential elements of every [patentable] invention. In
other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechanic,
not that of the inventor.424
He then explained the problems with the "invention standard"
following the Hotchkiss decision:
[A]s this Court has observed, "[tihe truth is, the word ['invention']
cannot be defined in such manner as to afford any substantial aid in
determining whether a particular device involves an exercise of the
inventive faculty or not." Its use as a label brought about a large
variety of opinions as to its meaning both in the Patent Office, in the
courts, and at the bar.425
He listed the same problems that Hand identified in Lyon v.
Bausch & Lomb Co..
Thereafter this became the standard rubric and was applied in
many cases. The variants were numberless; and "invention" became
circumstances indicative of the presence or absence of obviousness,
traditionally taken into account in determining "invention," such as
long-felt need, immediate copying, sudden displacement of existing
practices or devices, difficulty of achievement, failure of others, etc.
Once these facts have been assembled, there remains the ultimate
statutory requirement of unobviousness, the third requirement 'for
patentability, which becomes a matter of statutory application and as
such must be a question of law.
Rich, The Vague Concept of Invention, supra note 29, at 872 n.36. It should also
be noted that copies of Rich's "Kettering Address" were provided to the Supreme
Court with some of the amicus briefs that were submitted in the Graham case.
Furthermore, Justice Clark's law clerk, Charles Reed, who wrote the first draft of
the Graham decision, was well acquainted with Rich's "Kettering Address" at
that time and its influence on him and the Grahamdecision inquiries or tests for
determining obviousness or not is unmistakable.
An interesting anecdote
describing how Reed learned about that address from a patent law course taught
by Tom Arnold appears in DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT
LAW (1998), at 566-68.
424. Graham, 383 U.S. at 11. (citation omitted). Compare Lyon v. Bausch
Lomb Optical Co., 224 F.2d 530, 535 (2d Cir. 1955).
425. Graham,383 U.S. at 11-12 (citations omitted).
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perhaps the most baffling concept in the whole catalogue of judicial
efforts to provide postulates for indefinitely varying occasions.42 6
He then proceeded to analyze § 103. He found several parallels
between the Hotchkiss decision and the language used in the
statute. He found that:
The first sentence of this section is strongly reminiscent of the
language in Hotchkiss. Both formulations place emphasis on the
pertinent art existing at the time the invention was made and both
are implicitly tied to advances in that art. The major distinction is
that Congress has emphasized "non-obviousness" as the operative
test of the section, rather than the less definite "invention" language
of Hotchkiss that Congress thought had led to "a large variety" of
expressions in decisions and writings."'
Justice Clark's discussion of secondary considerations also
appears strikingly similar to Rich's Kettering speech and Hand's
numerous opinions discussing the patentability standard. Justice
Clark stated:
Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but
unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light
to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter
sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or non-obviousness,
these inquires may have relevancy.42 8
Justice Clark completed his discussion on § 103 with advice to
the Patent Office. Realizing that the Patent Office would bear the
largest responsibility in ensuring that § 103 was applied
consistently with the Graham opinion, he noted:
[The primary responsibility for sifting out unpatentable material
lies in the Patent Office. To await litigation is-for all practice
purposes-to debilitate the patent system. We have observed a
notorious difference between the standards applied by the Patent
Office and by the courts. While many reasons can be adduced to
explain the discrepancy, one may well be the free rein often
exercised by Examiners in their use of the concept of "invention.42
' 9
Justice Clark concluded by advising the Patent Commissioner to
ensure that Examiners
"strictly adhere" to the 1952 Act as
43
interpreted in Graham.
In the Graham case, the Supreme Court held the patent
invalid. The patent related to the use of a spring clamp on
agricultural plows to absorb shocks when the plow hits
obstructions in the soil and to allow the plow to elevate so it passes

426. Lyon, 224 F.2d at 536.
427. Graham,383 U.S. at 14.
428. Id.at 17-18.

429. Id.at 18.
430. Id.
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over the obstruction without damage to the plow. 43 ' In 1955, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held the patent valid, but in 1964
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held the patent invalid.4 32 In
upholding the Eighth Circuit's decision of invalidity, the Supreme
Court observed that the petitioner's argument for patentability
was based on a so-called "free-flex theory" that was not found in
the claims of the patent nor described in the patent as a
significant feature of the invention.433
In companion cases decided the same day as Graham,
Calmar, Inc., v. Cook Chemical Co.434 and Colgate-PalmoliveCo. v.
Cook Chemical Co.,4 5 the Supreme Court likewise reversed a
holding of patent validity by the same court of appeals involved in
4 36
The patent in the Cook Chemical Co. cases related to a
Graham.
finger-actuated, lockable pump dispenser for spraying the liquid
contents of a container.437
Also decided by the Supreme Court the same day as the
Graham and Cook Chemical Co. cases, was the case of United
States v. Adams.4 38 There the former United States Court of
Claims had held the Adams patent valid and the Supreme Court
affirmed. 39
The Adams patent described the "first practical,
be
water-activated, constant potential battery which could 44
fabricated and stored indefinitely without any fluid in its cells."
The Court was impressed with the fact that the Adams invention
in the art and that "noted
ignored the conventional wisdom
44
experts expressed disbelief in it." '
The ink on the Graham decision was hardly dry when Giles
Rich, sitting on the bench of the CCPA, authored the opinion In re
4
' Khelghatian involved a process claim for removing
Khelghatian.1
carbonyl sulfide from gaseous hydrocarbons.443 The Patent Office
Board of Appeals had affirmed an examiner's rejection of several

431. Id.at 4.
432. Graham, 383 U.S. at 4.
433. Id. at 25. Had the asserted claims recited the "free-flex" feature the
outcome might have been different. This illustrates the importance of having the
claims recite the feature that distinguishes over the prior art.
434. Calmar, Inc., v. Cook Chem. Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
435. Colgate-Palmolive Co. v. Cook Chem. Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
436. Id.at 4.
437. Id.at 4.
438. 383 U.S. 39 (1966).
439. Id.
440. Id. at 43.
441. Id. at 52.
442. 364 F.2d 870 (C.C.P.A. 1966). Graham was decided on February 21, 1966.
In re Khelghatiancame down on August 4, 1966. Judge Rich included secondary
considerations in his list of factual inquiries a court should make in assessing
patentability. Rich, The Vague Conceptof Invention, supra note 29, at 872 n.36.
443. Khelghatian,364 F.2d at 871.
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of the patent claims.444 The Board based its decision on the fact
that, although Khelghatian's invention was more efficient than the
prior art, its improvement in efficiency would have been expected
from the prior art.445
Rich began his opinion with a clarification of how to apply §
103. He noted a recent statement by the Commissioner of Patents
published in an Official Gazette.
In this statement, the
Commissioner instructed that evidence of "commercial success,
long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others ...are of secondary
446
importance" and should only be considered "in doubtful cases."
Rich forcefully responded that a determination of obviousness
must consider "all the record evidence.., regardless of whether
any 'doubt' as to447patentability exists upon an examination of the
prior art alone."
Although § 103 does not explicitly mandate that "secondary
considerations" should be considered in determining obviousness
or non-obviousness, there was enough generous language in
Graham for Rich to insist they be considered, in every
patentability case. In the end, Rich held that the improvement in
the Khelghatian invention was not suggested by the prior art and
that the claims were patentable. This opinion helped to cement
the Graham analysis with immediate precedent, and signified the
beginning of a trend in the CCPA to refine and improve the nonobviousness standard.
VIII.THE BLACK

CLOUD OF SYNERGISM - BLACK ROCK AND SAKRAIDA

Following the Graham endorsement of § 103, the circuit
courts began to abandon the invention standard in favor of the
non-obviousness test.44 8 District courts were instructed to base
their obviousness determinations on the factual findings specified
449
in Graham.
Obviousness was to be considered at the time of the
invention, unbiased by hindsight.4 5' Failure to rigidly follow § 103

444. Id. at 870-71.
445. Id. at 874.
446. Id.at 872 n.2.
447. Id. at 872.
448. See, e.g., Preuss v. General Elec. Co., 392 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1968);
Schmidinger v. Welsh, 383 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1967).
449. See, e.g., Hensley Equip. Co. v. Esco Corp., 383 F.2d 252, 258 n.10 (5th Cir.
1967) (citation omitted) ("It is desirable that the district courts make specific
findings on the factual matters which the Supreme Court, in Graham v. John
Deere Co., held determined obviousness.... .).
450. See, e.g., Higley v. Brenner, 387 F.2d 855, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("The test of
obviousness, however, must be applied as of the time of the invention and not
retrospectively as of the time of the suit."); Mott Corp. v. Sunflower Indus., Inc.,
314 F.2d 872, 879 (10th Cir. 1963).
[O]bviousness, within the meaning of the statute, does not mean that
one skilled in the art can perceive the solution after it has been found
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as specified in Graham would lead to reversible error. 4 ' The
slightest hint of "flash of genius" in an opinion was rejected.4 2
But the tenacity of the invention standard had been
underestimated. This time, it disguised itself as a "synergism"
requirement.
The first sighting appeared in one sentence of a five-page
Supreme Court opinion, Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc., v. Pavement
Salvage Co. 53 This case involved an invention for a device used to
apply layers of asphalt pavement. 4 4 Since asphalt is only pliable
at hot temperatures, the patentee designed a special chassis that
would hold both a radiant burner for heating the exposed edge of a
cold strip of pavement and equipment for spreading and shaping
the hot asphalt.455 The Court reasoned that although there was
doubt in the industry that radiant heat would solve the problems
of asphalt cold joints, the combination of the burner with the
spreading tools would have been "reasonably obvious to one with
ordinary skill in the art."4 56 This rather innocuous conclusion was
followed by this surprising language:
A combination of elements may result in an effect greater than the
sum of the several effects taken separately. No such synergistic
result is argued here. It is, however, fervently argued that the
combination filled a long felt want and has enjoyed commercial
success. But those matters "without invention will not make
patentability."*7
Ignoring the § 103 non-obviousness analysis also present in
the Black Rock opinion, patent attorneys began to debate whether
the Supreme Court had just created a new patentability
requirement of synergism.
The Ninth Circuit rejected the temptation to slip into
synergism terminology in its 1971 opinion in Reeves Instrument
Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, InC.458 This case involved a patent
that related to checking general analog computers.4 9 The Reeves
court rejected the notion that combination patents should receive

and pointed out by someone else, but the test is as of an earlier time,
when the search is on for the solution to the problem It should not be
determined on the basis of subjective speculation as to what, after
everything has been disclosed, might have seemed obvious.

Id.
451. See Colourpicture Publishers, Inc., v. Mike Roberts Color Prods., Inc., 394
F.2d 431, 433-35 (1st Cir. 1968).
452. See Jones Knitting Corp. v. Morgan, 361 F.2d 451, 456-58 (3d Cir. 1966).
453. 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
454. Id. at 57-58.
455. Id. at 58.
456. Id. at 59-60.
457. Id. at 61 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
458. 444 F.2d 263 (9th Cir. 1971).
459. Id.at 263.
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special scrutiny.460 In the Court's opinion, that kind of synergism
argument "suggests an analytical approach to patentability which
is directly contrary to the statutory language of 35 U.S.C. 103
which provides that the inquiry into patentability must be drawn
toward the 'subject matter as a whole' and not to the
46 elements of a
claimed combination and their individual novelty." '
The Reeves court interpreted Black Rock as a mere
affirmation of the standard set out in Graham, stating: "From an
analytical view, the most definitive statement of the requirement
of nonobviousness and the approach to be taken by federal courts
in determining this question is found in Graham v. John Deere
462

cO.

Instead of looking for a "synergistic result," the Reeves court
analyzed the difference between the patent and the prior art given
46 3
the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention.
In making this determination, the Reeves court noted the
importance of the Graham secondary considerations: "When the
evidence shows that several others in the art have attempted to
solve the same problem and have not arrived at the solution
claimed by the patent in suit, the 464statutory presumption of
validity is substantially strengthened."
Rich praised the Reeves opinion in a speech before the Los
Angeles Patent Law Association on September 18, 1972.465 He
made every effort to dampen the negative effects of the Black Rock
synergism language, that could re-introduce uncertainty in to the
patent law, uncertainty that he had worked so hard to eliminate.
He criticized the assertion that combination patents should receive
special scrutiny. "[Ailmost all inventions
are combinations of
466
elements, generally all old elements."
How can judges and patent examiners distinguish a
combination patent from a regular one? Even if a distinction
between the types of patents exists, what test would satisfy a
nebulous "synergism" requirement? Judge Rich denounced such a
synergism requirement: "The laws of physics and chemistry in
accordance with which all inventions perform do not permit of the
judicially imagined magic accordingly to which 2+2=5.
Wherever
467
such a spurious test prevails all patents are invalid."
Despite the ominous synergism cloud now looming on the
horizon, Rich concluded his speech on an optimistic note:

460. Id. at 270.
461. Id.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.

Id. at 271 (citation omitted).
Reeves, 444 F.2d at 270.
Id. at 272 (footnotes omitted).
Rich, Laying the Ghost, supra note 13, at 44.
Id.at 43.

467. Id. at 44.
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I do not believe the Supreme Court sees the inconsistencies between
Graham and Black Rock that get patent lawyers so excited and I
think that if it ever has to resolve the matter it will stick with
Grahamand say-for face saving reasons-that Black Rock is really
to the same effect.468
Things would get worse, however, before they got better.
Seven years after Black Rock the Supreme Court spoke again on
obviousness in Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc. 09 This case involved a
patent for a water flush system designed to remove cow manure
from the floor of a dairy barn. 470 The closest prior art to the
claimed invention involved spot delivery of pressurized water to a
barn floor.'
While generally effective at removing the manure,
this system required additional manual labor to help move the
manure out the door.472 Sakraida's claimed invention provided for
the abrupt release of a large body of dammed-up water directly on
the barn floor, forcing a sheet of water to pass over the entire floor
and thereby creating a greater force of friction between the water
and the manure for flushing purposes.473 Consequently, the
Sakraida invention greatly reduced the amount of supplemental
manual labor needed.474
Perhaps the Court was unduly influenced by the seemingly
simplistic nature of the solution to the problem addressed by the
patent. Perhaps Justice Brennan was simply unaware of the long
struggle within the patent law for a workable standard of
patentability. Whatever the reason, the Court was so sure that
this combination of elements could not possibly constitute a
patentable invention that it failed to correctly apply the statutory
test of non-obviousness spelled out in § 103 and explained in
Graham.
The Court briefly mentioned the § 103 statutory requirement
of non-obviousness, then quickly brushed it aside for an in-depth
discussion of judicially inspired synergism requirements and the
unique problems of "combination" patents. 475 Citing the pre-1952
Act A & P case, Justice Brennan observed that it would be difficult
and improbable to find "invention" in any combination of old
elements.476 Whatever the Court's view on whether a collection of
old elements ever warranted a patent, it was clear that the Court
would not uphold the patent here because this particular assembly

468. Id.
469. 425 U.S. 273 (1976).

470. Id. at 273.
471. Id. at 276-77.
472. Id.

473. Id. at 277.
474. Sakraida,425 U.S. at 277.

475. Id.at 281-83.
476. Id. at 281.
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of old elements did not produce any "synergistic" effect. 477 Indeed,
the Court ignored all objective evidence of secondary
considerations and finally concluded that:
Though doubtless a matter of great convenience, producing a
desired result in a cheaper and faster way, and enjoying commercial
success, (the patentee) "did not produce a new or different
function" .. . within the test of validity of combination patents.
benefits "without invention will not make
These desirable
"418

patentability.

After Sakraida,the Patent Bar was left to wonder what happened
to the non-obviousness standard spelled out in § 103.
IX. THE STABILIZING FORCES OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
A.

Wiping Out Synergism

After Black Rock and Sakraida, defendants in patent
litigation not surprisingly began to make reference to
"combination patents" and requirements of synergism. Speaking
before the American Patent Law Association in 1978 in his home
town of Rochester, New York, Judge Rich tackled the synergism
language of Sakraida.479 He pointed out that the Sakraidaopinion
still based its non-obviousness determination on the framework of
§ 103 and the Graham decision, neither of which mentioned
synergism.4 8o Rich argued that "Far from being an improbable
place to find patentability, the new and unobvious combination is
the usual place for finding it. This is a truism to any patent
examiner or patent lawyer, but the
48 Supreme Court hears patent
'
cases so seldom as not to know it.,
Rich's efforts to protect the non-obviousness test of § 103 were
In 1976, Commissioner C.
supported by the Patent Office.
Marshall Dann issued a directive on the effect of Sakraida and
Black Rock on § 103.42 The Commissioner stated that the Patent
Office would continue to rely on the three-pronged test set out in
Even though "the Court [in
Graham v. John Deere Co.48 3
Sakraidal and Black Rock went on to discuss whether the claimed
combinations produced a 'new or different function' and a
synergistic result,'" both of the decisions had "clearly decided
477. Id. at 282.
478. Id. at 282-83 (citations omitted).
479. Giles S. Rich, Escaping the Tyranny of Words-Is Evolution in Legal
Thinking Impossible?, 60 J. PAT. [& TRADEMARK] OFF. SOc'Y 271 (1978)
[hereinafter Rich, Escapingthe Tyranny of Words].
480. Id. at 295-96.
481. Id. at 296.
482. C. Marshall Dann, Examination of Claims for Patentability Under 35
US.C. 103, 949 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. GAZETTE 3 (1976).

483. Id.
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whether the claimed inventions were unobvious on the basis of the
three-way test in Graham."484
The Commissioner concluded
"Nowhere in its decisions in those cases does the Court state that

the 'new or different function' and 'synergistic result' tests
supersede a finding
of unobviousness or obviousness under the
48 5
test.,
Graham
Two years later, the Patent Office announced changes in the
Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) to formally
mandate the consideration of "Commercial Success and Other
Considerations Bearing on Obviousness."486
According to the
changes in the MPEP:
Affidavits or declarations submitting evidence of commercial
success, long-felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., must be
considered by the Examiner in determining the issue of obviousness
of claims for patent-ability [sic] under 35 U.S.C. 103. Such evidence
might be utilized to give light to circumstances surrounding the
origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia of
obviousness or unobviousness, such evidence may have relevancy.487

Patent examiners were clearly instructed that "[t]he Graham
v. John Deere pronouncements on the relevance of commercial
success, etc. to a determination of obviousness were not negated"
by Sakraida or Black Rock. If the Patent Examiners remained
unconvinced by the evidence submitted; the new instructions
required them to state specifically the reasons why the evidence
was not sufficient. 488
The CCPA helped the Patent Office maintain strict
compliance with these objectives. In In re Kollman, the court
corrected a patent examiner's incorrect focus on synergism: "Often
during the prosecution of this application in the PTO and, indeed,
in the arguments presented to this court, the term 'synergism' is
applied without qualification. Synergism, in and of itself, is not
conclusive 48 9 of unobviousness in that synergism might be
expected. ,

But the Circuit Courts were beyond the CCPA's reach. In
SSP Agricultural Equipment, Inc., v. Orchard-RiteLtd., the Ninth
Circuit invalidated a patent for a wind machine used to prevent
frost from settling on crops.80 The patented wind machine used
longer, thinner fan blades in order to move "a larger mass of air
for a greater distance at fewer revolutions of the engine per
484. Id.
485. Id.
486. Rene D. Tegtmeyer, Commercial Success and Other Considerations
Bearingon Obviousness, 973 OFFICIAL GAZETrE 34 (1978).
487. Id. (citations omitted).

488. Id.
489. 595 F.2d 48, 55 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (citation omitted).
490. 592 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1979).
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minute than" had been possible with the previously used aircraft
propeller blades.49 ' Although the Ninth Circuit laid out the three
prongs of the Graham test, it based its rejection of the patent on
its failure, as a combination of elements, to achieve a "new result,"
stating:
Mechanical patents covering a combination of old elements must be
scrutinized with care, since it is unlikely that such combination will
amount to patentable invention. A mechanical combination must
utilize a new principle or achieve a new result to cause it to rise to
the status of invention. [citing Sakraida. Since the ... device
neither applies a new principle nor achieves an unusual new result,
it is not patentable .... 492
The court refused to consider the evidence of commercial
success offered by the patentee commenting that: "SSP's success in
selling its wind machines utilizing the [patented] fan assembly
and evidence of the existence of a long-felt need for the product are
secondary factors which we493do not consider, since the issue of
obviousness is not in doubt."
More synergism opinions appeared in decisions where the
courts upheld the validity of the patents based on a perceived
presence of "synergism." In Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area,
Inc., a court found sufficient "synergistic result" to uphold the
validity of a process patent for making snow for winter sports.494
The Hanson process created snow without a complicated system of
pipes and compressed air.495 Once again, the court began with a
careful citation to Graham and the factual determinations set out
in § 103, and then quickly shifted to synergism.496 According to the
court, "This is a 'synergistic result' and, therefore, we conclude
that, although it is a combination method patent, it meets49 7the
requirement of non-obviousness as set out in 35 U.S.C. § 103."
The synergism tide seemed unstoppable.
In Reinke
Manufacturing Co. v. Sidney Manufacturing Corp., the Eight
Circuit considered a patent for an electrically-driven circular
irrigation system. 99 The Reinke patent used a truss mechanism to
support the water pipes and to help the irrigation system
withstand "wallowing" and "whipping" stresses.4 99 After reviewing
the background facts of the case, the court announced the
following strategy:

491. Id.at 1099.

492. Id.at 1101.
493. Id.
494. 611 F.2d 156, 160 (6th Cir. 1979).
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.

Id. at 157.
Id at 159-60.
Id. at 160.
594 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 648.
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In our examination we will not only consider whether it was
Obvious that by putting together the various elements used the
result would be the effect achieved in the [patented device]; we will
also consider whether the effect is a new effect, or simply each of the
items performing its expected function. 00
True to its word, the court proceeded with an analysis of the
differences between the prior art and the claims in issue. The
court found that:
The connecting devices for the truss support and the tie rods were
different in the [patented device] from prior art insofar as irrigation
systems are concerned. Because Reinke alleges that the combined
effect of all of the elements was new-new in that it created an
effect heretofore undiscovered which enabled the span distance
between drive units to be increased to 120 feet-Reinke contends
that this complies with the concept of synergism. We do not agree
that this is synergism.0 1
Synergism, according to the court, would be evidenced by the
evolution of "a totally new functional aspect," not to be confused
50 2
with the occasional non-synergistic "natural phenomenon."
Instead of bringing about synergism, Reinke merely "used a better
and different truss design that had been used before in irrigation
systems. ... ,,503

One circuit judge, Sixth Circuit Judge George Edwards,
rejected Judge Rich's criticism of synergism. Speaking before the
District of Columbia Bar Association, Judge Edwards challenged
Judge Rich's position on synergism and stated what he perceived
to be his mandate from the Supreme Court: "[Iun dealing with
combination claims, if no new element is added, the elements
combined must produce a result greater than its parts added
together and one which
would not have been obvious to one skilled
50 4
in the art involved."
Rich responded to Judge Edwards' comments in a speech a
few months later.0 5 Rich described the "instant shock" he had
suffered from the realization that this "high federal judge, who
properly
felt bound
to follow
the Supreme
Court's
pronouncements," still believed that the test for patentability
revolved around a requirement of "invention" or "synergism.
Rich lamented:

500. Id. (emphasis added).
501. Id. at 651.
502. Id.
503. Sidney Manufacturing,594 F.2d at 651.
504. Judge George Edwards, That Clumsy Word "Nonobviousness , 60 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'Y 3, 13 (1978) (Reprint of address before the Bar Association of the
District of Columbia on November 17, 1977).
505. Rich, Escaping the Tyranny of Words, supra note 479, at 274-76.
506. Id. at 274-75.
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Oh, the tyranny of words? And the most tyrannical of all are those
related words, "inventor," "invention," "invents," and "invented." I
can't help wondering what those terms mean to the good judge and
why they have such a magical power over him that he deems "nonobviousness" to be a "clumsy" word by comparison. How does one go
about illuminating the darkness out of which sprang the [Judge
Edwards' comments]?
I have tried it before, apparently with
something less than total success, so I will try a new approach.0 7
The word "invention," Rich explained, included both
patentable and unpatentable conceptions. Expressing his belief
that not all inventions are patentable, Rich stated:
Now and then, in my early years on the court, a lawyer would argue
that the subject matter of the application on appeal should be
patentable because it truly was an invention, or contrariwise, that it
was not patentable because it was not an invention, but we rarely
hear such arguments any more. If we do, we simply remind counsel
that the issue is not whether there is an invention-there is always
an invention-and that the issue is its patentability,which turns on
compliance with the statute, which says nothing about being an
invention. 58
Rich further commented:
Until you understand the concept of unpatentable inventions
implicit in the statutes, you don't understand patent law at all.
About 1/3 of the inventions submitted to the Patent and Trademark
Office are held unpatentable. From 2/3 to 3/4 of all the inventions
brought to the CCPA are held unpatentable. The use of the term
"invention" or any of its variants in the Patent Act is of no
significance whatever on the main subject with which the act deals the patentability of inventions. Some are, some are not. Being an
invention is really no indication of patentability.' °9
The non-obviousness language of § 103, Rich explained,
attempted to nail down and clarify the line in the "gray area"
between patentable and unpatentable inventions. l
Patent
attorneys "from all branches of government, industry, and private
practice, working through a committee" devised the language of §
103."" The committee decided on "non-obviousness" as the key
term for this third requirement of patentability."2 Rich explained
how the committee structured the statute to limit an inquiry of
non-obviousness to discrete factual determinations of the
invention as a whole, at the time the invention was made, to a

507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.

Id. at 276.
Id. at 278.
Id.at 280.
Rich, Escapingthe Tyranny of Words, supra note 479, at 281.
Id.at 289.
Id. at 290.
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person of ordinary skill in the art.t 3
Having recalled all the effort that went into the creation of §
103, Rich turned to address its detractor:
I would ask the judge who feels that non-obviousness is clumsy,
either as a word or an idea, whether it is not less clumsy than
"invention." And I ask what right the courts have to substitute their
own ideas of what the requirement is for what Congress has said it
is. Is it not their duty to apply the law as Congress wrote it?
When the courts filled the void in the patent law by adding the
requirement of "invention," there was no statute on the subject.
Since 1952 there has been no void, but a carefully worked out
statutory substitute for the rough-hewn stopgap the courts produced
which the courts themselves said they could not explain.
Rich's persistence finally began to bear fruit. In Republic
Industries, Inc., v. Schlage Lock Co., the Seventh Circuit rejected
synergism as a requirement for patentability. t5
The patent
involved "a door closer used to hold open and to close fire doors in
hospital institutional health care facilities, and other public
buildings."" 6 In its opinion, the court echoed Rich's criticism of the
synergism test:
Neither Sakraida nor Black Rock can be cited as prescribing some
other, special test for the evaluation of combination claims.
Nowhere in these two decisions did the Court hold a synergistic
effect to be a necessary condition of patentability; nor did it hold
that to synergism supersedes a finding of non-obviousness under the
Graham analysis. To the contrary, each case quoted Graham with
approval. Each turned on whether the claimed inventiont 7was nonobvious on the basis of the three-pronged test in Graham.
In the Seventh Circuit's opinion, the difficulty of the
synergism test was that it forced the court to assess the
patentability of the invention after its elements had been
combined.5 8 Such a test would seem to contradict the teaching of §
103 that obviousness be determined based on the circumstances
that existed as of the time the invention was made, prior to the
actual combination of the claimed elements. t 9 There was no basis
in § 103 for placing an additional burden on combination
patents.52
The court concluded that "because synergism has
prevented the development of a consistent, predictable body of law
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514.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.

Id.
Id.
592 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1979).
Id.at 965.
Id.at 969.
Id. at 971.
Id.
Republic Indus., 592 F.2d at 971.
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under § 103, and because the concept does not bear any logical
ipso facto relationship to obviousness, the term has little, if any,
utility.""'
Some courts began to follow the Seventh Circuit's lead. 2
Others did not. For instance, in Herschensohn v. Hoffman, the
Ninth Circuit invalidated a patent for a hair brush with a flexible
spine and stiff bristles. 2 3 The brush was designed so that when it
was pulled through the hair, the spine would bend "so that the
distal ends of the fingers [holding the bristles] on the trailing side
of the brush will approach each other."5 24 The court focused on the
fact that a combination of old elements was involved, remarking
that: "The patent sets forth a combination of old elements ....All
of these elements are old in the art and no discussion of this art is
necessary. The patent, therefore, is a combination patent5 2and
is
5
controlled by the Supreme Court decisions on such patents."
Efforts by plaintiffs counsel to persuade the court that there
was no synergism requirement for patentability failed, as is
apparent from the court's comment: "Counsel for the plaintiffs
apparently never understood fully the requirement that a patent
based on a combination of elements old in the art must produce a
new and unusual result."526 The court added the comment that "It
is obvious.., that the patent is not valid, having no new, unusual
or synergistic result, and having no beneficial use other than uses
already old in the art of brushes and combs."527
By 1980, CCPA Chief Judge Howard Markey had joined
Judge Rich in the defense of § 103. In a speech before the Los
Angeles Patent Law Association, Judge Markey equated
synergism with a "virus" and asked that any "victorious lawyer
who finds such intellectual mud in the opinion go back to the court
and ask that it be cleansed. "128 Judge Markey instructed courts to
make the evidentiary findings dictated by the Graham nonobviousness test in his statement: "The very best cure for the
synergism virus is evidence. Evidence is, or should be, the key
that unlocks the door to decision in every field of the law. It is a
jurisprudential
disgrace when probative evidence is ignored in any
529
"

case.

521. Id. at 972.
522. See, e.g., Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535 (3rd Cir. 1981);
Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Gyromat Corp., 603 F.2d 361 (2nd Cir. 1979).
523. 593 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1979).
524. Id. at 895.
525. Id. (emphasis added).
526. Id.at 896.
527. Id. at 897 (footnote omitted).
528. Howard T. Markey, The Synergism Virus: Cause and Cure, 496 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) D-I, D-2 (1980) (Reprint of speech before Los
Angeles Patent Law Association on September 16, 1980).
529. Id.
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District courts sat on the sidelines watching. They randomly
lifted excerpts from various conflicting caselaw, creating their own
bizarre and contorted patentability tests. For instance, in Leinoff
v. Valerie Furs Ltd., a New York district court examined the
patentability of an invention for manufacturing pelts from
longhaired animal pets.53 0 The court embarked on its discussion of
obviousness with the caution that "[tihe resolution of the issue of
obviousness, as all courts have painfully recognized, is extremely
difficult."53'
Identifying the Leinoff patent as a combination
patent, the court reasoned that the following mix of synergism and
Graham factors should be applied:
[T]o arrive at a resolution of the issue of "obviousness," with respect
to combination patents the law in the Second Circuit is that the
three-fold test of Graham is to be applied and then, if the function of
elements of the inventor [sic] is known or obvious, the synergism
test is to be considered. If synergism is found, then the invention,
from the viewpoint of its result is not obvious and thus entitled to
patentability.
In Tri-Collarv. Reamco, Inc., another court tried to reconcile
synergism with the Graham analysis. 3 The patent involved a
"bottom hole stabilizer tool used in the drilling of oil wells."5 34 The
tool prevented drill collars from sticking to the walls of the drilling
holes and improved the quality of the drilling assembly.
Under
the subtitle "A Non-Obvious Synergistic Result or Does Two Plus
Two Equal Five?", the court opined that while "[slynergism is not
the sine qua non of patentability", it "may be an indication of nonobviousness." 3' According to this court, the Supreme Court in
Black Rock and Sakraida "did not intend to reduce emphasis on
the Graham analysis for obviousness under § 103, but merely said
that synergism is a symbolic reminder of what constitutes
non5 37
obviousness when a combination patent is at issue."
Believing it had such a combination patent on its hands, the
court then proceeded to expound at great length what qualities an
invention must possess in order to be "synergistic":
Only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the

530. 501 F. Supp. 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
531. Id. at 723.
532. Id. at 725. (emphasis added); see also Foseco Int'l Ltd. v. Chemincon, Inc.,
507 F. Supp. 1253, 1266 (E.D. Mich. 1981) ("When confronted with a combination
patent this standard requires an isolation of that unique essence of the

combination and a determination of whether that essence makes an authentic
contribution to mankind's store of knowledge.") (citation omitted).

533.
534.
535.
536.
537.

538 F. Supp. 669 (W.D. La. 1982).
Id. at 672.
Id.
Id. at 682-83.
Id. at 683.
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accumulation of old devices patentable. Therefore, it must be shown
that the combination took on some new quality or function from
being brought into concert ....
If the total only produced results
more striking than any previous utilization, that result is not
patentable as scores of progressive ideas in business are not
patentable.3 8
The court then rejected the patent holder's argument that his
invention possessed this "new quality or function" 539
by concluding,
"In the Court's view, two plus two still equals four."
Frustration with
the synergism
aberration
is best
demonstrated by the Ninth Circuit's en banc opinion of Sarkisian
v. Winn-Proof Corp." ° The object of the Sarkisian opinion was to
clarify the role of synergism in determining patentability and to
outline the legal and factual issues that must be resolved with
regard to non-obviousness."' The court began with its assessment
of the synergism problem. According to the Ninth Circuit, the
concept of synergism was perfectly acceptable.542 In its opinion,
the problems surrounding synergism arose because "[the
Supreme Court has not precisely defined the word, and circuit and
district courts have variously described it.
Those various
definitions have produced uncertainty in litigation requiring
preciseness."13
The problem could be avoided, according to the Ninth Circuit,
if the word "synergism" were used only where "the combination in
issue is synergistic in the literal sense." 44 Given the many
divergent definitions now spread throughout the caselaw, the
court concluded that it would simply replace the synergism test
with what it deemed to be the equivalent "unusual or surprising
results test."5 45 Under the Ninth Circuit's solution, all combination
patents now must produce an "unusual or surprising result" in
addition to passing the Graham analysis.
A cure for the synergism virus would finally come with the
establishment of the Federal Circuit as the single court to hear
appeals from all district courts in patent infringement cases. With
the various other circuit courts out of the way, Judges Rich and
Markey could slowly retrain and reeducate the district courts on
the proper method for applying § 103. For example, in Chore-Time
Equipment, Inc., v. Cumberland Corp., the Federal Circuit
reviewed a decision from the Eastern District of Tennessee that

538.
539.
540.
541.
542.
543.
544.
545.

Tri-Collar,538 F. Supp. at 683.
Id. at 684.
688 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1982).
Id. at 649.
Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id.
Sarkisian,688 F. Supp at 649.
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invalidated a patent for an automated poultry feeder. 4 ' Although
Judge Markey affirmed the district court's summary judgment of
invalidity under § 103, he went out of his way to correct the
district court's references to synergism as follows:
In determining patentability, we are guided, as we must be guided,
by the statute. A requirement that an invention reflect "synergism"
or achieve a "synergistic result" before it may be held patentable
appears nowhere in the statute, 35 U.S.C. The test of obviousness
under 35 U.S.C. § 103, as the statute makes plain, is whether the
invention as a whole would have been obvious at the time it was
made to one of ordinary skill in the art. References to synergism as
a patentability requirement are, therefore, unnecessary and
confusing.547
The Federal Circuit would spend the next couple of years
removing synergism from the non-obviousness requirements. This
task proved especially arduous with respect to district courts from
the Ninth Circuit. The Federal Circuit closely examined every
patent validity opinion to ensure that judges were both using the
three-pronged factual Graham analysis of § 103 and that the
analysis was being applied correctly.
For instance, in American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa &
Sons, Inc., Judge Rich, writing for the Federal Circuit, analyzed
an Oregon district court judgment invalidating a patent." 8 The
patent related to "[a] heavy duty shackle for use under great loads,
such as in anchor lines.""
Rich pointed out several errors
committed by the trial court, among them the jury instructions for
obviousness. Specifically, the district court judge instructed the
jury that:
You must next determine whether the differences between
plaintiffs claimed invention and the prior art, if any.... produce a
new and unexpected result. That is, you must determine whether
the elements making up plaintiffs claimed invention combine so as
to perform in some way ormanner, a new and unexpected function in
combination than they perform separately, The reason for this is
that a patented invention which unites only old elements without
producing either a new and unexpected result merely withdraws
from the public's use that which was known before.550
Rich rejected this instruction as "wholly erroneous," stating:
While the existence of a new and unexpected result or function or a
so-called 'synergistic' effect may support a holding of nonobviousness ...our predecessor courts have considered and rejected
the notion that a new result or function or synergism is a
546.
547.
548.
549.
550.

713 F.2d 774 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Id.at 781.
725 F.2d 1350 (Fed, Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1353.
Id.at 1360 (emphasis added).
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requirement of patentability."5 '
Another example is provided by Judge Markey's opinion in
552
Jones v. Hardy.
Jones owned both process and product patents
related to molding concrete panels.553 Markey attacked several
aspects of the district court's opinion. First, he observed that the
lower court examined the elements of the claims of the Jones
patent individually to assess the patentability of each individual
element.554 Markey explained:
[Ilt is irrelevant in determining obviousness that all or all other
aspects of the claim may have been well known in the art.... [TIhe
statute, the law established not by judges but by Congress, requires
that the invention as claimed be considered "as a whole" when
considering whether that invention would have been obvious when
it was made. 35 U.S.C. § 103."'
Markey then criticized the absence of proper Graham findings
and the erroneous use of synergism language: "The record contains
no specific factual findings on the scope and content of the prior
art, differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, level
of ordinary skill in the pertinent art, or other indicia
useful in
5 6
determining the obviousness/nonobviousness question."
The district court's conclusion that "the discovery does not
involve that degree of inventiveness which the courts have
required" provoked a firestorm from Markey.557 "Judges are not
constitutionally empowered to legislate their individual subjective
views respecting degrees of inventiveness .. .,55R
Markey
continued:
An appellate court's function is to review judgments, not opinions.
As above indicated, however, the district court's opinion establishes
that the judgment was in this case reached via a decisional path
diverted by fundamental legal errors and unaccompanied by a path
of reasoning and evidence upon which the judgment might be
affirmed.5 9
The Federal Circuit eventually removed synergism through
painstaking repetition and meticulous correction of erroneous
district court opinions.

551. Id. (emphasis added).
552. 727 F.2d 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
553. Id. at 1526.
554. Id. at 1528.
555. Id. (citations omitted).
556. Id. at 1529.
557. Jones, 727 F.2d at 1529.
558. Id. at 1530.
559. Id. at 1531. See also Judge Markey's opinion in Kansas Jack, Inc., v.
Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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B. Mandating "SecondaryConsiderations"
The advent of the Federal Circuit improved another aspect of
the patent law surrounding non-obviousness. By the time the
Federal Circuit was instituted in 1982, courts had strayed from
the mandatory consideration of secondary factors (despite the
instruction in Judge Rich's CCPA opinion In re Khelghatian).
Instead, courts restricted the use of secondary factors to cases
where patentability was close or doubtful.
Even the Second Circuit had turned its back on Learned
Hand's teachings of the importance of secondary considerations.
In Digitronics Corp. v. New York Racing Association, Inc,, the
Second Circuit affirmed a holding of patent invalidity."'
Digitronics was the assignee of a patent which pertained to data
processing systems for information received from ticket issuing
machines, specifically for wagers made by spectators at sporting
events."' After concluding that the claimed invention did not
produce any "synergistic" results not already present in the prior
art, the court moved on to the patent holder's argument that its
evidence of secondary considerations should have been included in
the lower court's discussion of the validity issue.56 The court was
unmoved by the patent holder's citation to Learned Hand's
opinions as is evident in its statement:
Despite the persuasive advocacy of Judge Learned Hand [in Reiner
and Bausch & Lomb], this view does not represent current law....
Only in a close case, in which application of the subjective criteria of
nonobviousness in 35 U.S.C. § 103 does not produce a firm
conclusion, can these objective or secondary considerations be used
to "tip the scales in favor of patentability." Because we hold that the
claims made here are clearly obvious, we need not examine
secondary considerations.6 3
The CCPA decisions were not controlling on the various
circuit courts that downplayed the importance of secondary
considerations. For example, the Ninth Circuit in Stevenson v.
Grentec, Inc., invalidated a skateboard patent that had been
previously upheld as valid by the CCPA in an appeal from a
related case before the United States International Trade
Commission (ITC).4
The ITC action had been brought
concurrently with the district court case.6
The ITC's decision
invalidating the patent had been overturned on appeal to the
560. 553 F.2d 740 (2d Cir. 1977).
561. Id.at 742.
562. Id at 748.
563. Id. at 748-49. (citations and footnote omitted); see also Medical Lab.
Automation, Inc., v. Labcon, Inc., 670 F.2d 671, 675 (7th Cir. 1981) (stating that
secondary considerations "only need be considered in close cases").
564. 652 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1981).

565. Id. at 21.
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CCPA.

Nevertheless, the district court granted summary judgment
invalidating the patent.5 6 7
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
commented on the related CCPA decision that: "To be sure, the
decisions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals should be
given great weight and treated
with respect; they are not,
68
however, binding on this Court."

1

Evidence of the commercial success of the patented
skateboard was one of the reasons the CCPA found the patent to
be valid and non-obvious. 569 The Ninth Circuit, however, held that
its caselaw did not mandate consideration of such evidence: "This
court has stated, however, that the trial court's failure to consider
secondary factors is not reversible error, and their presence or
absence is not of itself determinative of obviousness. Where
patents [sic] are obvious, they" cannot be saved from invalidity by
resorting to secondary factors.

170

In his efforts to educate the bench and the bar, Judge Rich
urged that evidence of secondary considerations be considered in
all patentability cases, not just in close cases. In one of his articles
on obviousness, he "suggest[s] that in thinking about those
'considerations' they be looked upon for what they factually are,
circumstantial evidence of unobviousness of the highest probative
value, unless there is some other explanation for the action."57 '
Judge Markey also emphasized the importance of secondary
considerations. In his speech before a Judges' Seminar, he stated
that "these considerations are not secondary in importance; they
are secondary only in time, because they occurred or became
relevant only after the invention was made ....
There is no
warrant for disregarding
any probative evidence in any case,
572
patent cases included."

Once the Federal Circuit was established as the single court
of appeals in all patent infringement cases, Judges Rich and
Markey were able to ensure the mandatory consideration of
secondary factors in every patent case. In Stratoflex, Inc., v.
Aeroquip Corp., Judge Markey assessed the validity of a patent for
electrically conductive tubing used in the aircraft industry.5 "
Markey corrected the lower court's failure to evaluate secondary
considerations,
declaring
that
evidence
of
secondary
566. Id.
567. Id.
568. Id. at 22-23.
569. Stevenson, 652 F.2d at 23.
570. Id. (citations omitted).
571. Rich, Laying the Ghost, supra note 13, at 39.
572. Howard T. Markey, Special Problems in Patent Cases, 57 J. PAT. OFF.
SoC'Y 675, 684 (1975) (Reprint of speech before a Judges' Seminar on October 16,
1974).
573. Stratoflex, Inc., v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530 (Fed, Cir. 1983).
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considerations "must always when present be considered en route
to a determination of obviousness. 1 74
He pointed out the
usefulness of secondary considerations in his opinion, stating:
Indeed, evidence of secondary considerations may often be the most
probative and cogent evidence in the record. It may often establish
that an invention appearing to have been obvious in light of the
prior art was not. It is to be considered as part of all the evidence,
not just when the decisionmaker remains in doubt after reviewing
the art.171
C. The Obviousness Inquiry
1. All of the Evidence Under the GrahamFactorsMust Be
Consideredso that There Are No A PrioriTests or Guaranteesof
Obviousness or Non-Obviousness
A good example of the profound impact of the Federal Circuit
on how district courts now conduct the obviousness inquiry under
35 U.S.C. § 103 is the case of Haworth, Inc., v Steelcase, Inc.,
5 76
discussed supra.
There, the district court strictly followed the
Federal Circuit's directives on § 103 and considered all of the
evidence on the four Grahamfactors.577
Today, district courts recognize that evidence of secondary
considerations must be evaluated; and, any argument that
requiresproof of synergism to sustain validity will be rejected. For
example, in NordbergInc., v. Telsmith, Inc., the court noted that,
"secondary considerations such as commercial success, long-felt
need in the industry, and copying by others must be considered in
determining the issue of obviousness."" 8 And, on synergism, that
same court concluded that the Federal Circuit has held that "there
is no requirement of a synergistic effect and that there is no basis
for treating combinations of old elements differently in
determining patentability.",19
574. Id.at 1538.
575. Id. at 1538-39. See also Simmons Fastener Corp. v. Illinois Tool Works,
Inc., 739 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that failure to consider secondary
factors constitutes reversible error); In re Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989, 996 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (instructing the patent examiner to accept and consider evidence of
secondary considerations).
576. See supra notes 22-45 for a discussion of Haworth.
577. See infra Appendices A and B for examples of proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law on the obviousness issue, used in the Haworth case; see
also infra Appendices C-D for examples of model jury instructions on the
obviousness issue consistent with the mandates of the Federal Court.
578. 881 F. Supp. 1252, 1293 (E.D. Wis. 1995), afTd, 82 F.3d 394 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (emphasis added).
579. Id. See also GNB Battery Tech., Inc., v. Exide Corp., 876 F. Supp. 582, 598
(D. Del. 1995), atid,78 F.3d 605 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("[Tlhe Federal Circuit requires
that the statutory requirements for obviousness be applied regardless of whether
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While evidence of secondary considerations coupled with a
claimed difference over the prior art are important factors, they do
not automatically guarantee a determination of non-obviousness.
For example, in Richardson-Vicks, Inc., v. Upjohn Co., the Federal
Circuit affirmed a district court decision granting judgment as a
matter of law that the patent in suit was invalid as obvious, after
the jury had returned a verdict upholding the patent.-8

'

The

patent at issue involved "an over-the-counter ('OTC') medicine
that combines ... the analgesic ibuprofen and the decongestant
pseudoephedrine [into a single tablet] ... for the relief of cough,
cold, and flu symptoms."58 ' The product was highly successful,
achieving "annual sales of... $48 million dollars, with gross profit
margins of between 67% and 79% within three years of the
product's introduction. "S82 Not only was the product economically
successful, there was evidence that the claimed combination of the
analgesic and decongestant as a single unit provided a
"synergistic" improvement over taking the analgesic and
decongestant as separate medicines. 3
At trial, the patent holder also introduced evidence of
skepticism of others about the product, as well as evidence of prior
art that taught away from the claimed invention.8 4 In addition,
the claimed combination recited the use of a different analgesic
58
than that used in the combined single tablet of the prior art. 1
Despite strong evidence of secondary considerations and a
claimed difference over the closest prior art, the Federal Circuit
found the claimed combination of the analgesic and decongestant
in a "single unit dosage" would have been obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art.8 The court based its conclusion, inter
alia, on widespread knowledge among doctors and patients that
the prior use in combination of taking separate tablets for the
claimed analgesic and decongestant was effective in relieving
cough, cold and flu symptoms.5 8 7 In addition, ibuprofen, the
analgesic used and claimed in the patent was known to be
interchangeable with
other well-known analgesics, such as
aspirin or acetaminophen.588 Further, the Federal Circuit found
that "[t]he only difference between the prescribed combination [the
prescription in the prior art] and the patented invention is that

the invention is a combination of old elements.").
580. 122 F.3d 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
581. Id.at 1477.
582. Id. at 1482.
583. Id. at 1481.
584. Id. at 1482.
585. Richardson-Vicks, 122 F.3d at 1482.
586. Id. at 1483.
587. Id.at 1484.
588. Id. at 1483.
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the [prior art] prescription was not contained in a single tablet." 8 9
However, in the court's opinion, this difference was "clearly
suggested" by prior art, such as CO-TYLENOL, which combined a
decongestant
with the well-known
prior art analgesic
(acetaminophen) in a single tablet. 90
The Richardson-Vicks case, therefore, shows that evidence of
the level of skill in the art, as demonstrated by those actually
practicing in the field, if sufficiently compelling, can neutralize the
effect of strong secondary considerations and lead to a
determination that the claimed invention, though novel and
advantageous, was obvious. Stated differently, the obviousness
inquiry requires that the determination be made based on a
consideration of the "totality of the evidence." Indeed, in holding
as it did, the Court explained:
Evidence of secondary considerations, including evidence of
unexpected results and commercial success, are but part of the
"totality of the evidence" that is used to reach the ultimate
conclusion of obviousness .... The existence of such evidence,
however, does not control the obviousness determination....
Therefore, we must consider all of the evidence under the Graham
factors before reachingour decision.59'
Hence, there are no longer any a priori positive or negative
tests of obviousness that can be simply, automatically applied by
the courts to circumvent considering all of the evidence under the
four Graham factors. In other words, the obviousness issue cannot
be determined by a priori formulas, such as, substituting one
known element for another in a combination would be obvious, or
combining separate elements into a single unit would be obvious.
If such a priori formulas could have been applied, there would
have been no need for the Federal Circuit to consider all of the
evidence under the four Graham factors in the Richardson-Vicks
case. Indeed, if the evidence of prior art in that case had not
included the practice of doctors to prescribe taking the analgesic
ibuprofen and the decongestant pseudoephedrine, as separate
tablets, the result might have been different and the Federal
Circuit might have upheld the claimed invention as unobvious,
even though it involved substituting one known analgesic
(ibuprofen) for another (acetaminophen) that had already been
combined with the decongestant in a single tablet in the prior art.

589. Id.
590. Richardson-Vicks, 122 F.3d at 1484.
591. Id. at 1483 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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2.

Woe to District Courts That Do Not Follow the FederalCircuit

a.

Non-obviousness Is the Standard of Patentability

District courts that do not follow the Federal Circuit's
directives on obviousness can expect criticism as well as a
reversal. For example, in its reversal of a recent district court
decision erroneously granting summary judgment of invalidity,
the Federal Circuit in Monarch Knitting Machinery Co. v. Sulzer
Morat GMBH not only called the four-step factual determinations
of Graham v. John Deere Co. "these critical facts," but it also
criticized the district court's use of "archaic terminology" that
suggested use of a standard of patentability outside the statutory
mandate of § 103.'
The Federal Circuit remarked:
Given the occasional use of archaic terminology in the district
court's opinion, this court also emphasizes that the standard for
patentability is the statutory standard. The inquiry is not whether
there was a "real discovery of merit" or whether the claimed
invention offered a "new solution," but whether the claimed subject
matter as a whole "would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person3 having ordinary skill in the art." 35
U.S.C. 103(a) (Supp. I 1995).11

b.

Hindsight Must Be Avoided

In the Monarch case, the Federal Circuit also criticized the
district court's erroneous use of hindsight to determine the scope
and content of the prior art:
Defining the problem in terms of its solution reveals improper
hindsight in the selection of the prior art relevant to obviousness.
See, e.g., In re Antle, 58 C.C.P.A. 1382, 444 F.2d 1168, 1171-72, 170
USPQ 285, 287-88 (CCPA 1971) (warning against selection of prior
art with hindsight). By importing the ultimate solution into the
problem facing the inventor, the district court adopted an overly
narrow view of the scope of the prior art. It also infected the district
court's determinations about the content of the prior art .... By

defining the inventor's problem in terms of its solution, the district
court missed this necessary antecedent question, namely, whether
the prior art contains a 94suggestion or motivation to combine
references to form a trend.1

592. 139 F.3d 877, 881 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
593. Id.
594. Id. at 881-82 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also In re
Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In that case, the Federal Circuit
reversed a decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences of the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office that had upheld an examiner's final
rejection under 35 U.S.C § 103 based on a combination of references. Id. at
1350. In finding that the rejection improperly relied on hindsight to
combine the references the Court offered the following observations to help

The John Marshall Law Review

[32:437

c. The Courts Must Consider all Evidence on the Four-Step

Analysis of the Graham Case
The Federal Circuit further noted that the record included
evidence of secondary considerations, such as commercial success,
long-felt need, skepticism in the art about the claimed invention
and the prior art teaching away from it, that raised genuine issues

of fact precluding summary judgment.9

The court specifically

remarked that:
The evidence in the record raised genuine issues of fact concerning
the content of the prior art as well as several secondary

avoid the use of hindsight in determining the question of non-obviousness:
To prevent the use of hindsight based on the invention to defeat
patentability of the invention, this court requires the examiner to show a
motivationto combine the references that create the case of obviousness.
In other words, the examiner must show reasons that the skilled
artisan, confronted with the same problems as the inventor and with no
knowledge of the claimed invention, would select the elements from the
cited prior art references for combination in the manner claimed. This
court has identified three possible sources for a motivation to combine
references: the nature of the problem to be solved, the teachings of the
prior art, and the knowledge of persons of ordinary skill in the art. In
this case, the Board relied upon none of these. Rather, just as it relied
on the high level of skill in the art to overcome the differences between
the claimed invention and the selected elements in the references, it
relied upon the high level of skill in the art to provide the necessary
motivation.
The Board did not, however, explain what specific
understanding or technological principle within the knowledge of one of
ordinary skill in the art would have suggested the combination.
Instead, the Board merely invoked the high level of skill in the field of
art. If such a rote invocation could suffice to supply a motivation to
combine, the more sophisticated scientific field would rarely, if ever,
experience a patentable technical advance.
Instead, in complex
scientific fields, the Board could routinely identify the prior art elements
in an application, invoke the lofty level of skill, and rest its case for
rejection. To counter this potential weakness in the obviousness
construct, the suggestion to combine requirement stands as a critical
safeguard against hindsight analysis and rote application of the legal
test for obviousness. Because the Board did not explain the specific
understanding or principle within the knowledge of a skilled artisan
that would motivate one with no knowledge of Rouffet's invention to
make the combination, this court infers that the examiner selected these
references with the assistance of hindsight. This court forbids the use of
hindsight in the selection of references that comprise the case of
obviousness. See In re Gorman, 933 F.2d 982, 986, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1885,
1888 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Lacking a motivation to combine references, the
Board did not show a proper prima facie case of obviousness. This court
reverses the rejection over the combination of King, Rosen, and Ruddy.
Id. at 1357-58 (emphasis added). "When a rejection [of a patent on the basis of
obviousness] depends on a combination of prior art references, there must be
some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine the reference." Id. at
1355.
595. Monarch Knitting, 139 F.3d at 886.
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considerations. This court concludes that these issues are material

to an obviousness determination in this case. Accordingly, this
court vacates the district court's grant of summary judgment and
remands for further proceedings.'9'
Thus, there can be no question that the Federal Circuit will
insist that the "critical" four-step analysis of Graham v. John
Deere Co. be strictly followed and all evidence on those factors
evaluated by district courts in determining the question of
obviousness under 35 U.S.C. 103.
D. Uniting the Voices of Support: The Patent and Trademark
Office's 1994 Public Hearingon § 103
The question of how § 103 was being implemented or applied
by the PTO was considered in 1994 when the Patent Office issued
a Notice of Public Hearing and Request for Comments on the
Standard of Non-Obviousness. 97 The Patent Office claimed receipt
of complaints that § 103 was being applied too leniently. The
Patent Office specifically cited criticism that the Federal Circuit
"has given too much weight to the strong commercial success
598 of an
invention as a secondary consideration of non-obviousness."
The overwhelming response from patent attorneys, judges
and examiners evidenced their strong support for § 103. BNA
commented that "[i]f there are critics of the current standard for
determining non-obviousness, few showed up at the. . . hearing."' 99
Many supporters, however, spoke on behalf of the current nonobviousness standard.
The sole opponent at the Patent Office hearing argued for a
"stricter, pre-Federal Circuit standard of non-obviousness." 60 This
speaker reiterated the complaint mentioned in the Patent Office
notice that courts were paying too much attention to secondary
considerations such as commercial success. 0 '
Ironically, he
wanted the Patent Office to ignore § 103 and return to a strict
"ingenious invention" standard, contending that "[tioday's lowered
standard of non-obviousness erases the difference between an
ingenious invention and a routine one."62 Not surprisingly, his
suggestion fell on deaf ears.

596. Id.
597. Public Hearings and Request for Comments on the Standard of
Nonobviousness, 59 Fed. Reg. 22152 (1994).
598. Non-Obviousness Standardis Okay, But Needs Better Application, PTO
is Told, 48 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 294, 295 (1994).

599. Id.
600. Id. at 296.
601. Id.

602. Id.
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RECAP OF THE LAST TWO HUNDRED YEARS

To paraphrase a popular commercial, our patentability
standard has come a long way since Thomas Jefferson's 1791
proposal to deny patents on inventions that were "unimportant
and obvious." Today, we see that, while we have a good and
workable standard to invalidate "obvious" inventions, a patent
claim may nevertheless be considered valid as defining nonobvious subject matter even though the only claimed differences
over the closest prior art may appear "unimportant and obvious."
Such a result occurs because the current standard considers
whether the claimed invention, as a whole, would have been
obvious to a person of ordinary skill. Further, it does not consider
the claimed invention in isolation or in hindsight. In other words,
the claimed invention is to be considered as a whole in light of the
contemporaneous evidence of secondary considerations and the
level of ordinary skill in the art which, as in the Haworth case
discussed above, demonstrate that what may now seem obvious in
hindsight had escaped the best workers in the field at the time of
the invention, who were motivated, but failed to come up with a
solution.
It was noted that the seeds for an obvious-to-one-of-ordinaryskill-in-the-art standard were planted as early as 1825 by the
unsuccessful defendant in the case of Earle v. Sawyer, where the
court held there were only two conditions for patentability, novelty
and utility."3
Twenty-five years later, however, in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,
the Supreme Court accepted the skill-of-an-ordinary-mechanicstandard, but did not provide any criteria or methodology for
determining whether the patented invention in issue was within
the skill of such a mechanic."' Rather, it seemed that the Court
simply determined that question in isolation from any
surrounding circumstances. For example, the patent owner had
argued:
Knobs had been in use many hundred years; potter's ware and
porcelain, many thousand; but no one ever before succeeded in
uniting the clay and the iron so as to make of the two a substantial
and useful article. There are many difficulties in uniting them ....
The potter's ware and porcelain knobs are almost everywhere taking
the place of the metal knob.605
Yet, in its Hotchkiss opinion, the Court made no reference to
these difficulties or secondary considerations. Nor is there any
indication that the Court did any analysis of any evidence to
determine whether more ingenuity and skill than that possessed
603. Earle v. Sawyer, 8 F. Cas. 254 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825) (No. 4,247).
604. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. 248 (1850).
605. Id. at 254-55 (emphasis added).
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by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business, were
required to apply the old method (of connecting the metal shank
and spindle to metal and wood door knobs) to a frangible material,
that is, to a porcelain or potter's clay door knob. The Court seems
to have simply focused in isolation on the difference, namely
substituting a door knob of a different but known material,
potter's clay or porcelain, for wood or metal. The Court concluded
that such a substitution was not worthy of a patent, without
considering whether there were any difficulties in seeking to make
the frangible porcelain-to-metal connection secure, durable and
practical. Under today's standard, a different result might have
been reached.
In any event, while the skill-of-the-ordinary-mechanicstandard was well stated and accepted in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,
a problem arose since the Court provided no methodology for
applying that standard. Without a methodology, the lower courts
in subsequent decisions were free to decide the skill-of-theordinary-mechanic issue using hindsight and based on personal,
subjective views of what should or should not be patentable,
without considering the circumstances surrounding the creation of
the patented invention and the acts of infringement. Courts often
paid no more than lip service to the Hotchkiss standard, instead
applying a subjective test of whether the patented invention
involved the "exercise of the inventive faculty" or a "flash of
genius," to decide whether it was an "invention" and therefore
patentable. Very little consideration, if any, was given to evidence
of secondary considerations.
The trend in the 1930's and 1940's was to apply a stricter
standard leading to Justice Jackson's observation that "the only
patent that is valid is one which this Court has not been able to
get its hands on."606
A notable exception to that approach was Learned Hand, and
later, Giles Rich. Their contributions to the enactment of the
Patent Act of 1952 and the later development of 35 U.S.C. § 103 to
the standard we know today are beyond measure.
In his famous 1955 opinion, Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical
Co., Learned Hand pointed out the correct way to interpret § 103,
stating that it was intended to reverse the stricter trend being
followed by the Supreme Court. °7 Eleven years later, the Supreme

606. Jungerson v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949).
607. 224 F.2d 530, 535 (2d Cir. 1955) Earlier in his 1952 Commentary on the
New Patent Act, P.J. Federico, then an Examiner-in-Chief at the U.S. Patent
Office and one of the drafters of § 103, commented as follows on § 103:
While it is not believed that Congress intended any radical change in
the level of invention or patentable novelty, nevertheless, it is believed
that some modification was intended in the direction of moderating the
extreme degrees of strictness exhibited by a number of judicial opinions
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Court followed his lead in Graham v. John Deere Co. 60 8
In his famous 1964 Kettering Award speech, Giles Rich
enunciated, for the first time, a systematic, four step methodology
or criteria for determining obviousness or not under 35 U.S.C. §
103.0 ' One could argue that same methodology was intuitively
applied by Learned Hand in his patent decisions before and after
enactment of § 103. However, Learned Hand did not spell out
these criteria as a systematic aid in deciding later cases. Thus,
Giles Rich's contribution was critical to the development of the
obviousness standard. Although the Supreme Court did not
specifically refer to Rich's 1964 speech when it later, in 1966,
adopted that same four step process in Graham v. John Deere Co.
the paternity of this four step methodology cannot be seriously
challenged.
Adoption of the four step methodology and mandatory
consideration of secondary considerations by the Federal Circuit
also prevents a patented invention from being considered in
isolation or compared to the prior art using hindsight. The
determination of obviousness requires the claimed invention as a
whole be considered in light of the evidence of ordinary skill in the
art and secondary considerations. Hence, there should be no room
for any a prioritests or rote formulas for determining obviousness,
such as it would be obvious to substitute one known material for
another; or it would be obvious to make automatic what was done
manually.
Now, the courts must follow the four steps as
mandated by the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, and not
simply focus on the difference over the prior art in isolation from
the rest of the claims, the level of ordinary skill in the art and the
secondary considerations.
The significance of having the claim(s) of the patent recite the
difference(s) over the prior art is well illustrated in Graham v.
John Deere Co.6"" As noted above, the patent in this case described
a plow shank provided with a spring clamp which permitted the
shank to automatically lift up over an obstruction and then spring
back to its normal position, thereby avoiding damage to the plow
share."' The patent owner's argument to the Supreme Court
based validity on having the flexing feature run the entire length
of the plow shank.6 2 But the lower court specificallyfound that

over the past dozen or more years; that is, that some change of attitude
more favorable to patents was hoped for.
35 U.S.C.A. 1, 22-23 (1954).
608. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
609. Rich, The Vague Concept of Invention, supra note 29, at 872 n.36.
610. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
611. Id. at 4.
612. Id. at 23.
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"flexing is not a claim of the patent in suit."6 1 3 The Supreme Court

likewise rejected the patent owner's flex theory argument because
that feature was not recited in any claims. The Court held that
the structure actually claimed presented no non-obvious
differences over the prior art."4 Had a patent claim recited that
feature, the result may very well have been different.
XI. CONCLUSION

As we near the end of the 20th Century, we see that our
country's patent system is not only alive and well, but flourishing.
That condition is due in no small part to the 1952 enactment of the
§ 103 standard, and the vision and unremitting efforts of Learned
Hand and Giles Rich in developing and propagating that standard.
As a result, companies and individuals today have greater
incentive to spend time and money on research to create new
inventions and patent them, thereby enriching the useful arts.
They know that their limited periods of exclusivity can be upheld
in court.
Surely, we are currently experiencing in a very meaningful
way, the wisdom and truth of Abraham Lincoln's timeless
observation about our patent system: "The
Patent System Added
61 5
the Fuel of Interest to the Fire of Genius.

613. Id. at 25.
614. Id. at 25-26.
615. The quote from Abraham Lincoln may be found engraved over the
northwest entrance to the U.S. Department of Commerce at 15th and "E"
Streets, N.W., Washington, D.C., which housed the Patent Office for many
years. Consistent with Lincoln's observation, Newsweek dedicated an entire,
special issue to inventions and discoveries in the 20th Century and their
impact on industry, science and our daily lives. The issue is entitled: 2000, A
New Millennium, The Power of Invention. NEWSWEEK, Winter 1997-98. The
issue concludes with the profound observations that this country nourishes "a
climate that consistently encourages the new, the practical and the useful";
and that "[i]nnovation is a spirit; it subsists on trial and error. It would be
odd-indeed a contradiction-if anyone found a once-and-for-all way to do it."
Id. at 79.
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APPENDIX A
EXCERPTS ON NON-OBVIOUSNESS FROM THE PRE-TRIAL PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT OF HAWORTH, INC., IN HA WORTH, INC., V.
STEELCASE, INC.,685 F. SUPP. 1422 (W.D. MI. 1988); REVERSED IN
PART, 10 U.S.P.Q. 1251 (FED. cR. 1989)

XIIX.VALIDITY OF THE ASSERTED CLAIMS OF THE HAWORTH
PATENTS IN SUIT

A.

The Haworth Patent Claims in Suit

109. Claims 5 and 29 of the Haworth '008 patent and claims
18 and 26 of the Haworth '733 reissue patent are asserted by
Haworth to be infringed by Steelcase's manufacture and sale of
the accused panels.
110. Claims 5 and 29 of the '008 patent are supported by the
disclosure in the original Haworth '294 patent so as to be entitled
to the filing date thereof, namely, September 22, 1975, for
purposes of determining prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)
[Finding of Fact No. 42, above].
111. Prior art of the type specified in 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) for
the inventions defined by the four patent claims asserted herein
would therefore have to have an effective date prior to September
22, 1974 [i.e., one year before the application filing date]. Prior art
of the type specified in 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) would have to have an
effective date prior to May 29, 1975 [the date of conception of the
claimed inventions] [Finding of Fact No. 40, above].
B.

The Scope and Content of the PriorArt

112. The prior art identified by Steelcase as the most
pertinent for the Haworth inventions is the Modulo 3 panel as
disclosed in the United States Siegal Patent No. 3,841,042 and in
certain publications and physical exhibits. Other prior art relied
upon by Steelcase is as follows: United States Patents Nos.
625,828 (Case) [DX 1204]; 2,038,075 (Edwards) [DX 1205];
2,162,864 (Rugg) [PX 370]; 3,362,005 (Corns) [JX 303]; 3,590,135
(Herbenar) [DX 1207]; 3,715,627 (D'Ausilio) [DX 1208]; 3,802,146
(Tacke) [DX 12091; and the publication Steelcase Movable Wall
System, 1972 [JX 1008].
113. (a) The Siegal patent No. 3,841,042 discloses the
prewired Modulo 3 panels. A single splined post is provided for
mechanically interconnecting each two adjacent panels. While
some very limited angular movement of the panels may be
possible after they are connected to the spline, for example, due to
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manufacturing tolerances or the like, the splined connection was
deliberately designed to securely lock the panels from being
pivoted in any meaningful sense [JX 299, abstract, column 1, lines
42-43, 48; column 3, lines 51-53, 56-58]. Hence, the panels could
not be angularly adjusted after being locked together by the
splined post.
(b) When rearranging panels into different work station
configurations, it is necessary to detach the Modulo 3 panels from
the splined post by elevating them manually and then, while
supporting their weight, moving them to one of only a limited
number of specific possible angles to establish a new angular
orientation. They are then reconnected to the splined post and
dropped down into a locked position.
(c) A prewired raceway or channel is provided at the bottom
of the Modulo 3 panels with a pair of receptacle outlets disposed
externally on each side of the channel. A standard three-pronged
plug is arranged interiorly near one end of the channel and a
standard three-holed socket is arranged interiorly at the other end
of the channel. The Siegal patent explicitly states that an
"extension cord" is utilized for electrically connecting one panel to
another [JX 299, column 4, lines 46-47, 48-49, 51]. When adjacent
panels are connected in a straight line, the extension cord will be
connected to the female socket and to the male plug at the
opposed, facing ends of the channels on the interconnected panels.
If, however, the panels are connected in T or Y configuration, it is
necessary that the extension cord plug into an external female
socket (i.e., a standard receptacle) on the outside of the channel of
one panel, as well as be connected to the interior male plug at the
end of the channel in the adjacent panel.
(d) Power is brought into the Modulo 3 panels from the
building by means of conventional plug and wiring connected to
the first panel. The plug is plugged into a conventional outlet in
the wall, or to the outlet in a floor monument or ceiling junction
box, in the manner of plugging in an appliance, so as to avoid the
necessity of using a licensed electrician [Siegal Tr. 72, 73]. Since
the prewired channels include exposed male prongs at one end, it
is possible, when reconfiguring the Modulo 3 panels, for someone
to jerry-build an extension cord so that it has a male plug at both
ends and use that extension cord to bring power into the system
through the interior female socket at one end of the channel. By
so doing, there would then be the danger of having live or hot
exposed prongs at the end of one of the Modulo 3 panels or at the
end of a panel-to-panel interconnecting extension cord.
(e) The Modulo 3 panel did not and would not have received
code approval in important major cities throughout the country. It
does not disclose a wall panel positionable in an office building and
having non-handed power blocks and flexible connectors. Hence,
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the prewired Modulo 3 panel is not a versatile potential feeder
panel that can be connected to building power at either end and
have power flow through the prewired base in either direction.
()
The Modulo 3 panels could be characterized as "cord
connected appliances" and they were so regarded by U.L. as well
as by Siegal, himself. The Siegal '042 patent does not contain any
claim to the electrical wiring or other electrical components of his
design, only to the mechanical components. Siegal had tried to
secure some claims on the electrical components but they were
rejected by the Examiner [UMF n, a, Siegal Tr. 55, 147, 159].
(g) While the Modulo 3 panels received U.L. listing in June
1975, Tiffany did only some limited marketing of those panels.
That was around the mid 1970s. By early 1978, production of the
Modulo 3 panels had ceased. They were taken off the market and,
in the words of Siegal, "by 1978 - 1979 Modulo 3 was a marketing
basket case" [UMF p; Siegal Tr. 178-179, 1831.
114. The Case patent No. 625,828 relates to cable couplings
for railroad cars. It discloses a cable E having four horizontally
aligned male prongs K at each end for fitting into four horizontally
aligned mating holes in terminal boxes C and D at the opposed
ends of railroad cars to be coupled together. It does not disclose a
wall panel positionable in an office building and having power
blocks and flexible connectors. This patent is from non-analogous
art and entitled to no weight.
115. The Edwards patent No. 2,038,075 relates to transformer
and power distribution arrangements. It discloses a transformer
having recesses 26, 27 and 36, 37 of different configuration. It
does not disclose a wall panel positionable in an office building and
having power blocks and flexible connectors. This patent is from
non-analogousart and entitled to no weight.
116. The Rugg patent No. 2,162,864 relates to a prefabricated
wiring system for the permanent floor-to-ceiling walls in a
building.
It discloses the concept of having a receptacle
(containing a conventional outlet therein) removably electrically
connected to the wiring within the wall. It does not disclose a wall
panel positionable in an office building and having power blocks
and flexible connectors.
117. The Corns patent No. 3,362,005 relates to connectors for
electrically connecting together printed circuit boards. It discloses
a hinge-type electrical connector. It does not disclose a wall panel
positionable in an office building and having power blocks and
flexible connectors.
118. The Herbenar patent No. 3,590,135 relates to power
It discloses a
distribution means within a ceiling structure.
suspended ceiling having grid members 1, connectors 3 and
lighting units 9. It does not disclose a wall panel positionable in
an office building and having power blocks and flexible connectors.
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119. The D'Ausilio patent No. 3,715,627 discloses a
pre-formed electrical wiring system to be installed within a
molded structure. It does not disclose a wall panel positionable in
an office building and having power blocks and flexible connectors.
120. The Tacke patent No. 3,802,146 discloses a specific
mechanical hinge mechanism for mechanically connecting office
divider panels. It does not disclose any prewiring or electrification
of the panels. It does not disclose a wall panel positionable in an
office building and having power blocks and flexible connectors.
121. The 1972 Steelcase Movable Wall System brochure
discloses an example of the hard wiring of panels that was
conventional before the Haworth inventions [Findings of Fact Nos.
22-23, above]. It does not disclose a wall panel positionable in an
office building and having power blocks and flexible connectors.
122. Each of the prior art references relied on by Steelcase
was either considered by the Examiner or is of no greater
relevance than prior art references considered by the Examiner.
Hence, they are no better than the references that were considered
by the Examiner. All of the important and material prior art,
therefore, was before the Examiner, was considered by the
Examiner, and was rejected by the Examiner in his allowance of
the claims of the patents in suit.
C. Differences Between the PriorArt and Haworth Claims at Issue
123. Claim 5 of the Haworth '008 patent in suit includes the
following limitations which constitute differences over the prior
art:
(d) each said power block having identical first and second
connection means integrally associated therewith;...
(g) said two connection means as associated with each said
power block being spaced inwardly from the sides of its
respective panel;...
(i) said electrical connector means including a pair of
substantially identical third connection means;...
(k) said third connection means defining one half of said
separable electrical connection and being alternatively
releasably engageable with either one of said first and second
connection means;
(1) said connector means, when joined to said opposed pair
of power blocks, being disposed substantially between, or
flush with parallel vertical planes as
defined by the opposed
616
sides of said first and second panels;
124. Limitation (i) is directed to the feature that the flexible

616. The letters used for these subparagraphs do not appear in the patent
itself. They are utilized, for convenience of reference, in the claim comparison
chart, PX 350.
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electrical connector has substantially identical connection means
at each end so as to be electrically connectable to the power block
regardless of panel or electrical base orientations. Thus, this
limitation relates to a "non-handed" system that distinguishes
over a "handed" power system using extension cords. Additionally,
these limitations recite the provision of each power block having
identical first and second connection means [limitation (d)], each
of which is releasably engageable with the connection means on
the flexible electrical connector [limitation (k)]. Further, these
limitations recite that the two connection means on each power
block are "spaced inwardly from the sides of its respective panel"
[limitation (g)], and that when the flexible electrical connector is
joined to the power blocks, it is disposed substantially between, or
flush with the parallel vertical planes defined by the front and
back sides of the panel [limitation (1)]. (The manner in which
these limitations are readable on the Haworth patent disclosure is
clear from the claim comparison chart of PX 350.)
125. These differences of claim 5 over the prior art are
neither shown nor suggested in the Siegal '042 patent or in any of
the applicable prior art references for the Modulo 3 panels. In the
Modulo 3 panels, an extension cord is utilized as the electrical
connection means for electrically connecting one panel to the other
so that it is a "handed" system wherein the raceway is designed to
be connected to building power only at one end, and power only
flows through the raceway in one direction. Limitation (i) is not
met by the Modulo 3 panels because extension cords do not have
substantially identical connection
means at each end.
Furthermore, each end of the Modulo 3 raceway does not have
"identical first and second connection means integrally associated
therewith", and "spaced inwardly from the sides of the panel"
[limitations (d) and (g)]. Finally, when the extension cord of the
Modulo 3 panels is utilized for electrically connecting adjacent
panels disposed at an angle to each other (such as a Y or T
connection), the extension cord is not substantially between or
flush with the opposed sides of the panel. Rather, a significant
portion thereof extends outside of the confines of the panel as
shown, for example, by extension cords 79, 82 in Figure 8 of the
Siegal patent [JX 299]. Limitation (k) cannot be met because
limitations (d), (g) and (i) are not met by the Modulo 3 panels.
126. These differences in claim 5 over the prior art, taken
together, are likewise neither shown nor suggested in any of the
other references relied on by Steelcase. They are significant
limitations because they relate to the versatile "non-handedness"
of the Haworth inventions; they neither require nor permit the use
of extension cords; and they advantageously do not allow for any
part of the flexible connector or power blocks to extend beyond the
parallel planes defined by the front and back sides of the panels,
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even when three panels are electrically joined in a Y or T
configuration.
127. Claim 29 of the '008 patent includes limitations similar
to those just discussed for claim 5 and which are neither shown
nor suggested by the prior art references. See limitations (e), (i),
(j) and (k) of that claim as it appears in the claim comparison chart
of PX 351.
128. Claim 18 of the '733 patent includes the following
limitations which are differences over the prior art:
(h) said electrical connector means including first electrical
plug means adapted for reception within the socket means
associated with said one power block means and second
electrical plug means adapted for reception within the socket
means associated with said further power block means;...
(j) and wherein said flexible electrical connector means
includes hinge means for permitting relative angular
displacement of said partitions after said connector means
has been joined to said partitions, said hinge means being
disposed between said first and second plug means;...
(1) having cooperating hinge parts formed thereon and
defining said hinge means, said hinge parts defining a
substantially
vertically
[sic] hinge
axis
which
is
approximately aligned with the hinge axis defined by the
securing means, and said first and second plug means being
associated with said first and second housing elements
respectively. [PX 3481
129. These limitations in claim 18 are directed to: the flexible
electrical connector including plug means at each end [limitation
(h)]; the provision of hinge means in the flexible electrical
connector that permits angular displacement of the partitions or
panels that are mechanically secured together [limitation 0)]; and
the provision of cooperating hinge parts on the flexible electrical
connector for defining a substantially vertical hinge axis that is
approximately aligned with the hinge axis defined by the securing
means that mechanically connects the panels together [limitation
(1)]. (The manner in which these features are disclosed in the
Haworth patent is illustrated in the claim chart of PX 349.)
130. These differences in claim 18 over the prior art are
neither shown nor suggested in any of the prior art relied upon by
Steelcase, including the Siegal '042 patent and the other
applicable prior art for the Modulo 3 panels. In the Modulo 3
panels, the extension cords for connecting one panel to another do
not include plug means at each end [limitation (h)]; nor do they
contain hinge parts defining a hinge means for permitting relative
angular displacement of the panels and approximately aligned
with a hinge axis defined by the securing means for connecting one
panel to another [limitations 0) and (1)].
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131. These limitations in claim 18 are significant because
they enable the panels to be adjusted angularly without
disconnecting the flexible electrical connector, when rearranging
the panels into different work station configurations.
132. Claim 26 of the '733 patent includes the following
limitations which are differences over the prior art:
(c) said power block means comprising a boxlike housing
constructed of an electrically insulative material...
(g) third opening means formed in said housing and
cooperating with the electrically conductive elements for
defining second electrical socket means, said second socket
means defining a second plug receptacle having a geometrical
configuration which is different from the geometrical
configuration of said first plug receptacle so that the plug
which mates with said first plug receptacle will not mate with
said second plug receptacle and vice versa; and
(h) said housing as associated with at least one of said
power block means having fourth opening means formed
therein for permitting an electrical supply conduit to project
into said housing for connection to said electrically conductive
elements. [PX 349]
133. These differences in claim 26 over the prior art are
directed to: the feature of having the power block means include a
box-like housing made of an electrically insulative material
[limitation (c)]; the provision of separate opening means formed in
that box-like housing defining plug receptacles having different
geometrical configurations so that the plug that mates with one of
those receptacles will not mate with the other and vice versa
[limitation (g)]; and the provision of a fourth opening means in the
box-like housing for connection to an electrical supply conduit to
bring power into the system [limitation (h)]. (The manner in
which these limitations are present in the Haworth patent
disclosure are illustrated in the claim comparison chart of PX 349.)
134. These differences in claim 26 over the prior art are
neither shown nor suggested by the prior art relied upon by
Steelcase, including the Siegal '042 patent and the other
applicable prior art for the Modulo 3 panels. In the Modulo 3
panels, there is no power block comprising a box-like housing
having four separate openings therein, with two of the openings
being designed so that the plug that mates with one of them will
not mate with the other, and vice versa.617 In the channels for the
617. These openings in the novel Haworth power block enable it to provide the
multiple functions that contributed to the success of the Haworth inventions, as
noted above in Finding 39(b)-(e). The Modulo 3 panels do not contain any power
block at all, let alone a power block having all of those functions and capabilities,
as was recognized by Vanden Hock [Vanden Hock Tr. 166, 210-2111-yet those
are the very capabilities that Steelcase deliberately incorporated into the power
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Modulo 3 panels, all of the openings or sockets provide plug
receptacles having the same geometrical configuration so that they
may all receive the same type of plug from extension cords or
electrical equipment.
135. These limitations of claim 26 are significant because,
among other things, they make the panel versatile so that every
panel is potentially a feeder panel that can be connected to
building power at either end, and they preclude the use of
conventional extension cords for panel-to-panel electrical
connection.
D. Level of OrdinarySkill in The PertinentArt
136. The pertinent art to which the asserted claims of the
Haworth patents in suit are directed is that of electrification for
divider wall panels in the office furniture field.,
137. The level of skill in that art in the relevant time frame is
exemplified by the following prior art: United States Patent No.
3,759,297 of Westinghouse [JX 284; PX 323, Tab 44]; the use of
extension cords or like devices in open troughs or channels to be
attached to the panels as practiced, for example, by Herman
Miller; the hard wired Steelcase Movable Walls [PX 323, tab 63];
and the Siegal patent and the other applicable prior art for the
Modulo 3 panels [JX 299; PX 368)].
138. In considering the level of skill in the pertinent art,
reference may also be made to the subjective reactions of those
persons familiar with that art and who practiced that art up to
and around the time of the Haworth inventions. Such persons
would include the engineers at Steelcase, Westinghouse and
Herman Miller and the rest of those in the office furniture
industry who worked without success on a solution to the wiring
problem for office divider panels during the time frame of 19681976.
E. Novelty and Unobviousness of the Subject Matter of the
Asserted Claims
139. None of the prior art references and publications,
including the Siegal patent and the other applicable prior art on
the Modulo 3 panels, taken alone or together, discloses or
anticipates the subject matter of the asserted claims of the
Haworth patents in suit since each of those references fails to
show or suggest the claim limitations referred to in Findings Nos.
123-135, above.
140. Steelcase's concedes that the Siegal patent and the
Modulo 3 panels, alone, do not disclose or anticipate the subject
matter of the asserted claims. Steelcase argues that it would have
blocks of the Steelcase accused panels!
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been obvious to modify the Modulo 3 panels so that both ends of
the extension cords would be disposes substantially between or
flush with the panel sides in view of the Steelcase Movable Walls
publication and the Tacke, D'Ausilio and Rugg references. There
is no suggestion, however, in any of the references relied upon by
Steelcase for making such a modification to the Modulo 3 panels.
That suggestion only comes from a hindsight consideration of this
prior art after seeing the Haworth inventions. Furthermore, there
would be no room within the Modulo 3 panel raceway to dispose
the receptacle outlets sufficiently inwardly from the panel sides
without completely destroying or reconstructing the Modulo 3
raceway.
141. (a) Steelcase also argues that it would have been obvious
to employ the connector shown in the Case patent No. 625,828 for
the extension cord in the Modulo 3 panels to meet the limitation in
the claims that the flexible connector has plugs on each end for
reception within sockets on adjacent panels. Such a modification
of the Modulo 3 system would be completely untenable. First of
all, it would result in live, exposed hot prongs when one end of the
Case connector was inserted into the socket of a panel connected to
building power. Furthermore, the sockets in the Modulo 3 panels
would then have to be redesigned to receive the four horizontally
aligned prongs of the Case connector.
(b) Such a redesign could only be made without taking into
account the whole disclosure of the Siegal patent and the Modulo 3
panels, for it would then negate the Siegal objective of being able
to use that same connector in the standard outlets on the sides of
the raceway used to receive the conventional three pronged plugs
of electrical office equipment. Further, it would negate the Siegal
objective of using conventional extension cords to arrange and
power Modulo 3 panels in a T, Y or X configuration, as shown in
Figure 8 of the Siegal patent. But even leaving all these points
aside, Steelcase has failed to demonstrate that anyone working in
this art would consider looking for enlightenment in the nonanalogous art of cable coupling for railroad cars, the art to which
the Case patent is directed.
142. Steelcase also argues modifying the Modulo 3 panel
sockets so that they have different configurations, relying now on
the Edwards and/or Herbenar patents. Here again, Steelcase's
suggested modification of the Modulo 3 panels ignores that there
is no suggestion anywhere in the art of office divider panels for
making the internal sockets and the external receptacle outlets of
the Modulo 3 raceways of different configuration, except for the
Haworth inventions. The Edwards and Herbenar patents are
from completely nonanalogous arts. Furthermore, to make the
internal sockets and external receptacle outlets of the Modulo 3
raceways of different configuration would negate the Siegal
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objectives, as noted in the preceding finding. Hence, there would
be no logic whatsoever to modifying the Modulo 3 panel
construction in this manner.
143.. The asserted claims of the Haworth '008 and '733
patents satisfy all conditions of patentability and are, therefore,
valid. Steelcase has failed to prove facts which demonstrate to
this Court that the asserted claims are invalid.
[SECONDARY CONSIDERATIONS]

144. The Haworth inventions recited in the asserted claims
represent a significant advance in the office furniture industry,
inter alia,for the following reasons:
They satisfactorily solve the problem of providing an
(a)
office divider panel with a non-handed and versatile prewired
power system that would meet Code approval in major cities
through the country yet would be flexible enough to be
conveniently reconfigured into different work stations
arrangements;
(b) In spite of the fact that there was a long felt need for
such a solution in the time frame of 1970-1976, the best
engineers in the industry, including those at the industry
leader, Steelcase, who were working on the problem all failed
to solve it during that time frame;
(c)
The other major systems office furniture manufacturers
in this country, including Steelcase, have now adopted the
Haworth inventions covered by the asserted claims;
(d) The Haworth ERA 1 panel with prewired power system,
as covered by the asserted claims of the patents in suit, was
utilized as a benchmark for Steelcase's design and
development work of the accused panels; and
Steelcase's praise to the industry of the prewired power
(e)
system of the accused panels, which embody the Haworth
inventions of the asserted claims of the patents in suit, was
further recognition that the Haworth inventions were of such
novelty and importance as to mark a distinct and significant
step forward in the progress of the art.
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APPENDIX B
EXCERPTS ON NON-OBVIOUSNESS FROM THE PRE-TRIAL PROPOSED
FINDINGS OF FACT OF HAWORTH, INC., IN HA WORTH, INC., V.

STEELCASE, INC.,685 F. SUPP.

1422 (W.D. MI. 1988); REVERSED IN

PART, 10 U.S.P.Q. 1251 (FED. CIR. 1989)

I.

VALIDITY

(a) Novelty and Nonobviousness
B. The starting point in any consideration of patent validity is
35 U.S.C. § 282: "A patent shall be presumed valid ....
The
burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof
shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity."
C. "[Tihe burden of persuasion is and remains always on the
party asserting invalidity." Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States,
717 F.2d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1983).8
D. The claims of the patent are the measure of the invention and
"each claim must be considered as defining a separate invention."
35 U.S.C. § 282; Jones v.Hardy,727 F.2d 1524, 1528 (Fed. Cir.
1984). Hence, the burden of establishing invalidity of the claims
in suit rests upon Steelcase. It is a heavy burden that may be met
only by clear and convincing evidence. Alco Standard Corp. v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 808 F.2d 1490, 1498 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
E. A trial court is required under 35 U.S.C. § 282, "to say only
whether the patent challenger carried its burden of establishing
invalidity ......
Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d
1561, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 95 L. Ed.2d 843, 107 S.
Ct. 2187 (1987).
(a) "When the burden has not been carried a court need only
so state." Id. at 1570.
F. The Federal Circuit has recognized "that when the prior art
before the court is the same as that before the PTO, the burden on
the party asserting invalidity is more difficult to meet." Bausch &
Lomb, Inc., v. Barnes - Hind/HydrocurveInc., 796 F.2d 443, 447
(Fed. Cir. 1986). See also, Hughes Aircraft Co., 717 F.2d at 1359.
G. The Modulo 3 panels principally relied upon by Steelcase
were fully and duly considered by the PTO with respect to both

618. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Fed. Cir.) was
established in October 1982 as the single and only appellate, reviewing court for
appeals from patent infringement litigation in all of the federal district courts in
this country. 28 U.S.C. § 1295. Hence, any appeal from a final decision of the
district court In the subject litigation will be heard by that court so that the
decisions of that court are controlling for the substantive issues in this civil
action.
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patents in suit. The additional Modulo 3 literature and
information in the files of Haworth and not disclosed to the PTO
was merely cumulative, at best, and added nothing material to the
information before the Examiner on the Modulo 3 panels.' 9
Furthermore, the other prior art references relied upon by
Steelcase fall into two categories. They were either (a) considered
by the PTO or (b) are of no greater relevance and no better than
the references cited and considered by the PTO [Findings of Fact
Nos. 112-122, above].
H. When the prior art relied on by the attacker adds nothing
material to that which was considered by the PTO Examiner, the
attacker has the "added burden of overcoming the deference that
is due to a qualified governmental agency presumed to have
properly done its job". That agency, the Patent Office, "includes
one or more examiners who are presumed to have some expertise
in interpreting the references and to be familiar from their work
with the level of skill in the art, and whose duty it is to issue only
valid patents." American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons,
Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
821 (1984) (emphasis added).
i.
Furthermore, where, as here, there was a contested,
adversarial proceeding in which the defendant fully participated
[JX 1005, p. 404], and the prior art evidence at trial was merely
cumulative of the PTO proceedings, a lower court will not err in
giving to the PTO decision the "deference" that is due to a
qualified governmental agency. Windsurfing Int7 Inc., v. AMF
Inc., 782 F.2d 995, 998-99 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 91 L.Ed.2d
565, 106 S. Ct. 3275 (1986), citing American Hoist & Derrick Co.,
725 F.2d at 1359. See also, Interconnect Planning Corp. v. Feil,
774 F.2d 1132, 1139 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (Burden made heavier by a
reissue proceeding which concentrated on those references and
reasons that occasioned its filing.)
J. "Anticipation [under 35 U.S.C. § 102] requires the presence in
a single prior art reference disclosure of each and every element of
the claimed invention, arranged as in the claim." Lindemann
Maschinenfabrik GmBH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 730
F.2d 1452, 1458 (Fed. Cir. 1984). Neither the Modulo 3 panels or
any other prior art relied upon by Steelcase anticipates the
asserted claims of the Haworth patents in suit [Findings of Fact
Nos. 123 - 135, above].
[SCOPE AND CONTENT OF PRIOR ART, DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE

PRIOR ART AND THE CLAIMS AT ISSUE, AND THE LEVEL OF SKILL IN

619. Much of the literature on Modulo 3 panels that was not submitted by
Haworth to the PTO was not available as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) or (b)
[Finding of Fact No. 1621.
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THE ART]

K. With respect to the question of nonobviousness under 35
U.S.C. § 103, the scope and content of the prior art and the
differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be
determined. The level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art must
also be resolved. Against this background the question of
obviousness or nonobviousness of the claimed subject matter is
decided. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17, 86 S. Ct. 684,
15 L. Ed.2d 556 (1966). See also, PanduitCorp., 810 F.2d at 1564.
The "usual way" of determining the level of ordinary skill in a
particular art "is by referring to the subjective reaction of a person
thoroughly familiar with the particular art and, if possible, one
who practiced the art at the crucial time in question." Kalman v.
Kimberly-Clark Corp., 713 F.2d 760, 772-773 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 1026 (1984) (quoting Maisbary Mfg. Co. v. Aid,
Inc., 447 F.2d 809, 811 (7th Cir. 1971). Therefore, reference may
be made to actions of the skilled engineers at Steelcase, Herman
Miller and Westinghouse and the rest of the industry during the
relevant time period, including the wire manager approach of the
Westinghouse patent No. 3,759,297, the Herman Miller approach
of using troughs or channels at the bottom of the panels and
containing extension cords, the unsuccessful efforts of the
Steelcase engineers working with and under Mohr, and the
Siegal-Modulo 3 panel approach of using extension cords [Findings
of Facts Nos. 136-138].
L. Six factors relevant to a determination of the level of ordinary
skill in the art are: (a) the educational level of the inventors; (b)
the type of problems encountered in the art; (c) prior art
"solutions" to those problems; (d) rapidity with which innovations
are made; (e) sophistication of the technology; and (0 educational
level of active workers in the field. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 796 F.2d
at 449-50; EnvironmentalDesigns, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d
693, 696-97 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984).
[SECONDARY CONSIDERATIONS]

M. Secondary considerations of nonobviousness are also
applicable to give light to the circumstances surrounding the
origin of the patented subject matter and they have relevance to
the determination of obviousness or nonobviousness of such
subject matter. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18, Simmons Fastener
Corp. v. Illinois Tool Works, 739 F.2d 1573, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065 (1985). Such secondary tests, also
called "objective evidence", include:
1. Did the patented Haworth inventions fulfill a long-felt
need in the industry to which they apply? Rosemount, Inc., v.
Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d. 1540, 1546 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468, 1474-75 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (Finding of
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longstanding problem supported by the fact that the "industry
leader" was also funding and promoting development of a similar
product.) [See Findings of Fact Nos. 21 - 36, above]
2. Did others fail to solve the problem of designing flexible
office divider panels with a prewired power system that would be
flexible and versatile and, further, that would consistently meet
the requirements of local code authorities throughout the country?
Alco Standard Corp., 808 F.2d at 1500 (Weight given to the fact
that "Westinghouse, a large corporation working on this matter
had tried but failed."); Rosemount, Inc., 727 F.2d at 1545 (The
industry leader was doing all it could to preserve its lead in the
marketplace, yet it failed in that effort.) [Findings of Fact Nos. 2136].
3.
Did the patented Haworth inventions meet with
commercial success upon their introduction to the market? In that
regard, did they supplement other products then in use and also
receive widespread recognition in the industry? Panduit Corp.,
810 F.2d at 1572; Rosemount, Inc., 727 F.2d at 1544. A nexus
between the Haworth patented inventions and their commercial
success is clearly established and the evidence of secondary
considerations is entitled to great weight. Simmons Fastener
Corp., 739 F.2d at 1575-76. [See Findings of Fact 91-96, 153-154,
above]
4. Did Steelcase copy the patented Haworth inventions in
preference to the prior art Modulo 3 panels? Panduit Corp., 810
F.2d at 1571 and 1574; Rosemount, Inc., 727 F.2d at 1546; Akzo
N.. v. United States Int. Trade Comm'n, 808 F.2d 1471, 1480
(Fed. Cir. 1986) cert. denied, 96 L.Ed.2d 382, 107 S. Ct. 2490
(1987). [See Finding of Fact Nos. 73-90, above]
5. Has Steelcase praised the patented Haworth inventions?
Rosemount, Inc., 727 F.2d at 1546. [See Findings of Fact 95,
above]
N. The answer to all of these inquiries is "yes."
0. The Federal Circuit has held that these secondary
consideration inquiries are an "essential and integral part" of the
determination of nonobviousness. Alco Standard Corp., 808 F.2d
at 1498. The Federal Circuit has also held:
the judicial process requires that a court withhold a conclusion of
obviousness until it has fully assessed the impact of any objective
evidence [secondary considerations] of nonobviousness. Only then
can a court base its judgment, as it must on all probative evidence of
record. PanduitCorp., 810 F.2d at 1570-71.
P. Hence, the secondary considerations are to be considered as
part of all the evidence, not just when the decision maker remains
in doubt about nonobviousness after reviewing the art. Indeed,
evidence of secondary considerations may often be the most
probative and cogent evidence of nonobviousness in the record. In
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re Piasecki,745 F.2d at 1475.
Q. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals has observed that:
[tihose charged with determining compliance with 35 U.S.C. § 103
are required to place themselves in the minds of those of ordinary
skill in the relevant art at the time the invention was made, to
determine whether that which is now plainly at hand would have
been obvious at such earlier time.
The invention must be viewed not with the blueprintdrawn by the
inventor, but in the state of the art that existed at the time.
Interconnect PlanningCorp., 774 F.2d at 1138 (emphasis added).
R. In determining the scope and content of the prior art,
references "must be read as a whole and consideration must be
given where the references diverge and teach away from the
claimed invention."
Akzo NV. v. United States Int'l. Trade
Comm'n, 808 F.2d at 1481 (emphasis added). For instance, use of
extension cords and conventional or standard-type plug
receptacles was an essential part of the Modulo 3 panel envisioned
by its inventor Burton Siegal [Findings of Fact Nos. 113, 141-142,
above].
S. When considering whether to combine references "there must
be some reason for the combination other than the hindsight
gleaned from the invention itself." Interconnect Planning Corp.,
774 F.2d at 1143, citing ACS Hosp. Sys., Inc., v. Montefiore Hosp.,
732 F.2d 1572, 1577 n.14 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
There must be
"something in the prior art as a whole to suggest the desirability,
and thus the obviousness of making the combination." Id. at 1143
(emphasis added) (quoting Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmBH,
730 F.2d at 1462). This prevents a challenger from using the
"mosaic" approach where the claims are used as a frame, and
individual noted parts of separate prior art references are
employed to recreate a facsimile of the claimed invention.
Interconnect PlanningCorp., 774 F.2d at 1143, citing WL. Gore &
Assoc., Inc., v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1983),
cert. denied,469 U.S. 851 (1984); Panduit Corp., 810 F.2d at 1574.
Thus, as in Akzo NV., 808 F.2d at 1481, where the challenger
could not show how the prior art patents could be brought together
to render the invention obvious without reconstructing the
teachings of those patents assisted by hindsight, there is no
teaching or suggestion here from the Modulo 3 panel inventor,
Burton Siegal, or from any other prior art reference which would
have led one of ordinary skill in the art at that time to modify the
Modulo 3 panel as is now suggested by Steelcase [Findings of Fact
Nos. 139-142].
T. Further, proposing a combination of references requiring a
reconstruction of the primary reference in a manner that "would
completely alter the construction and mode of operation of the
primary reference" so that it would not function in its intended
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manner supports the view that the "obviousness of the proposed
changes is not derived from the cited prior art, but only from the
appellant's [inventor's] disclosure." Exparte Weber, 154 U.S.P.Q.
491, 492 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1967) (emphasis added). See also,
Diamond Int7 Corp. v. Walterhoefer, 289 F. Supp. 550, 559 (D. Md.
1968) (The court notes there was no authority for the proposition
that, and has great difficulty in understanding how, a device
which requires a modification making it unworkable suggests such
a modification). Such modification of the channel of the Modulo 3
panels as suggested by Steelcase, would require a complete
reconstruction of those channels and an elimination of extension
cords for electrically connecting one panel to another. Yet, the use
of such extension cords was an essential part of the prewired
panels envisioned by Siegal, the inventor of the Modulo 3 panels.
In any event, the modifications of the channels of the Modulo 3
panels proposed by Steelcase would destroy the purpose of the
structure and operation of that device as expressly envisioned by
the inventor [Findings of Fact Nos. 141-142, above].
[NEED TO CONSIDER THE CLAIMED INVENTION, AS A WHOLE, NOT
JUST THE CLAIMED DIFFERENCE]

U. In comparing the differences between the prior art and the
claims at issue:
it is improper... to consider the difference as the invention. The
'difference' may have seemed slight (as has often been the case with
some of history's great inventions, e.g., the telephone), but it may
have been the key to success and advancement in the art resulting
from the invention... Hence the statute, the law established not by
judges but by Congress requires that the invention as claimed be
considered 'as a whole' when considering whether that invention
would have been obvious when it was made. 35 U.S.C. § 103. Jones
v. Hardy, 727 F.2d at 1528 (emphasis added).
V. Measured by the foregoing tests, the subject matter of the
asserted Haworth claims from the '008 patent and the '733 reissue
patent was not obvious at the time the inventions were made to
those skilled in the art, particularly as to the Steelcase engineers
who found it necessary to base the development of the accused
Steelcase panels on the Haworth inventions [Findings of Fact 7390, above].
W. Steelcase has failed to meet its burden of proving invalidity of
any one of the asserted claims by clear and convincing evidence.
Therefore, claims 5 and 29 of the '008 patent and claims 18 and 26
of the '733 patent are valid.
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APPENDIX C
The following instructions were taken from
the AIPLA's "GUIDE
62 °
To JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN PATENT CASES:

OBVIOUSNESS UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103

In order to be patentable, an invention must not be obvious to
a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was
made. The issue is not whether the claimed invention would be
obvious to you as a layman, to me as a judge, or to a genius in the
art, but whether it would have been obvious to one of ordinary
skill in the art at the time it was made.
GRAHAM V. JOHN DEERE TEST

You can conclude that the patent granted by the Patent and
Trademark Office is invalid, even though not identically disclosed
in a single prior art device or reference, if the defendant has
established by clear and convincing evidence that the claimed
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious to a person of
ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time the patented
invention was made.
In determining whether the defendant has established
obviousness of the claimed subject matter the following steps
should be taken by you:
1. Compare the scope and content of the prior art relied upon
by defendant against the patent;
2. Identify the difference or differences between each claim of
the patent and the prior art; and
3. Determine the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art at
the time the invention of the patent in suit was made.
Against this background, you will then make your conclusion
whether the evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that the
claimed subject matter would have been obvious to a person of
ordinary skill in the pertinent art at the time the invention was
made. Before reaching a conclusion, you must also consider
evidence submitted by the plaintiff to establish commercial
success as a result of the invention, long felt but unresolved need
filled by the invention, failure of others to solve the problem solved

620. GUIDE TO JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 48, at 25-29.
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by the invention, acquiescence in the validity of the patent by
others.
SCOPE AND CONTENT OF THE PRIOR ART

In arriving at your decision of whether or not the claimed
invention is obvious, you must first determine the scope and
content of the prior art. The prior art includes the following items
received into evidence during the trial:
1. Patents that issued more than one year before the filing
date of the patent or before the date of invention;
2. Publications having a date more than one year before the
filing date of the patent or before the date of invention;
3. U.S. patents that have a filing date prior to the date of
invention of the claimed subject matter in the patent;
4. Anything in public use or on sale in the U.S. more than
one year before the filing date of the patent in suit;
5. Anything that was publicly known or used by others in
this country before the date of invention of the claimed
subject matter in the patent; and
6. Anything that was made or built in this country by
another person before the date of invention of the claimed
subject matter in the patent where the thing made or built
was not abandoned, suppressed or concealed.
DIFFERENCES OVER THE PRIOR ART

The next factor that you must consider is whether the
difference or differences alleged by the defendant to exist between
the prior art and the claimed invention has or have been
established by clear and convincing evidence. Although it is
proper for you to note any such differences between the claimed
invention and the prior art, you must not consider those
differences as the invention because the test is whether the
claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious to one of
ordinary skill over all of the prior art. Each claim must be
considered in its entirety and separately from the other claims.
LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL

Factors to be considered in determining the level of ordinary
skill in the pertinent art include all of the evidence submitted by
plaintiff and defendant to show:
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the educational level of the inventor;
the types of problems encountered in the art;
the prior art patents and publications;
the activities of others;
prior art solutions to the problem encountered by the
inventor;
the sophistication of the technology; and
the education of others working in the field.
FACTORS INDICATING NONOBVIOUSNESS

Before reaching your conclusion as to whether the defendant
has established the obviousness of the claimed invention you must
consider the following evidence which may tend to negate
defendant's evidence of obviousness: (use only those applicable)
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Commercial success of products covered by the patent in
suit due to the merits of the invention and not other
factors such as advertising;
A long-felt need in the art which was satisfied by the
invention of the patent in suit;
The failure of others to make the invention;
Copying of the invention by others in the field;
Unexpected results achieved by the invention;
Praise of the invention by the infringer or others in the
field;
The taking of licenses under the patent by others.
Expressions of disbelief by experts and those skilled in
the art; and
The patentee proceeded contrary to accepted wisdom of
prior art.

You must be satisfied there is a causal connection between
the evidence showing the existence of one or more of the listed
facts and the claimed invention. For example, if you conclude that
commercial success is due solely to advertising, promotion,
salesmanship or the like, or is due to features of the product other
than those claimed in the patent in suit, then it is not established
that commercial success has a relation to the invention itself and
should weigh against defendant's evidence on the question of
obviousness.
OBVIOUSNESS-HINDSIGHT

The question of nonobviousness is simple to ask, but difficult
to answer. A person of ordinary skill in the art is presumed to
have knowledge of the relevant prior art at the time of the
patentee's invention. If you find the available prior art shows each
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of the elements of the claims in suit, you must determine whether
it would then have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the
art to combine or coordinate these elements in the same manner
as the claims in suit. The difficulty that attaches to all honest
attempts to answer this question can be attributed to the strong
temptation to rely on hindsight while undertaking this evaluation.
It is wrong to use the patent in suit as a guide through the maze of
prior art references, combining the right references in the right
way so as to achieve the result of the claims in suit.
OBVIOUS TO TRY

The evidence might indicate to you that what the inventors
did was obvious to try. If so, this does not necessarily indicate the
patent is invalid for obviousness. "Obvious to try" is not the
standard. The standard is whether the invention as a whole
would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the field to
which the invention pertains at the time the invention was made.
STATE OF THE ART-CANNOT USE HINDSIGHT

You are instructed that when you consider the prior art,
whether in the form of writings, physical exhibits, or patents, you
must consider them for what they actually disclose to one of
ordinary skill in the art, and no more. You cannot use hindsight
to assemble the invention from parts made up of individual
elements of the prior art devices, nor can you reconstruct any of
the prior art devices or materials unless obvious to one of ordinary
skill in the art to do so.
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APPENDIX D
The following are 6selected
from 4 L. Sand, et al., Modern Federal
2
Jury Instructions: 1
NON-OBVIOUSNESS

The defendant contends that the patent is invalid because the
invention was "obvious."
I instruct you that a patent is invalid if the defendant
establishes by clear and convincing evidence that the subject
matter as a whole would have been obvious to a person of ordinary
skill in the pertinent art at the time the invention was made.
The question of whether the invention was obvious ultimately
is a question of law for me to decide. However, I will decide that
question based upon whether you find the following facts to have
been proved by clear and convincing evidence:
1. What was the scope [and content] of the prior art at the
time the [e.g., product] was invented?
2. What the differences are between each claim of the patent
and the prior art?
3. What was the level of ordinary skill in the prior art at the
time the invention was made?
4. Whether there are secondary considerations that negate
defendant's claim of obviousness?
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PRIOR ART AND INVENTION1

22

The next factual issue you must consider is what are the
differences between the prior art and the invention.
The defendant has the burden to show that the prior art
taken as a whole suggests the obviousness of making the
combination that is in the form of the patented invention. In
determining what, if any, differences there are between the prior
art and the patented invention, you should consider the prior art
as it appeared to a person of ordinary skill in the art at the time.
You cannot use hindsight to reconstruct any of the prior art
devices or materials, nor can you assemble the invention from
parts made up of individual elements of the prior art devices,
unless it would have been obvious to do so at the time to one of
ordinary skill in the art.

621. 4 Leonard B. Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions§ 86.03 (1995)
(citations and comments omitted).
622. Adapted from the charge of Judge Martin in Construction Technology,
Inc., v. Lockformer Co., 86 Civ. 0457, 88 Civ. 0742 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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LEVEL OF ORDINARY SKILL

3

I have referred in these instructions to a person of ordinary
skill in the art. What do I mean by such a person? The person of
ordinary skill is a hypothetical person who is presumed to be one
who is aware of all pertinent prior art. The skill of the actual
inventor is irrelevant, because inventors may possess something
which sets them apart form the workers of ordinary skill in the
art.

Factors to be considered in determining what is the level of
ordinary skill in the pertinent art include all of the evidence
submitted by the parties that show:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

the education level of the inventor;
the types of problems encountered in the art;
the prior art patents and publications;
the activities of others;
prior art solutions to the problems encountered by the
inventor;
6. the rapidity of innovation in the field;
7. the sophistication of the technology; and
8. the education of others working in the field.
SECONDARY FACTORS INDICATING NON-OBVIOUSNESS624

The following secondary facts that may tend to negate the
defendant's claim of obviousness include the following:
1. Commercial success of products covered by the patent due
to the merits of the invention and not from other factors
such as advertising;
2. A long felt need in the art which was satisfied by the
invention of the patent in question;
3. The failure of others to make the invention;
4. Copying of the invention by others in the field;
5. Unexpected results achieved by the invention;
6. Praise of the invention by the infringer or others in the
field;
7. The taking of licenses under the patents by others;
8.

Expressing of disbelief by experts and those skilled in the

art; and
9. The patentee proceeded contrary to accepted wisdom of
prior art.
If you find any of these facts, you must make the additional
finding of whether there is a causal connection between the listed
623. Id.
624. Id.
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facts you find and the claimed invention.
(If applicable: For example, if you conclude that commercial
success, if any, is due solely to advertising, promotion and
salesmanship and is not due to features of the product claimed in
the patent, then the evidence of commercial success should not
weigh against defendant's evidence on the question of
obviousness.)

